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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is Mantle Safe?

MNTEthereum
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical6/10Governance2/10Upgrades1/10Checks passed1 of 5Findings1 High · 1 Medium · 2 Low4
SummaryAI Copilot

The L1MantleToken contract implements an upgradeable ERC-20 token with burnable, permit, and voting functionalities.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced — strong Multisig
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Proxy contract
  • Top-10 concentration > 50%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — strong Multisig (6-of-14)
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
  • Proxy contract (upgradeable — admin can replace logic)
  • Top-10 concentration > 50% (86.7% total → 55.3% effective; 34.4% in EOAs, 52.3% in contracts — heavy)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 99% of DEX liquidity)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 99% of DEX liquidity)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 41 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintMintable
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityUpgradeable

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
52.3%Contracts34.4%Wallets13.3%Everyone else
52.3%Contracts34.4%Wallets13.3%
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
86.7%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking52.3%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell34.4%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply13.3%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads55.3%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$3.54M across 4 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$3.52MShare of depth99.3%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0x3e2a…7eea

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium2 Low
High

Centralized Minting Authority

The mint function is protected by the onlyOwner modifier, meaning only the contract owner can mint new tokens. While the owner is a robust 6/14 multisig, this design centralizes the control over the token's supply, giving the multisig significant power to inflate the token supply. This is a fundamental design choice but represents a high-impact point of control (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic).H-01

Issue

The mint function is protected by the onlyOwner modifier, meaning only the contract owner can mint new tokens. While the owner is a robust 6/14 multisig, this design centralizes the control over the token's supply, giving the multisig significant power to inflate the token supply. This is a fundamental design choice but represents a high-impact point of control (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic).

Fix

Acknowledge this as a design decision. Ensure the multisig governance process for minting is transparent, well-documented, and subject to community oversight. Consider implementing a timelock for minting operations or a more decentralized minting mechanism if future protocol evolution allows.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Owner's Control Over Mint Cap Numerator

The setMintCapNumerator function, which determines the maximum percentage of total supply that can be minted in an interval, is callable only by the owner (multisig). Although there's an upper bound (MINT_CAP_MAX_NUMERATOR), the owner can adjust this value at any time. Frequent or unexpected changes to this parameter could impact market perception and token economics (7.5 Governance, 7.4 Economic).M-01

Issue

The setMintCapNumerator function, which determines the maximum percentage of total supply that can be minted in an interval, is callable only by the owner (multisig). Although there's an upper bound (MINT_CAP_MAX_NUMERATOR), the owner can adjust this value at any time. Frequent or unexpected changes to this parameter could impact market perception and token economics (7.5 Governance, 7.4 Economic).

Fix

Implement a timelock for changes to mintCapNumerator to provide transparency and allow stakeholders to react. Clearly communicate any proposed changes to this parameter well in advance. Consider a more decentralized governance mechanism for such critical parameter adjustments in the future.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Reliance on block.timestamp for nextMint

The nextMint timestamp is calculated and updated using block.timestamp. While block.timestamp is generally reliable, miners can manipulate it within a small range (up to 900 seconds on Ethereum). For a MIN_MINT_INTERVAL of 365 days, this manipulation is negligible and does not pose a significant risk of accelerating the minting schedule (7.2 Code Security).L-01

Issue

The nextMint timestamp is calculated and updated using block.timestamp. While block.timestamp is generally reliable, miners can manipulate it within a small range (up to 900 seconds on Ethereum). For a MIN_MINT_INTERVAL of 365 days, this manipulation is negligible and does not pose a significant risk of accelerating the minting schedule (7.2 Code Security).

Fix

Given the very long MIN_MINT_INTERVAL, the impact of block.timestamp manipulation is minimal. No immediate action is required, but for future designs involving shorter time intervals, block.number or an oracle-based timestamp might be considered for greater robustness.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Missing Zero Address Check for _recipient in mint

The mint function does not explicitly check if the _recipient address is address(0). While OpenZeppelin's underlying _mint function would revert if to is address(0), an explicit check in the mint function would provide clearer intent and a more specific error message, preventing accidental burning of tokens to the zero address (7.2 Code Security).L-02

Issue

The mint function does not explicitly check if the _recipient address is address(0). While OpenZeppelin's underlying _mint function would revert if to is address(0), an explicit check in the mint function would provide clearer intent and a more specific error message, preventing accidental burning of tokens to the zero address (7.2 Code Security).

Fix

Add an explicit check at the beginning of the mint function: if (_recipient == address(0)) revert MantleToken_ImproperlyInitialized(); or a custom error for zero address recipients.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The L1MantleToken contract implements an upgradeable ERC-20 token with burnable, permit, and voting functionalities. It features a controlled minting mechanism with a time interval and a dynamic cap. The contract leverages OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries and follows best practices for upgradeability and access control, with critical functions protected by a robust multisig ownership structure. While the technical implementation is strong, the centralized control over minting and mint cap adjustments by the owner multisig introduces a notable economic risk.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The L1MantleToken contract is built upon well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries, ensuring a strong foundation for ERC-20 functionality, burning, and access control (7.3 Access Control). Solidity version 0.8.15 mitigates common integer overflow/underflow risks (7.2 Code Security). The minting logic correctly implements time-based intervals and a dynamic cap, preventing excessive inflation. Minor improvements could include explicit zero-address checks for recipient parameters in the mint function.

Governance2/10High risk

The contract's economic model centers around a controlled minting mechanism, where new tokens can be minted by the owner, which is a robust 6/14 multisig (7.4 Economic). This centralization of minting (7.5 Governance) and the ability to adjust the mint cap via setMintCapNumerator are significant points of control. While secured by a multisig, these powers could lead to supply inflation if not managed transparently and responsibly, impacting token value.

Upgrades1/10High risk

The contract utilizes the TransparentUpgradeableProxy pattern, with the implementation logic residing in L1MantleToken. The upgrade process is secured by an OpenZeppelin ProxyAdmin, which is owned by a Timelock (7.7 Upgrades). This Timelock is, in turn, controlled by a multisig, providing a robust and decentralized upgrade path with a time delay. This setup significantly reduces the risk of malicious or hasty upgrades, ensuring operational safety (7.8 Operations).

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Ensure the multisig controlling minting and parameter changes operates with full transparency and community oversight.

Regularly review the minting policy and communicate any changes to the token supply or mint cap clearly to stakeholders. Maintain vigilance over the multisig signers and their security practices to prevent unauthorized access to critical functions and uphold the integrity of the token supply.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeTransparentUpgradeableProxy
NetworkEthereum
Token age1y
Contract0x3c3a…f354
Deployer0xc22d…bb9f
Proxy Upgrade Controls
Proxy TypeEip1967 Transparent
AdminOZ ProxyAdmin → Timelock
ImplementationVerified source
Upgrades (30d)0 · stable
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Audit History
  1. Aug 14, 202660Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the MNT contract address?

The Mantle (MNT) contract on Ethereum is 0x3c3a81e81dc49a522a592e7622a7e711c06bf354. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.

Is Mantle a scam?

Quantum Audit's risk score for Mantle is 60/100 (Medium risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Retained; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Not locked; Upgradeability: Upgradeable. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.

Is MNT liquidity locked?

Liquidity lock: Not locked (as of Sep 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $3.54M.

Who holds MNT?

As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 86.7% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.

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