The LivepeerToken contract is an ERC20 token implementation leveraging OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries for core functionality, including access control, burning, and permit functionality. The contract introduces specific roles for minting and burning tokens, managed by a DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE. While the code quality is high and standard vulnerabilities are mitigated by the Solidity version and library usage, the centralized control over token supply via these roles presents a significant operational and economic risk if the administrative keys are compromised. The contract is not upgradeable, ensuring immutability but requiring new deployments for any future changes.
On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is Livepeer Token Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The LivepeerToken contract is an ERC20 token implementation leveraging OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries for core functionality, including access control, burning, and permit functionality.
Read the full analysis- Ownership status UNKNOWN
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 99.6%
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (98.7% total → 49.1% effective; 16.1% in EOAs, 82.7% in contracts — moderate)
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 99.6% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 100% of DEX liquidity)
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 100% of DEX liquidity)
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking82.7%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell16.1%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply1.3%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0xdfa8…b8e00xd84b…44a10xf502…fc230xeb2e…acbeNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighCentralized Control over Token Supply
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE has ultimate control over the token's supply by being able to grant and revoke both MINTER_ROLE and BURNER_ROLE. A compromise of the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE would allow an attacker to mint an arbitrary amount of tokens, leading to hyperinflation, or burn all tokens, causing a denial of service for the token's utility. This centralization is a significant single point of failure for the token's economic stability (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance).H-01
Issue
The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE has ultimate control over the token's supply by being able to grant and revoke both MINTER_ROLE and BURNER_ROLE. A compromise of the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE would allow an attacker to mint an arbitrary amount of tokens, leading to hyperinflation, or burn all tokens, causing a denial of service for the token's utility. This centralization is a significant single point of failure for the token's economic stability (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance).
Fix
Implement a robust multi-signature wallet for the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE with a high number of required confirmations. Consider distributing the signers across different trusted entities. Explore decentralized governance mechanisms for critical role management in the long term.
Status
Unresolved
MediumSingle Point of Failure for Admin Role Management
If the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is controlled by a single External Owned Account (EOA), it represents a single point of failure. The compromise of this EOA's private key would grant an attacker full control over the token's administrative functions, including the ability to assign themselves MINTER_ROLE or BURNER_ROLE (7.8 Operations).M-01
Issue
If the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is controlled by a single External Owned Account (EOA), it represents a single point of failure. The compromise of this EOA's private key would grant an attacker full control over the token's administrative functions, including the ability to assign themselves MINTER_ROLE or BURNER_ROLE (7.8 Operations).
Fix
Ensure that the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is controlled by a multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) rather than a single EOA. This significantly increases the security posture by requiring multiple approvals for critical operations.
Status
Unresolved
LowLack of Time-Locks for Critical Operations
The contract does not implement time-locks for critical administrative actions, such as granting or revoking roles, or for large minting operations. While not a direct vulnerability, the absence of time-locks means that administrative changes or significant supply alterations can be executed immediately, leaving no window for community review or emergency intervention in case of a compromised key (7.8 Operations).L-01
Issue
The contract does not implement time-locks for critical administrative actions, such as granting or revoking roles, or for large minting operations. While not a direct vulnerability, the absence of time-locks means that administrative changes or significant supply alterations can be executed immediately, leaving no window for community review or emergency intervention in case of a compromised key (7.8 Operations).
Fix
Consider integrating a time-lock mechanism for sensitive administrative functions. This would introduce a delay between the initiation and execution of critical operations, allowing for detection and potential mitigation of malicious actions.
Status
Unresolved
InfoNon-Upgradeability of Contract
The LivepeerToken contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable contract. This means its logic cannot be modified after deployment. While this provides immutability and reduces the risk of malicious upgrades, it also implies that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or protocol changes would require deploying a new contract and migrating all existing token holders, which can be a complex and disruptive process (7.7 Upgrades).I-01
Issue
The LivepeerToken contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable contract. This means its logic cannot be modified after deployment. While this provides immutability and reduces the risk of malicious upgrades, it also implies that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or protocol changes would require deploying a new contract and migrating all existing token holders, which can be a complex and disruptive process (7.7 Upgrades).
Fix
Acknowledge the implications of non-upgradeability. For future contracts, if flexibility is desired, consider implementing an upgradeable proxy pattern (e.g., UUPS or Transparent Proxy) from OpenZeppelin. For this contract, ensure robust testing and a clear migration plan if changes become necessary.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The LivepeerToken contract demonstrates strong technical foundations (7.1 Architecture, 7.2 Code Security). It utilizes OpenZeppelin's AccessControl, ERC20Burnable, and ERC20Permit modules, which are well-audited and industry-standard. The use of Solidity 0.8.9 inherently protects against integer overflow/underflow vulnerabilities. The code is concise, readable, and follows common Solidity best practices, with clear role definitions for MINTER_ROLE and BURNER_ROLE. No reentrancy or other common EVM-specific vulnerabilities were identified.
The contract's economic model (7.4 Economic) and governance structure (7.5 Governance) are highly centralized. The DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE has the power to grant and revoke MINTER_ROLE and BURNER_ROLE, effectively controlling the token's total supply. While this is a common pattern for managed tokens, it introduces a significant centralization risk. A compromise of the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE could lead to arbitrary token minting or burning, severely impacting the token's value and ecosystem integrity. Operational security (7.8 Operations) around the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is paramount.
The LivepeerToken contract is not designed with upgradeability in mind (7.7 Upgrades). It is a standard, immutable contract deployment. This design choice ensures that the contract's logic cannot be altered post-deployment, providing certainty and reducing the risk of malicious upgrades. However, it also means that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or changes to the token's logic would necessitate deploying an entirely new contract and migrating existing token holders, which can be a complex and costly process.
To mitigate the identified risks, it is strongly recommended to secure the DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE with a robust multi-signature wallet solution, ideally with a high threshold for execution.
Consider implementing time-locks for critical administrative actions, such as granting or revoking roles, to provide a window for community oversight and emergency intervention. Regularly review and audit the addresses holding critical roles to ensure their continued security and trustworthiness.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Jul 27, 202663Medium
- Jul 27, 202667High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Livepeer Token a scam?
Based on automated analysis, Livepeer Token scores 67/100 (High Risk) on our risk scale. No honeypot was detected, but always verify independently before investing.
Is Livepeer Token safe to buy?
Our scanner flagged a risk score of 67/100. Ownership has not been renounced, which is a risk factor. DYOR before purchasing any token.
Has Livepeer Token been audited?
The contract has not been verified on-chain. Verification is not the same as a full security audit. Use Quantum Audit's free tool to run a deeper analysis of the contract code.
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