The FourERC20 contract is a standard ERC-20 token implementation, largely based on battle-tested OpenZeppelin Contracts. It provides core token functionalities without custom logic for minting, burning, or advanced features. The code adheres to common security practices for ERC-20 tokens, with identified risks primarily related to proper initialization and understanding of its base functionality rather than critical vulnerabilities.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is Post-Quantum Coin Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The FourERC20 contract is a standard ERC-20 token implementation, largely based on battle-tested OpenZeppelin Contracts.
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- Liquidity < $10k
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (91.2% total → 42.7% effective; 10.4% in EOAs, 80.8% in contracts — moderate)
- Liquidity < $10k ($9,415 across 1 pairs — easily drained)
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking80.8%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell10.4%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply8.8%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
Security Findings
LowPotential for Uninitialized Token Metadata
The FourERC20 contract includes an internal _init function intended to set the token's _name and _symbol. However, this function is not called within the FourERC20 contract itself. If a derived contract fails to call _init in its constructor, the name() and symbol() functions will return empty strings, leading to a poor user experience and potential integration issues with platforms expecting valid metadata.L-01
Issue
The FourERC20 contract includes an internal _init function intended to set the token's _name and _symbol. However, this function is not called within the FourERC20 contract itself. If a derived contract fails to call _init in its constructor, the name() and symbol() functions will return empty strings, leading to a poor user experience and potential integration issues with platforms expecting valid metadata.
Fix
Ensure that any contract inheriting from FourERC20 explicitly calls the _init(string memory name_, string memory symbol_) function within its constructor to properly initialize the token's metadata.
Status
Unresolved
InfoAbsence of Public Supply Control
The FourERC20 contract provides internal _mint and _burn functions, but it does not expose any public functions for minting or burning tokens. This means that the total supply of the token is fixed at deployment unless a derived contract explicitly implements and exposes these functionalities. This is a design choice for a base ERC-20 contract but should be noted for deployment planning (7.8 Operations).I-01
Issue
The FourERC20 contract provides internal _mint and _burn functions, but it does not expose any public functions for minting or burning tokens. This means that the total supply of the token is fixed at deployment unless a derived contract explicitly implements and exposes these functionalities. This is a design choice for a base ERC-20 contract but should be noted for deployment planning (7.8 Operations).
Fix
If dynamic supply management (minting or burning) is required, a new contract inheriting from FourERC20 must be created to implement and secure these functionalities with appropriate access control. Otherwise, the token's supply will be immutable after initial deployment.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The technical architecture is robust, leveraging well-audited OpenZeppelin ERC-20 implementations, ensuring a strong foundation (7.1 Architecture). Code security is high, with no apparent reentrancy, integer overflow/underflow, or other common Solidity vulnerabilities due to Solidity 0.8+ checked arithmetic and careful use of unchecked blocks (7.2 Code Security). Access control is standard for ERC-20, relying on msg.sender for transfers and approvals (7.3 Access Control). A minor technical consideration is the internal _init function, which requires a derived contract to properly set token metadata.
The contract implements a basic ERC-20 token with no inherent governance mechanisms or complex economic models (7.5 Governance, 7.4 Economic). Its economic stability relies solely on its utility and adoption, as it lacks features like fees, staking, or dynamic supply adjustments. The absence of public minting/burning functions means the total supply is fixed unless a derived contract introduces such mechanisms, which simplifies the economic model but limits flexibility.
The contract is not designed to be upgradable, as indicated by the absence of proxy patterns or upgrade-specific logic (7.7 Upgrades). This design choice eliminates risks associated with upgradeability, such as proxy storage collisions, faulty upgrade logic, or administrative key compromise. Any changes to the token's logic would necessitate a new contract deployment.
It is crucial to ensure that any contract inheriting from FourERC20 properly calls the internal _init function in its constructor to set the token's name and symbol, preventing uninitialized metadata.
If dynamic supply management (minting or burning) is desired, a derived contract must be implemented to expose and secure these functionalities with appropriate access control. Thorough testing of the deployment process and any custom logic in derived contracts is recommended.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Aug 16, 20260Low
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the PQC contract address?
The Post-Quantum Coin (PQC) contract on BNB Chain is 0x887ee6d7cba3d342530d5defbeb13a7409d34444. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is Post-Quantum Coin a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for Post-Quantum Coin is 0/100 (Low risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Renounced; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is PQC liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Sep 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $9.4K.
Who holds PQC?
As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 91.2% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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