Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis

Is Player 8453 a Scam?

PLAYERBase

Not verified

This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →

Last checked Oct 28, 2026 · 1 audit on recordNew Launch · 3h old

Chart

53/ 100

Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?

How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest

Technical8/10 Governance3/10 Upgrades7/10 Checks passed5 of 7 Findings3 Medium · 5 Info8

SummaryAI Copilot

The DopplerERC20V1 contract is a standard ERC-20 token with governance voting capabilities, deployed as an EIP-1167 minimal clone.

Read the full analysis

What raised the score

Owner can pause all transfers
A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through
Liquidity not locked
Top-10 concentration > 20%
Code: Inability to Withdraw ETH

Exact factors

Owner can pause all transfers
A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through
Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool; this pool is 100% of DEX liquidity) — held by independent providers — market-depth risk
Top-10 concentration > 20% (70.8% total → 30.0% effective; 2.8% in EOAs, 68.0% in contracts)
Code: Inability to Withdraw ETH (Medium, static analysis)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (3h old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Oct 285 of 7 checks passed

Contract verifiedVerified

OwnershipRetained

MintNo mint

Liquidity lockNot locked

UpgradeabilityFixed code

HoneypotNone found

Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Oct 28, 2026210 holders

ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply

70.8%of supply sits with the top 10 holders

Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking68.0%
Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell2.8%
Everyone else200 holders29.2%

Effective concentrationwhat the score reads30.0%

How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 28, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Oct 28$54.0K across 7 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$53.8KShare of depth99.5%

Top-1 Unlocked Holder62.4%

Top-3 Unlocked97.5%

Unlocked LP held by

0x8160…287d0xe6fc…71f10xbcf6…64cf0x3e44…b36c

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

3 Medium5 Info

Medium

Inability to Withdraw ETH

The contract accepts ETH transfers but lacks any function to withdraw or transfer these funds out of the contract. Any ETH sent to the contract address will be permanently locked.CD-01

Issue

The contract accepts ETH transfers but lacks any function to withdraw or transfer these funds out of the contract. Any ETH sent to the contract address will be permanently locked.

Fix

Add an 'emergencyWithdraw' or 'withdrawETH' function that allows the owner to recover accidentally sent ETH to a secure address.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Centralized Control Over Token Transfers

The contract owner or a designated controller can unilaterally stop or enable token transfers by calling 'lockPool', 'unlockPool', or 'disableBalanceLimit'. This allows the administrator to freeze user funds or restrict trading at their discretion.CP-05

Issue

Fix

Implement a time-lock mechanism for these administrative functions or transition control to a decentralized governance body to prevent arbitrary restriction of user assets.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Liquidity not locked

0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 4 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x8160…287d — holds 62.4% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY

Issue

Fix

Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Who holds the supply

The ten largest holders own 70.8% of supply. What remains: 2.8% in wallets, 68.0% in other contracts. 210 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS

Issue

The ten largest holders own 70.8% of supply. What remains: 2.8% in wallets, 68.0% in other contracts. 210 holders in total.

Fix

Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Not listed by any independent source

210 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY

Issue

210 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.

Fix

Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

The market for this token

Liquidity $54K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $222K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET

Issue

Liquidity $54K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $222K (DexScreener, all pools).

Fix

Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Asset class: Governance token

A token whose main use is voting on a protocol's decisions (delegation and vote checkpoints in its code). The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: vote delegation in its code. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: a ProxyAdmin contract. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $54K of DEX liquidity across 7 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE

Issue

Fix

Check how much of the voting supply insiders hold and what governance can change.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Recently launched — less than a day of market history

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT

Issue

Fix

Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.

Status

Acknowledged

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 28

Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The DopplerERC20V1 contract is a standard ERC-20 token with governance voting capabilities, deployed as an EIP-1167 minimal clone. The architecture is immutable, preventing logic upgrades. While the core token functionality is standard, the contract includes centralized administrative controls that allow the owner to restrict transfers and manage balance limits. The protocol is currently at a medium risk level due to these centralized controls and the inability to recover accidentally sent ETH.

Technical8/10Low risk

The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC-20 and governance, ensuring robust base logic. 7.1 Architecture is fixed via EIP-1167, providing high security against upgrade-related exploits. 7.2 Code Security is generally high, though 7.6 External interactions are limited by the lack of an ETH withdrawal mechanism. 7.3 Access Control is strictly enforced via Ownable and Controller roles.

Governance3/10High risk

7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance aspects are heavily influenced by the owner's ability to lock pools and modify transfer rules. While this allows for emergency response, it introduces significant centralization risk. The token holders have voting rights, but the owner retains ultimate control over the transferability of the asset.

Upgrades7/10Low risk

7.7 Upgrades are not supported as this is an EIP-1167 minimal clone. The logic is immutable, which eliminates the risk of malicious implementation swaps. 7.8 Operations are stable, though the lack of an ETH recovery function is a minor operational oversight.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

The protocol should consider implementing a 'withdrawETH' function restricted to the owner to recover any funds accidentally sent to the contract address.

Additionally, to improve decentralization, the owner should consider transitioning the 'lockPool' and 'disableBalanceLimit' functions to a multi-signature wallet or a governance-controlled DAO contract rather than a single EOA.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record

TypeProxy, Token

NetworkBase

Token age3h

Contract0x442d…fee1

Deployer0x890d…2090

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Audit History

Oct 28, 202653Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the PLAYER contract address?

The Player 8453 (PLAYER) contract on Base is 0x442d624be3a2b2f430b75f390bb7458c05b4fee1. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.