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TCryptochicks TCC
0xa439…4444
BNB Chain Not verifiedLast checked 3d ago 1 audit on record
DexScreener ↗
How is this score calculated? → Low Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The FourERC20 contract implements a standard ERC-20 token, largely based on OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries. It provides core token functionalities like transfers, allowances, and balance tracking. The contract itself does not include public minting or burning mechanisms, implying a fixed supply unless extended by a derived contract. The overall security posture is strong due to adherence to established standards and robust OpenZeppelin implementations.

1 Low2 Informational
Volume 24h
$26.5K
Liquidity
$110.8K
Price
$0.000425
Token Age
17d
Top 10 Holders
70.2%

Security Findings

1 Low2 Info
Low

Potential Centralization Risk in Derived Supply Control

L-01While `FourERC20` itself does not implement public supply mechanisms, any derived contract that adds public `_mint` or `_burn` functionality typically assigns control over these functions to a single owner or a small set of privileged addresses. This introduces a point of centralization (7.3 Access Control) where a single entity could inflate or deflate the token supply, potentially impacting its economic stability (7.4 Economic). This is a common design pattern but carries inherent risks if not managed with robust access control.
IssueWhile `FourERC20` itself does not implement public supply mechanisms, any derived contract that adds public `_mint` or `_burn` functionality typically assigns control over these functions to a single owner or a small set of privileged addresses. This introduces a point of centralization (7.3 Access Control) where a single entity could inflate or deflate the token supply, potentially impacting its economic stability (7.4 Economic). This is a common design pattern but carries inherent risks if not managed with robust access control.
FixIf a derived contract implements minting/burning, consider using a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance mechanism to control these sensitive functions. Implement time-locks for critical operations to provide a window for community review and reaction. Clearly communicate the ownership and control mechanisms to the community.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Abstract ERC20 Implementation Lacks Public Supply Control

I-01The `FourERC20` contract provides a foundational ERC20 implementation but does not expose public functions for minting (`_mint`) or burning (`_burn`) tokens. These functions are internal, meaning that if this contract is deployed directly without a derived contract adding public interfaces for supply management, the token's total supply would be fixed at deployment (e.g., via a constructor) and could not be altered afterward. This is an architectural design choice, not a vulnerability, but it's crucial for deployers to understand its implications regarding supply management and future tokenomics.
IssueThe `FourERC20` contract provides a foundational ERC20 implementation but does not expose public functions for minting (`_mint`) or burning (`_burn`) tokens. These functions are internal, meaning that if this contract is deployed directly without a derived contract adding public interfaces for supply management, the token's total supply would be fixed at deployment (e.g., via a constructor) and could not be altered afterward. This is an architectural design choice, not a vulnerability, but it's crucial for deployers to understand its implications regarding supply management and future tokenomics.
FixDeployers should be aware that this contract, as-is, creates a fixed-supply token. If dynamic supply management (minting/burning) is required, a separate contract inheriting `FourERC20` must be developed to implement and secure these functionalities. Clearly document the intended supply mechanism for users and integrators.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Strong Reliance on OpenZeppelin Standards

I-02The contract leverages well-audited and widely adopted OpenZeppelin Contracts for its core ERC20 logic, including `Context`, `IERC20`, and `IERC20Metadata`. This significantly reduces the likelihood of common vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, integer overflows (due to Solidity 0.8+ and careful use of `unchecked`), and standard ERC20 compliance issues. The inclusion of `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance` also mitigates known front-running risks associated with the standard `approve` function. This is a best practice and a strength of the implementation.
IssueThe contract leverages well-audited and widely adopted OpenZeppelin Contracts for its core ERC20 logic, including `Context`, `IERC20`, and `IERC20Metadata`. This significantly reduces the likelihood of common vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, integer overflows (due to Solidity 0.8+ and careful use of `unchecked`), and standard ERC20 compliance issues. The inclusion of `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance` also mitigates known front-running risks associated with the standard `approve` function. This is a best practice and a strength of the implementation.
FixContinue to monitor OpenZeppelin's security advisories and updates, as any vulnerabilities discovered in the underlying libraries could potentially affect this contract. Ensure that the specific OpenZeppelin version used is up-to-date and free from known issues.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow10/10

The technical implementation (7.2 Code Security) of the FourERC20 contract is robust, leveraging OpenZeppelin's well-audited ERC-20 standard. This includes built-in protections against common vulnerabilities like integer overflows/underflows (due to Solidity 0.8+ and careful use of `unchecked` in `decreaseAllowance`). The contract adheres to ERC-20 specifications, providing standard transfer, allowance, and balance functions. The inclusion of `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance` (7.3 Access Control) helps mitigate front-running risks associated with the standard `approve` function.

GovernanceLow8/10

The FourERC20 contract (7.4 Economic) is designed as a foundational ERC-20 token without inherent public minting or burning capabilities. This implies a fixed token supply if deployed directly, which can contribute to economic predictability. However, if a derived contract implements supply control, the economic model would depend on the access control (7.3 Access Control) of those functions, potentially introducing centralization risk. There are no explicit governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance) within this contract, simplifying its operational model.

UpgradesLow10/10

Based on the provided information, the contract is not deployed as a proxy (7.7 Upgrades) and is not designed to be upgradeable. This eliminates upgrade-related risks such as storage collisions, logic errors during upgrades, or unauthorized upgrade paths. The immutability of the deployed contract ensures consistent behavior over its lifetime.

Security Checklist

5/5 checks passed
Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedPass
No Mint FunctionPass
Liquidity LockedPass
Not a ProxyPass

Holder Composition

70.2% in top 10
52.3% in wallets17.9% in contracts
Effective Concentration59.5%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$110.8K

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address

Key Addresses

2 addresses
Deployer
0x699f…6b25
Unlocked LP Held By
0x4f0f…328d

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

3 factors
  • Top-10 concentration > 50% (70.2% total → 59.5% effective; 52.3% in EOAs, 17.9% in contracts — heavy)
  • Token age < 30 days (still settling)
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Related Audits

6 more on the record
币安人生Low RiskSKYAILow RiskBLow RiskDOYRLow RiskCREPELow Risk4Low Risk

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