Is TCryptochicks (TCC) Safe? Smart Contract Security Analysis

Security Checklist

5/5 checks passed

Contract VerifiedPass

Ownership RenouncedPass

No Mint FunctionPass

Liquidity LockedPass

Not a ProxyPass

Audit History

2 audits on record

Jul 2251Jul 230

Every audit run adds a dated snapshot — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Audit Summary

The FourERC20 contract implements a standard ERC-20 token, largely based on OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries. It provides core token functionalities like transfers, allowances, and balance tracking. The contract itself does not include public minting or burning mechanisms, implying a fixed supply unless extended by a derived contract. The overall security posture is strong due to adherence to established standards and robust OpenZeppelin implementations.

Final Recommendation: It is recommended to thoroughly review the deployment strategy for the FourERC20 token, especially concerning how its total supply will be managed. If a dynamic supply is desired, ensure that any derived contract implementing minting/burning functions has robust access control and multi-signature safeguards. For any integrations, always verify the token's address and ensure interactions are with the intended contract.

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow

10/10

The technical implementation (7.2 Code Security) of the FourERC20 contract is robust, leveraging OpenZeppelin's well-audited ERC-20 standard. This includes built-in protections against common vulnerabilities like integer overflows/underflows (due to Solidity 0.8+ and careful use of `unchecked`

GovernanceLow

8/10

The FourERC20 contract (7.4 Economic) is designed as a foundational ERC-20 token without inherent public minting or burning capabilities. This implies a fixed token supply if deployed directly, which can contribute to economic predictability. However, if a derived contract implements supply control,

UpgradesLow

10/10

Based on the provided information, the contract is not deployed as a proxy (7.7 Upgrades) and is not designed to be upgradeable. This eliminates upgrade-related risks such as storage collisions, logic errors during upgrades, or unauthorized upgrade paths. The immutability of the deployed contract en

LP Distribution

LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock

LP Locked100.0% · Null Address

What Raised This Score

3 factors

Top-10 concentration > 50% (77.6% total → 64.7% effective; 56.1% in EOAs, 21.5% in contracts — heavy)
Token age < 30 days (still settling)
1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Findings

3 total

1 Low 2 Info

L-01LowUnresolved

Potential Centralization Risk in Derived Supply Control

While `FourERC20` itself does not implement public supply mechanisms, any derived contract that adds public `_mint` or `_burn` functionality typically assigns control over these functions to a single owner or a small set of privileged addresses. This introduces a point of centralization (7.3 Access Control) where a single entity could inflate or deflate the token supply, potentially impacting its economic stability (7.4 Economic). This is a common design pattern but carries inherent risks if not managed with robust access control.

Recommendation: If a derived contract implements minting/burning, consider using a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance mechanism to control these sensitive functions. Implement time-locks for critical operations to provide a window for community review and reaction. Clearly communicate the ownership and control mechanisms to the community.

I-01InformationalUnresolved

Abstract ERC20 Implementation Lacks Public Supply Control

The `FourERC20` contract provides a foundational ERC20 implementation but does not expose public functions for minting (`_mint`) or burning (`_burn`) tokens. These functions are internal, meaning that if this contract is deployed directly without a derived contract adding public interfaces for supply management, the token's total supply would be fixed at deployment (e.g., via a constructor) and could not be altered afterward. This is an architectural design choice, not a vulnerability, but it's crucial for deployers to understand its implications regarding supply management and future tokenomics.

Recommendation: Deployers should be aware that this contract, as-is, creates a fixed-supply token. If dynamic supply management (minting/burning) is required, a separate contract inheriting `FourERC20` must be developed to implement and secure these functionalities. Clearly document the intended supply mechanism for users and integrators.

I-02InformationalUnresolved

Strong Reliance on OpenZeppelin Standards

The contract leverages well-audited and widely adopted OpenZeppelin Contracts for its core ERC20 logic, including `Context`, `IERC20`, and `IERC20Metadata`. This significantly reduces the likelihood of common vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, integer overflows (due to Solidity 0.8+ and careful use of `unchecked`), and standard ERC20 compliance issues. The inclusion of `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance` also mitigates known front-running risks associated with the standard `approve` function. This is a best practice and a strength of the implementation.

Recommendation: Continue to monitor OpenZeppelin's security advisories and updates, as any vulnerabilities discovered in the underlying libraries could potentially affect this contract. Ensure that the specific OpenZeppelin version used is up-to-date and free from known issues.

Is TCryptochicks Safe? TCC