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Is TCryptochicks Safe?

TCCBNB Chain
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Low RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical10/10Governance8/10Upgrades10/10Checks passed5 of 5Findings1 Low · 2 Info3
SummaryAI Copilot

The FourERC20 contract implements a standard ERC-20 token, largely based on OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Top-10 concentration > 50%
  • Token age < 30 days
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Top-10 concentration > 50% (70.2% total → 59.5% effective; 52.3% in EOAs, 17.9% in contracts — heavy)
  • Token age < 30 days (still settling)
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 45 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
17.9%Contracts52.3%Wallets29.8%Everyone else
17.9%52.3%Wallets29.8%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
70.2%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking17.9%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell52.3%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply29.8%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads59.5%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$110.8K

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$110.8KShare of depth100.0%
LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address
Unlocked LP held by
0x4f0f…328d

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Low2 Info
Low

Potential Centralization Risk in Derived Supply Control

While FourERC20 itself does not implement public supply mechanisms, any derived contract that adds public _mint or _burn functionality typically assigns control over these functions to a single owner or a small set of privileged addresses. This introduces a point of centralization (7.3 Access Control) where a single entity could inflate or deflate the token supply, potentially impacting its economic stability (7.4 Economic). This is a common design pattern but carries inherent risks if not managed with robust access control.L-01

Issue

While FourERC20 itself does not implement public supply mechanisms, any derived contract that adds public _mint or _burn functionality typically assigns control over these functions to a single owner or a small set of privileged addresses. This introduces a point of centralization (7.3 Access Control) where a single entity could inflate or deflate the token supply, potentially impacting its economic stability (7.4 Economic). This is a common design pattern but carries inherent risks if not managed with robust access control.

Fix

If a derived contract implements minting/burning, consider using a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance mechanism to control these sensitive functions. Implement time-locks for critical operations to provide a window for community review and reaction. Clearly communicate the ownership and control mechanisms to the community.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Abstract ERC20 Implementation Lacks Public Supply Control

The FourERC20 contract provides a foundational ERC20 implementation but does not expose public functions for minting (_mint) or burning (_burn) tokens. These functions are internal, meaning that if this contract is deployed directly without a derived contract adding public interfaces for supply management, the token's total supply would be fixed at deployment (e.g., via a constructor) and could not be altered afterward. This is an architectural design choice, not a vulnerability, but it's crucial for deployers to understand its implications regarding supply management and future tokenomics.I-01

Issue

The FourERC20 contract provides a foundational ERC20 implementation but does not expose public functions for minting (_mint) or burning (_burn) tokens. These functions are internal, meaning that if this contract is deployed directly without a derived contract adding public interfaces for supply management, the token's total supply would be fixed at deployment (e.g., via a constructor) and could not be altered afterward. This is an architectural design choice, not a vulnerability, but it's crucial for deployers to understand its implications regarding supply management and future tokenomics.

Fix

Deployers should be aware that this contract, as-is, creates a fixed-supply token. If dynamic supply management (minting/burning) is required, a separate contract inheriting FourERC20 must be developed to implement and secure these functionalities. Clearly document the intended supply mechanism for users and integrators.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Strong Reliance on OpenZeppelin Standards

The contract leverages well-audited and widely adopted OpenZeppelin Contracts for its core ERC20 logic, including Context, IERC20, and IERC20Metadata. This significantly reduces the likelihood of common vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, integer overflows (due to Solidity 0.8+ and careful use of unchecked), and standard ERC20 compliance issues. The inclusion of increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance also mitigates known front-running risks associated with the standard approve function. This is a best practice and a strength of the implementation.I-02

Issue

The contract leverages well-audited and widely adopted OpenZeppelin Contracts for its core ERC20 logic, including Context, IERC20, and IERC20Metadata. This significantly reduces the likelihood of common vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, integer overflows (due to Solidity 0.8+ and careful use of unchecked), and standard ERC20 compliance issues. The inclusion of increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance also mitigates known front-running risks associated with the standard approve function. This is a best practice and a strength of the implementation.

Fix

Continue to monitor OpenZeppelin's security advisories and updates, as any vulnerabilities discovered in the underlying libraries could potentially affect this contract. Ensure that the specific OpenZeppelin version used is up-to-date and free from known issues.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The FourERC20 contract implements a standard ERC-20 token, largely based on OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries. It provides core token functionalities like transfers, allowances, and balance tracking. The contract itself does not include public minting or burning mechanisms, implying a fixed supply unless extended by a derived contract. The overall security posture is strong due to adherence to established standards and robust OpenZeppelin implementations.

Technical10/10Low risk

The technical implementation (7.2 Code Security) of the FourERC20 contract is robust, leveraging OpenZeppelin's well-audited ERC-20 standard. This includes built-in protections against common vulnerabilities like integer overflows/underflows (due to Solidity 0.8+ and careful use of unchecked in decreaseAllowance). The contract adheres to ERC-20 specifications, providing standard transfer, allowance, and balance functions. The inclusion of increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance (7.3 Access Control) helps mitigate front-running risks associated with the standard approve function.

Governance8/10Low risk

The FourERC20 contract (7.4 Economic) is designed as a foundational ERC-20 token without inherent public minting or burning capabilities. This implies a fixed token supply if deployed directly, which can contribute to economic predictability. However, if a derived contract implements supply control, the economic model would depend on the access control (7.3 Access Control) of those functions, potentially introducing centralization risk. There are no explicit governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance) within this contract, simplifying its operational model.

Upgrades10/10Low risk

Based on the provided information, the contract is not deployed as a proxy (7.7 Upgrades) and is not designed to be upgradeable. This eliminates upgrade-related risks such as storage collisions, logic errors during upgrades, or unauthorized upgrade paths. The immutability of the deployed contract ensures consistent behavior over its lifetime.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is recommended to thoroughly review the deployment strategy for the FourERC20 token, especially concerning how its total supply will be managed.

If a dynamic supply is desired, ensure that any derived contract implementing minting/burning functions has robust access control and multi-signature safeguards. For any integrations, always verify the token's address and ensure interactions are with the intended contract.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age17d
Contract0xa439…4444
Deployer0x699f…6b25
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Audit History
  1. Jul 23, 20260Low
  2. Jul 22, 202651Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Related Audits

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