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Is Quant Safe?

QNTEthereum
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical5/10Governance1/10Upgrades2/10Checks passed4 of 7Findings1 Critical · 1 High · 2 Medium · 1 Low5
SummaryAI Copilot

The audit of the StandardToken contract revealed a critical flaw where the totalSupply() function does not accurately reflect the actual circulating supply due to the mint function failing to update the totalSupply_ variable.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 76.8%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced (admin/mint authority retained)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 76.8% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 44% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 44% of DEX liquidity)
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 44 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintMintable
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
21.0%Contracts7.8%71.2%Everyone else
21.0%Contracts7.8%71.2%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
28.8%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking21.0%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell7.8%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply71.2%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads16.2%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.06M across 8 pairs
Show 2 more pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$459.8KShare of depth43.6%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder76.8%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0x0271…110d0xc6f7…8bc60xceea…d3d40x8cc5…366e

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Critical1 High2 Medium1 Low
Critical

Inaccurate totalSupply Calculation

The totalSupply_ variable is initialized to a fixed value (45,467,000 QNT with 18 decimals) and never updated by the mint function. This means totalSupply() will always return the initial hardcoded value, not the actual sum of all token balances, leading to a critical misrepresentation of the token's circulating supply. This can severely impact market perception, integrations, and overall token economics.C-01

Issue

The totalSupply_ variable is initialized to a fixed value (45,467,000 QNT with 18 decimals) and never updated by the mint function. This means totalSupply() will always return the initial hardcoded value, not the actual sum of all token balances, leading to a critical misrepresentation of the token's circulating supply. This can severely impact market perception, integrations, and overall token economics.

Fix

Modify the mint function to increment totalSupply_ by _value whenever new tokens are minted. Ensure totalSupply_ accurately reflects the sum of all token balances. Alternatively, remove totalSupply_ and calculate totalSupply() by summing all balances, though this is less gas efficient.

Status

Unresolved

High

Outdated Solidity Compiler Version

The contract uses pragma solidity ^0.4.21. This version range is significantly outdated and may be susceptible to known compiler bugs and security vulnerabilities that have been patched in newer versions (e.g., 0.8.x). Deploying with an old compiler version increases the risk of undiscovered or known exploits.H-01

Issue

The contract uses pragma solidity ^0.4.21. This version range is significantly outdated and may be susceptible to known compiler bugs and security vulnerabilities that have been patched in newer versions (e.g., 0.8.x). Deploying with an old compiler version increases the risk of undiscovered or known exploits.

Fix

Upgrade the Solidity compiler version to a recent, stable release (e.g., ^0.8.0). Thoroughly test the contract after upgrading, as syntax and behavior may have changed, particularly regarding assert vs require and default overflow checks.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

ERC-20 approve Race Condition

The approve function is vulnerable to the known ERC-20 race condition. If a user calls approve to change an allowance from X to Y, and the spender front-runs this transaction by spending X tokens, the spender could then spend Y tokens, effectively spending X+Y tokens. While increaseApproval and decreaseApproval are provided to mitigate this, the approve function itself remains vulnerable.M-01

Issue

The approve function is vulnerable to the known ERC-20 race condition. If a user calls approve to change an allowance from X to Y, and the spender front-runs this transaction by spending X tokens, the spender could then spend Y tokens, effectively spending X+Y tokens. While increaseApproval and decreaseApproval are provided to mitigate this, the approve function itself remains vulnerable.

Fix

While increaseApproval and decreaseApproval are good additions, users should be educated to use these functions instead of approve when modifying an existing allowance. For approve itself, consider adding a check that _value is 0 if allowed[msg.sender][_spender] is not 0, forcing a two-step approval process (set to 0, then set to new value).

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Immutable Crowdsale Address and Centralized Minting

The crowdsale address, which has exclusive permission to call the mint function, is set in the constructor and cannot be changed. This creates a single point of control for token minting without any mechanism for transferability or multi-signature protection. If the crowdsale key is compromised or lost, it could lead to unauthorized minting or a permanent inability to mint new tokens.M-02

Issue

The crowdsale address, which has exclusive permission to call the mint function, is set in the constructor and cannot be changed. This creates a single point of control for token minting without any mechanism for transferability or multi-signature protection. If the crowdsale key is compromised or lost, it could lead to unauthorized minting or a permanent inability to mint new tokens.

Fix

Consider implementing a mechanism to transfer ownership of the crowdsale role, possibly through a time-locked or multi-signature process. Ideally, the crowdsale address itself should be a multi-signature wallet to reduce the risk of a single point of failure.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Gas Inefficiency with assert in SafeMath

The SafeMath library uses assert for overflow/underflow checks. In Solidity versions prior to 0.8.0, assert consumes all remaining gas upon failure, whereas require refunds unused gas. While functionally correct for preventing arithmetic errors, this can lead to higher gas costs for failed transactions compared to modern require-based checks.L-01

Issue

The SafeMath library uses assert for overflow/underflow checks. In Solidity versions prior to 0.8.0, assert consumes all remaining gas upon failure, whereas require refunds unused gas. While functionally correct for preventing arithmetic errors, this can lead to higher gas costs for failed transactions compared to modern require-based checks.

Fix

If upgrading to Solidity 0.8.0+, SafeMath might not be strictly necessary due to built-in overflow checks. If remaining in 0.4.x, consider replacing assert with require in SafeMath functions for better gas efficiency on reverts, though this would require careful re-evaluation of the SafeMath library's design.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The audit of the StandardToken contract revealed a critical flaw where the totalSupply() function does not accurately reflect the actual circulating supply due to the mint function failing to update the totalSupply_ variable. Additionally, the contract uses an outdated Solidity compiler version, which may expose it to known vulnerabilities. Access control for minting is centralized and immutable, and the ERC-20 approve function is susceptible to a race condition.

Technical5/10Medium risk

The contract implements the ERC-20 standard using the SafeMath library to prevent integer overflows/underflows, which is a strength (7.2 Code Security). However, a critical issue exists where the totalSupply() function does not correctly track the token supply after minting, leading to a misrepresentation of the token's circulating supply (7.1 Architecture, 7.2 Code Security, 7.4 Economic). The use of an outdated Solidity compiler version (^0.4.21) introduces potential exposure to known compiler bugs (7.2 Code Security). Furthermore, the approve function is vulnerable to a race condition (7.2 Code Security).

Governance1/10High risk

The economic model is severely impacted by the totalSupply misrepresentation, which can lead to incorrect market valuations and user confusion (7.4 Economic). Access control for the mint function is appropriately restricted to a crowdsale address (7.3 Access Control). However, this crowdsale address is immutable and represents a single point of control for token issuance, lacking any multi-signature or upgradeability features (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance). There are no explicit governance mechanisms beyond this single-address control.

Upgrades2/10High risk

The contract does not implement any upgradeability patterns, meaning its logic is immutable once deployed (7.7 Upgrades). While this eliminates risks associated with faulty upgrade mechanisms, it also prevents any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or adjustments to the crowdsale address without a complete redeployment and migration. This lack of flexibility is a significant operational constraint (7.8 Operations).

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is imperative to address the critical totalSupply calculation error by ensuring the mint function correctly updates the totalSupply_ variable.

The contract should be recompiled with a modern, stable Solidity compiler version (e.g., 0.8.x) to benefit from recent security patches and gas optimizations. Consider implementing a multi-signature wallet for the crowdsale address to enhance security and decentralization of minting control.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeStandardToken
NetworkEthereum
Token age5y
Contract0x4a22…4675
Deployer0xf5e3…c4bc
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Audit History
  1. Sep 1, 202655Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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