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Is Palu Safe?

PALUBNB Chain
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Low RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical8/10Governance8/10Upgrades9/10Checks passed7 of 7Findings1 Critical · 2 Info3
SummaryAI Copilot

The FourERC20 contract is an implementation of the ERC-20 standard, largely based on OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (71.6% total → 31.4% effective; 4.5% in EOAs, 67.1% in contracts — moderate)
  • 1 Critical finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 47 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
67.1%Contracts4.5%28.4%Everyone else
67.1%Contracts4.5%28.4%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
71.6%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking67.1%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell4.5%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply28.4%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads31.4%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$383.4K across 4 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$370.5KShare of depth96.6%
LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address
Unlocked LP held by
0xbed6…53d20x3c5c…66b60x69c0…fd740x2fb8…ea690x0f7a…056d0x4dd4…a26b

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Critical2 Info
Critical

Non-functional Token due to Missing Constructor and Minting Logic

The FourERC20 contract, as provided, lacks a public constructor to initialize the token's _name and _symbol variables. More critically, it does not include any public or external function to mint an initial supply of tokens. The _mint function is internal, meaning it can only be called by the contract itself or a derived contract. If FourERC20 is deployed directly, _totalSupply will remain 0, and no tokens can ever be created, rendering the token completely non-functional and unusable.C-01

Issue

The FourERC20 contract, as provided, lacks a public constructor to initialize the token's _name and _symbol variables. More critically, it does not include any public or external function to mint an initial supply of tokens. The _mint function is internal, meaning it can only be called by the contract itself or a derived contract. If FourERC20 is deployed directly, _totalSupply will remain 0, and no tokens can ever be created, rendering the token completely non-functional and unusable.

Fix

Implement a public constructor in FourERC20 that calls _init(name_, symbol_) and _mint(recipient, initialSupply) to set the token's metadata and create an initial supply upon deployment. Alternatively, ensure that any contract inheriting FourERC20 properly implements these initialization and minting steps in its own constructor.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Use of Internal _init Function for Token Metadata

The contract uses an internal function _init(string memory name_, string memory symbol_) to set the token's name and symbol. While this pattern is common in base contracts designed for inheritance, it means that if FourERC20 is deployed directly without a derived contract calling _init in its constructor, the _name and _symbol state variables will remain empty strings. This contributes to the non-functional state of the token.I-01

Issue

The contract uses an internal function _init(string memory name_, string memory symbol_) to set the token's name and symbol. While this pattern is common in base contracts designed for inheritance, it means that if FourERC20 is deployed directly without a derived contract calling _init in its constructor, the _name and _symbol state variables will remain empty strings. This contributes to the non-functional state of the token.

Fix

If FourERC20 is intended to be directly deployable, convert _init into a public constructor. If it's strictly a base contract, ensure clear documentation for developers inheriting it to call _init in their derived contract's constructor.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Adherence to OpenZeppelin Standards

The FourERC20 contract largely follows the structure and implementation patterns of OpenZeppelin Contracts for ERC-20 tokens. This includes using Context for _msgSender(), implementing standard ERC-20 functions, and including increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance to mitigate common allowance-related issues. This adherence to well-audited and widely adopted standards enhances the contract's inherent security and reliability.I-02

Issue

The FourERC20 contract largely follows the structure and implementation patterns of OpenZeppelin Contracts for ERC-20 tokens. This includes using Context for _msgSender(), implementing standard ERC-20 functions, and including increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance to mitigate common allowance-related issues. This adherence to well-audited and widely adopted standards enhances the contract's inherent security and reliability.

Fix

Continue to leverage and stay updated with OpenZeppelin's best practices and contract versions. Ensure any custom logic added in the future maintains the same high standards.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The FourERC20 contract is an implementation of the ERC-20 standard, largely based on OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries. However, the contract as provided lacks a constructor to initialize token parameters (name, symbol) and, critically, a mechanism to mint the initial supply of tokens. If deployed directly, this contract would result in a non-functional token with zero total supply, rendering it unusable for its intended purpose. This fundamental design flaw constitutes a critical vulnerability.

Technical8/10Low risk

The contract leverages well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries for its core ERC-20 functionality, which contributes to strong code security (7.2 Code Security). Standard ERC-20 functions like transfer, approve, and transferFrom are correctly implemented. However, the primary technical risk lies in the contract's architecture (7.1 Architecture) as a standalone deployable token, specifically the absence of a constructor and any public or external minting functions. This design flaw prevents the token from ever having a supply, making it non-functional.

Governance8/10Low risk

The contract has no explicit governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance) or access control roles beyond the standard ERC-20 sender/spender model (7.3 Access Control). The economic model (7.4 Economic) is severely compromised because the token's total supply is permanently zero due to the lack of a minting function. This renders the token economically worthless and unusable, representing a critical economic risk.

Upgrades9/10Low risk

The FourERC20 contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy (7.7 Upgrades). Therefore, there are no specific upgrade-related risks. Any changes to the token's logic would require deploying a new contract.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is strongly recommended to either implement a constructor within the FourERC20 contract to initialize _name, _symbol, and mint an initial supply, or to deploy a derived contract that properly extends FourERC20 with these essential functionalities.

Without a constructor and a minting mechanism, the deployed token will be non-functional. Additionally, consider adding an Ownable or similar access control pattern if specific administrative functions (like pausing or further minting/burning) are desired post-deployment.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age10mo
Contract0x02e7…4444
Deployer0xf16d…dbcd
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Audit History
  1. Aug 30, 20262Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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