This audit focused on a set of utility libraries (Context, IERC165, SignedMath, Math, ERC165, Strings). The core MSVP contract, which would utilize these libraries and define the protocol's primary logic, was not provided. Therefore, the assessment is limited to the security and correctness of these foundational components. The libraries demonstrate robust mathematical operations and string utilities, but the use of inline assembly in Math.mulDiv and unchecked blocks requires careful integration and validation by the consuming contracts.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is MetaSoilVerseProtocol Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →This audit focused on a set of utility libraries (Context, IERC165, SignedMath, Math, ERC165, Strings).
- Top-10 concentration > 50%
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- Liquidity < $50k
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0%
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Top-10 concentration > 50% (65.9% total → 61.7% effective; 58.9% in EOAs, 7.0% in contracts — heavy)
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- Liquidity < $50k ($11,919 across 2 pairs — thin market)
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking7.0%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell58.9%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply34.1%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x05cc…5f120x4403…776b0x622b…d22d0x0596…24740xd286…d32f0xe90d…1e95No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighComplex Inline Assembly in Math.mulDiv
The mulDiv function in the Math library utilizes complex inline assembly for critical arithmetic operations. While assembly can offer performance benefits and precise control, it is significantly more difficult to audit, verify, and maintain compared to high-level Solidity. Subtle errors in assembly can lead to incorrect calculations, unexpected behavior, or even critical vulnerabilities that are hard to detect. The current implementation involves intricate bitwise operations and mulmod calls.H-01
Math.mulDivIssue
The mulDiv function in the Math library utilizes complex inline assembly for critical arithmetic operations. While assembly can offer performance benefits and precise control, it is significantly more difficult to audit, verify, and maintain compared to high-level Solidity. Subtle errors in assembly can lead to incorrect calculations, unexpected behavior, or even critical vulnerabilities that are hard to detect. The current implementation involves intricate bitwise operations and mulmod calls.
Fix
Thoroughly review and formally verify the mulDiv assembly code to ensure its correctness across all possible input ranges. Consider adding extensive unit tests specifically for mulDiv covering edge cases, large numbers, and zero values. If possible, provide detailed comments explaining each step of the assembly logic. Alternatively, consider using a well-vetted and simpler mulDiv implementation if the performance gains from this specific assembly are not strictly necessary.
Status
Unresolved
MediumExtensive Use of unchecked Blocks Without Contextual Validation
Several functions within the Math and SignedMath libraries, such as abs, sqrt, log2, log10, and log256, employ unchecked blocks. While unchecked is a valid optimization in Solidity 0.8.0+ to prevent automatic overflow/underflow checks, it shifts the responsibility of ensuring arithmetic safety to the caller. Without the context of the MSVP contract, it's unclear if all inputs to these unchecked operations are guaranteed to prevent overflows or underflows, potentially leading to incorrect state changes or unexpected behavior if not properly validated by the consuming contract.M-01
unchecked Blocks Without Contextual ValidationIssue
Several functions within the Math and SignedMath libraries, such as abs, sqrt, log2, log10, and log256, employ unchecked blocks. While unchecked is a valid optimization in Solidity 0.8.0+ to prevent automatic overflow/underflow checks, it shifts the responsibility of ensuring arithmetic safety to the caller. Without the context of the MSVP contract, it's unclear if all inputs to these unchecked operations are guaranteed to prevent overflows or underflows, potentially leading to incorrect state changes or unexpected behavior if not properly validated by the consuming contract.
Fix
Ensure that any contract utilizing these unchecked functions performs rigorous input validation or has strong invariants that guarantee arithmetic safety. Document the assumptions made about input ranges for each unchecked block. When integrating these libraries into MSVP, verify that all calls to these functions are safe from overflow/underflow based on the specific application logic.
Status
Unresolved
LowPotential for Precision Loss in mulDiv with Default Rounding
The mulDiv function, when called without a Rounding parameter or with Rounding.Zero, truncates the result, effectively rounding down. While this behavior is often desired, if not explicitly accounted for in economic calculations, repeated truncations can lead to a cumulative loss of precision. This could result in minor discrepancies over time, potentially affecting token balances or reward distributions if not properly managed.L-01
mulDiv with Default RoundingIssue
The mulDiv function, when called without a Rounding parameter or with Rounding.Zero, truncates the result, effectively rounding down. While this behavior is often desired, if not explicitly accounted for in economic calculations, repeated truncations can lead to a cumulative loss of precision. This could result in minor discrepancies over time, potentially affecting token balances or reward distributions if not properly managed.
Fix
Ensure that the consuming MSVP contract explicitly considers the rounding behavior of mulDiv. For sensitive economic calculations where precision is paramount, evaluate if Rounding.Up or a custom rounding logic is more appropriate. Document the chosen rounding strategy for all critical calculations to prevent misunderstandings and ensure consistent behavior.
Status
Unresolved
InfoMissing Core Contract Logic (MSVP)
The provided source code only includes utility libraries (Context, IERC165, SignedMath, Math, ERC165, Strings). The main MSVP contract, which would integrate these libraries and define the core business logic, state variables, and user interactions of the protocol, was not supplied for review. This significantly limits the scope of the audit, as the overall security posture, economic model, access control, and upgradeability of the actual protocol cannot be assessed.I-01
MSVP)Issue
The provided source code only includes utility libraries (Context, IERC165, SignedMath, Math, ERC165, Strings). The main MSVP contract, which would integrate these libraries and define the core business logic, state variables, and user interactions of the protocol, was not supplied for review. This significantly limits the scope of the audit, as the overall security posture, economic model, access control, and upgradeability of the actual protocol cannot be assessed.
Fix
Provide the complete source code for the MSVP contract and any other relevant contracts that comprise the protocol. A full audit requires access to all interconnected components to thoroughly evaluate potential vulnerabilities, interactions, and overall system design.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The technical architecture consists of well-defined utility libraries for mathematical operations and string conversions (7.1 Architecture). The Math library provides advanced functions like mulDiv and sqrt, which are crucial for precise calculations. However, the mulDiv function utilizes complex inline assembly, which increases the risk of subtle bugs and makes verification challenging (7.2 Code Security). Additionally, several functions employ unchecked blocks, shifting the responsibility for overflow/underflow prevention to the caller, which could lead to issues if not handled carefully (7.2 Code Security). Access control (7.3) is not applicable as these are pure utility libraries.
The provided contracts are utility libraries and do not contain any economic mechanisms (7.4 Economic) or governance structures (7.5 Governance). Therefore, economic and governance risks cannot be assessed based on this code alone. There are no external interactions (7.6) defined within these libraries.
The provided code consists of standalone utility libraries and abstract contracts, which are not designed to be upgradeable themselves (7.7 Upgrades). The prefill data indicates is_proxy: false, confirming that these are not proxy contracts. Operational aspects (7.8) are not directly applicable to these pure utility components.
It is crucial to conduct a comprehensive audit of the main MSVP contract once it becomes available, focusing on how these utility libraries are integrated and utilized.
Particular attention should be paid to the inputs provided to functions using unchecked blocks and the mulDiv assembly to ensure all edge cases and potential overflow/underflow scenarios are robustly handled. Implement thorough unit and integration tests for all critical paths involving these mathematical operations.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Aug 20, 202642Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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