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Is HandlPay Safe?

HANDLBase
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical8/10Governance4/10Upgrades8/10Checks passed4 of 5Findings1 High · 1 Medium · 1 Low · 2 Info5
SummaryAI Copilot

This audit covers the HandlToken and HANDLSwap contracts. The HandlToken is an OFT-compliant ERC-20 token with Ownable access control.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • Liquidity < $50k
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 50.2%
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 93.0%
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (68.9% total → 34.3% effective; 11.2% in EOAs, 57.7% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • Liquidity < $50k ($44,548 across 2 pairs — thin market)
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 50.2% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • LP top3 unlocked holders = 93.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 44 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
57.7%Contracts11.2%Wallets31.1%Everyone else
57.7%Contracts11.2%31.1%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
68.9%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking57.7%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell11.2%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply31.1%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads34.3%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$44.5K across 2 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$44.5KShare of depth100.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder50.2%
Top-3 Unlocked93.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0x5c3b…25af0xc3e2…7ea00x3662…ba860x73fc…1ee50xece0…b5330xd1d7…84a2

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium1 Low2 Info
High

Centralized Control and Single Point of Failure in HANDLSwap

The HANDLSwap contract grants extensive control to a single admin address, set immutably during deployment. This administrator can unilaterally set the swap price (setPrice), pause all trading activities (setPaused), and withdraw all HANDL and USDC tokens held by the contract (withdrawHANDL, withdrawUSDC). This high degree of centralization (7.3, 7.5, 7.8) creates a significant single point of failure. A compromise of the admin's private key could lead to complete loss of funds, arbitrary price manipulation, and denial of service for all users.H-01

Issue

The HANDLSwap contract grants extensive control to a single admin address, set immutably during deployment. This administrator can unilaterally set the swap price (setPrice), pause all trading activities (setPaused), and withdraw all HANDL and USDC tokens held by the contract (withdrawHANDL, withdrawUSDC). This high degree of centralization (7.3, 7.5, 7.8) creates a significant single point of failure. A compromise of the admin's private key could lead to complete loss of funds, arbitrary price manipulation, and denial of service for all users.

Fix

Implement a multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) for the admin role to require multiple approvals for critical operations. For less time-sensitive actions like price updates, consider adding a timelock mechanism to allow users to react to impending changes. Explore options for progressive decentralization of control over time.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Potential Decimal Mismatch Risk in Swap Calculations

The buyHANDL and sellHANDL functions perform arithmetic operations involving 1e18 and usdcPerHandl to calculate swap amounts. While these calculations are mathematically sound for specific decimal assumptions (e.g., HANDL 18 decimals, USDC 6 decimals, and usdcPerHandl representing the price in 6-decimal USDC), these assumptions are not explicitly stated or enforced in the code (7.2). If usdcPerHandl is set with an incorrect decimal precision relative to USDC, or if USDC itself does not have 6 decimals, trades could result in incorrect token amounts being exchanged, leading to user losses or contract insolvency.M-01

Issue

The buyHANDL and sellHANDL functions perform arithmetic operations involving 1e18 and usdcPerHandl to calculate swap amounts. While these calculations are mathematically sound for specific decimal assumptions (e.g., HANDL 18 decimals, USDC 6 decimals, and usdcPerHandl representing the price in 6-decimal USDC), these assumptions are not explicitly stated or enforced in the code (7.2). If usdcPerHandl is set with an incorrect decimal precision relative to USDC, or if USDC itself does not have 6 decimals, trades could result in incorrect token amounts being exchanged, leading to user losses or contract insolvency.

Fix

Explicitly document the expected decimal precision for HANDL, USDC, and usdcPerHandl in the contract's NatSpec comments. Consider adding a mechanism to verify or enforce the decimal places of the underlying ERC-20 tokens, if possible, or ensure robust off-chain procedures for setting usdcPerHandl correctly. Implement comprehensive unit tests covering various decimal scenarios.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Lack of Slippage Protection for Users

The buyHANDL and sellHANDL functions execute swaps at the current usdcPerHandl price without any user-defined slippage tolerance (7.4). While the price is fixed by the admin, an admin could theoretically change the price between a user's transaction submission and its inclusion in a block. Without slippage protection, users could receive fewer tokens than expected if the price changes unfavorably, or their transaction could revert if the price moves too much.L-01

Issue

The buyHANDL and sellHANDL functions execute swaps at the current usdcPerHandl price without any user-defined slippage tolerance (7.4). While the price is fixed by the admin, an admin could theoretically change the price between a user's transaction submission and its inclusion in a block. Without slippage protection, users could receive fewer tokens than expected if the price changes unfavorably, or their transaction could revert if the price moves too much.

Fix

Consider adding an optional minHandlAmount or maxUsdcAmount parameter to the buyHANDL and sellHANDL functions, respectively. This would allow users to specify their acceptable slippage, ensuring they do not receive significantly less than expected or pay significantly more due to price changes or front-running (though less critical with an admin-set price).

Status

Unresolved

Info

Hardcoded Chain ID for Initial Minting

The HandlToken constructor includes a condition if(block.chainid == 137) to mint initial tokens only on Polygon (chain ID 137). This design choice (7.1) means that if the contract is deployed on any other chain, the initial minting to msg.sender will not occur. While this is likely an intentional deployment strategy for a multi-chain token, it's a hardcoded dependency.I-01

Issue

The HandlToken constructor includes a condition if(block.chainid == 137) to mint initial tokens only on Polygon (chain ID 137). This design choice (7.1) means that if the contract is deployed on any other chain, the initial minting to msg.sender will not occur. While this is likely an intentional deployment strategy for a multi-chain token, it's a hardcoded dependency.

Fix

Ensure this hardcoded chain ID aligns with the intended deployment strategy across all target networks. If initial minting is desired on other chains, the condition would need to be adjusted or removed, or a separate minting mechanism implemented post-deployment.

Status

Unresolved

Info

No Emergency Stop for Admin Fund Withdrawals

The HANDLSwap contract includes a setPaused function to halt trading, but the withdrawHANDL and withdrawUSDC functions, which allow the admin to drain funds, are not subject to the whenNotPaused modifier (7.8). This means that even if the contract is paused due to an emergency, the admin retains the ability to withdraw all funds. While the admin is trusted, this could be a concern if the admin key is compromised during a pause event.I-02

Issue

The HANDLSwap contract includes a setPaused function to halt trading, but the withdrawHANDL and withdrawUSDC functions, which allow the admin to drain funds, are not subject to the whenNotPaused modifier (7.8). This means that even if the contract is paused due to an emergency, the admin retains the ability to withdraw all funds. While the admin is trusted, this could be a concern if the admin key is compromised during a pause event.

Fix

Consider whether withdrawHANDL and withdrawUSDC should also be subject to a whenNotPaused modifier, or if a separate, more secure withdrawal mechanism (e.g., requiring a multi-sig or timelock) should be implemented, especially for large amounts. This would provide an additional layer of protection even if the admin key is compromised.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

This audit covers the HandlToken and HANDLSwap contracts. The HandlToken is an OFT-compliant ERC-20 token with Ownable access control. The HANDLSwap contract provides a simple fixed-price exchange between HANDL and USDC, managed by a single administrator. Key findings include significant centralization risks in the swap contract, a potential for decimal mismatch in swap calculations, and a lack of user slippage protection. The contracts are generally well-structured, but the high degree of administrative control introduces a single point of failure.

Technical8/10Low risk

The technical architecture (7.1) of both contracts is straightforward. The HandlToken leverages OpenZeppelin's Ownable and LayerZero's OFT for standard and cross-chain functionality. The HANDLSwap contract implements basic fixed-price swap logic. Code security (7.2) is generally good, with appropriate use of require statements and OpenZeppelin libraries. However, a potential decimal mismatch in swap calculations for USDC and HANDL could lead to incorrect trade amounts. Reentrancy is not a concern due to the absence of external ETH transfers and proper ERC-20 interaction patterns.

Governance4/10Medium risk

The economic model (7.4) of the HANDLSwap contract is a simple fixed-price exchange, entirely controlled by an administrator. The governance (7.5) is highly centralized, with a single admin address having immutable control over critical functions. This admin can set the swap price, pause trading, and withdraw all HANDL and USDC tokens from the contract. This creates a significant single point of failure, as a compromised admin key could lead to fund loss or market manipulation. There is no community governance or multi-signature control implemented.

Upgrades8/10Low risk

Neither the HandlToken nor the HANDLSwap contract implements any upgrade mechanism (7.7). Both contracts are designed to be immutable once deployed. This eliminates upgrade-related risks such as proxy misconfigurations or malicious upgrade proposals, but also means that any discovered vulnerabilities or desired feature changes would require a new contract deployment and migration.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is strongly recommended to decentralize or enhance the security of the admin role in the HANDLSwap contract, ideally by implementing a multi-signature wallet or a time-locked governance mechanism for critical functions like price setting and fund withdrawals.

Additionally, explicitly document and verify the decimal precision assumptions for HANDL and USDC within the swap calculations to prevent potential trading errors. Consider adding user-facing slippage protection to improve user experience and safety.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeHandlToken
NetworkBase
Token age4mo
Contract0x3bbc…4425
Deployer0xef87…ab19
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202640Medium
  2. Aug 11, 202628Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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