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Is Orderly Network Safe?

ORDERArbitrum
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical8/10Governance2/10Upgrades2/10Checks passed2 of 5Findings1 High · 2 Medium · 1 Low · 1 Info5
SummaryAI Copilot

The OrderOFT contract serves as an Omnichain Fungible Token (OFT) for the Orderly Network, leveraging LayerZero V2 for cross-chain functionality.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced — Multisig
  • Proxy contract
  • Top-10 concentration > 50%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 75.5%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — Multisig (2-of-3)
  • Proxy contract (upgradeable — admin can replace logic)
  • Top-10 concentration > 50% (89.0% total → 63.5% effective; 46.6% in EOAs, 42.4% in contracts — heavy)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 75.5% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 42 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityUpgradeable

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
42.4%Contracts46.6%Wallets11.0%Everyone else
42.4%Contracts46.6%Wallets11.0%
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
89.0%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking42.4%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell46.6%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply11.0%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads63.5%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$167.3K

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$167.3KShare of depth100.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder75.5%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0x745b…d37f0x2537…dfab

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High2 Medium1 Low1 Info
High

Centralized Control by Owner

The contract grants extensive administrative privileges to a single owner address (a 2/3 multisig). This owner can pause the contract, initiate upgrades, set LayerZero peers, and configure the LayerZero delegate. While a multisig provides some resilience against a single point of failure, a compromise of the multisig's keys would allow an attacker to take full control of the OFT's operations, potentially leading to asset loss or system disruption.H-01

Issue

The contract grants extensive administrative privileges to a single owner address (a 2/3 multisig). This owner can pause the contract, initiate upgrades, set LayerZero peers, and configure the LayerZero delegate. While a multisig provides some resilience against a single point of failure, a compromise of the multisig's keys would allow an attacker to take full control of the OFT's operations, potentially leading to asset loss or system disruption.

Fix

Ensure the multisig owner's operational security is paramount. Consider implementing a time-lock for critical administrative functions (e.g., upgrades, setPeer, setDelegate, pause) to introduce a delay between the transaction initiation and execution. This delay provides a window for detection and potential intervention, reducing the immediate impact of a compromised owner.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Critical Initialization Parameters

The initialize function takes _lzEndpoint and _delegate as critical parameters. The _delegate address is used to set both the contract's Ownable owner and the LayerZero endpoint's delegate. An incorrect or malicious address provided during initialization could lead to loss of ownership, misconfiguration of the LayerZero delegate, or unintended control over the contract.M-01

Issue

The initialize function takes _lzEndpoint and _delegate as critical parameters. The _delegate address is used to set both the contract's Ownable owner and the LayerZero endpoint's delegate. An incorrect or malicious address provided during initialization could lead to loss of ownership, misconfiguration of the LayerZero delegate, or unintended control over the contract.

Fix

Thoroughly verify all initialization parameters before deployment and execution. Implement a robust deployment process that includes multiple reviews of the initialization arguments. For production deployments, consider a multi-step initialization or a 'dry run' on a testnet to confirm correct setup.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Reliance on LayerZero Endpoint Security

The contract heavily relies on the security and correct functioning of the external LayerZero V2 endpoint. All cross-chain messaging, fee quoting, and token transfers (for LZ tokens) are routed through this endpoint. Any vulnerability, exploit, or misconfiguration within the LayerZero protocol or its endpoint could directly impact the security and functionality of the OrderOFT contract, potentially leading to frozen funds or unauthorized operations.M-02

Issue

The contract heavily relies on the security and correct functioning of the external LayerZero V2 endpoint. All cross-chain messaging, fee quoting, and token transfers (for LZ tokens) are routed through this endpoint. Any vulnerability, exploit, or misconfiguration within the LayerZero protocol or its endpoint could directly impact the security and functionality of the OrderOFT contract, potentially leading to frozen funds or unauthorized operations.

Fix

Maintain continuous monitoring of LayerZero's security announcements and updates. Establish a robust incident response plan for scenarios involving LayerZero protocol vulnerabilities. While direct control over the LayerZero endpoint is not possible, understanding its security posture is crucial for the OFT's overall security.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Potential for Peer Misconfiguration

The setPeer and setPeers functions, callable only by the owner, are responsible for configuring valid cross-chain communication paths by mapping eid (endpoint ID) to peer (remote OApp address). An incorrect peer configuration could lead to legitimate cross-chain messages being sent to unintended or malicious contracts, or prevent valid messages from being processed, disrupting cross-chain functionality.L-01

Issue

The setPeer and setPeers functions, callable only by the owner, are responsible for configuring valid cross-chain communication paths by mapping eid (endpoint ID) to peer (remote OApp address). An incorrect peer configuration could lead to legitimate cross-chain messages being sent to unintended or malicious contracts, or prevent valid messages from being processed, disrupting cross-chain functionality.

Fix

Implement strict internal procedures for verifying LayerZero peer addresses before setting them. Consider adding an event listener or monitoring system to alert on any changes to peer configurations, allowing for quick detection of unauthorized or erroneous updates.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Gas Optimization for setPeers Function

The setPeers function iterates through arrays (_eids and _peers) to set multiple peers in a single transaction. While functional, processing very large arrays in a single transaction could lead to high gas costs, potentially making the function expensive or even unusable if the array size exceeds block gas limits.I-01

Issue

The setPeers function iterates through arrays (_eids and _peers) to set multiple peers in a single transaction. While functional, processing very large arrays in a single transaction could lead to high gas costs, potentially making the function expensive or even unusable if the array size exceeds block gas limits.

Fix

For practical purposes, ensure that the expected number of peers to be set in a single call to setPeers remains within reasonable gas limits. If a very large number of peers needs to be configured, consider batching the operations into smaller transactions or optimizing the loop if possible, though the current implementation is standard for this pattern.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The OrderOFT contract serves as an Omnichain Fungible Token (OFT) for the Orderly Network, leveraging LayerZero V2 for cross-chain functionality. The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin upgradeable patterns (UUPS, Ownable, Pausable) and LayerZero's OApp framework. While the architecture is robust, the high degree of centralized control by the owner (a multisig) over critical functions such as upgrades, pausing, and LayerZero peer/delegate configuration introduces significant operational and security risks. Proper management of the owner's private keys and careful execution of administrative functions are paramount.

Technical8/10Low risk

The contract implements LayerZero's OFTUpgradeable standard, providing robust cross-chain token transfer capabilities (7.1 Architecture). It correctly uses OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 for token interactions and adheres to Solidity 0.8.20, mitigating common integer issues (7.2 Code Security). Access control for critical functions like setPeer and setDelegate is appropriately restricted to the owner (7.3 Access Control). However, the contract's heavy reliance on the LayerZero V2 endpoint means any vulnerabilities or misconfigurations within the external LayerZero protocol could directly impact the OFT's functionality and security (7.6 External).

Governance2/10High risk

The contract exhibits a high degree of centralized control, with the owner (a 2/3 multisig) possessing exclusive rights to critical administrative functions such as pausing the contract, upgrading its logic, and configuring LayerZero peers and delegates (7.5 Governance). While a multisig mitigates single-point-of-failure risks, compromise of the multisig's keys would grant an attacker full control over the OFT's operations and potentially the underlying token's cross-chain bridge. The economic model is primarily driven by LayerZero fees for cross-chain transfers, with no complex internal economic mechanisms (7.4 Economic).

Upgrades2/10High risk

The contract correctly implements the UUPS proxy pattern, allowing for future upgrades of its logic (7.7 Upgrades). The _authorizeUpgrade function is restricted to the onlyOwner modifier, ensuring that only the designated multisig can initiate upgrades. Storage gaps (__gap) are appropriately included in all upgradeable contracts to prevent storage collisions during upgrades. The primary risk associated with upgrades stems from the centralized control by the owner, as a compromised owner could deploy malicious logic.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Strengthen the security posture by ensuring the multisig owner's operational security is of the highest standard, including robust key management and multi-factor authentication for signers.

Implement comprehensive monitoring for all administrative actions, especially those related to LayerZero peer configuration and contract upgrades. Consider a time-lock mechanism for critical administrative functions to provide a window for community review and intervention, further decentralizing control and reducing immediate impact of a compromise.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeERC1967Proxy
NetworkArbitrum
Token age1y
Contract0x4e20…97b8
Deployer0x4a82…d7f5
Proxy Upgrade Controls
Proxy TypeEip1967 Uups
ImplementationVerified source
Upgrades (30d)0 · stable
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Audit History
  1. Aug 16, 202663Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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