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Is Freedom of Money Safe?

FREEDOM OF MONEYBNB Chain
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Low RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical10/10Governance9/10Upgrades10/10Checks passed7 of 7Findings1 Medium · 1 Low · 2 Info4
SummaryAI Copilot

The FourERC20 contract is a standard implementation of the ERC-20 token interface, largely based on OpenZeppelin Contracts.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (73.8% total → 34.7% effective; 8.7% in EOAs, 65.1% in contracts — moderate)
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 47 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
65.1%Contracts8.7%Wallets26.2%Everyone else
65.1%Contracts8.7%26.2%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
73.8%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking65.1%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell8.7%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply26.2%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads34.7%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$399.7K across 6 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$392.3KShare of depth98.2%
LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address
Unlocked LP held by
0x4eb7…f7e9

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Medium1 Low2 Info
Medium

Incomplete Token Implementation for Standalone Deployment

The FourERC20 contract is designed as a base ERC-20 implementation. It lacks a public constructor to set the token's name and symbol and does not expose public functions for _mint or _burn. This means the contract cannot be deployed as a fully functional, self-contained token without a derived contract adding these essential functionalities. Deploying this contract directly would result in a token with no initial supply and unchangeable default metadata.M-01

Issue

The FourERC20 contract is designed as a base ERC-20 implementation. It lacks a public constructor to set the token's name and symbol and does not expose public functions for _mint or _burn. This means the contract cannot be deployed as a fully functional, self-contained token without a derived contract adding these essential functionalities. Deploying this contract directly would result in a token with no initial supply and unchangeable default metadata.

Fix

A derived contract must be created that inherits from FourERC20. This derived contract should include a public constructor to call _init(name_, symbol_) and implement public functions (with appropriate access control) to utilize the internal _mint and _burn functionalities to manage the token supply.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Absence of Explicit Access Control for Administrative Functions

The _mint and _burn functions are internal, and the _init function is also internal. While this is appropriate for a base contract, if a derived contract exposes these or similar administrative functions (e.g., for supply management), it must implement robust access control (7.3). The current contract does not include any access control mechanisms like Ownable or AccessControl to restrict who can perform such operations, which could lead to unauthorized actions if not properly handled by a derived contract.L-01

Issue

The _mint and _burn functions are internal, and the _init function is also internal. While this is appropriate for a base contract, if a derived contract exposes these or similar administrative functions (e.g., for supply management), it must implement robust access control (7.3). The current contract does not include any access control mechanisms like Ownable or AccessControl to restrict who can perform such operations, which could lead to unauthorized actions if not properly handled by a derived contract.

Fix

When extending FourERC20 with administrative functionalities (e.g., minting, burning, pausing), ensure that these functions are protected by appropriate access control mechanisms, such as OpenZeppelin's Ownable or AccessControl roles, to prevent unauthorized execution.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Standard ERC-20 approve Front-Running Vulnerability

The standard ERC-20 approve function is susceptible to a known front-running vulnerability. If a user approves an allowance for a spender, and then attempts to change that allowance to a different value, a malicious actor could front-run the second transaction by executing the first approved transaction. This would cause the second approve transaction to set an allowance based on an outdated state, potentially leading to an unintended allowance value. The contract does provide increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance as mitigations.I-01

Issue

The standard ERC-20 approve function is susceptible to a known front-running vulnerability. If a user approves an allowance for a spender, and then attempts to change that allowance to a different value, a malicious actor could front-run the second transaction by executing the first approved transaction. This would cause the second approve transaction to set an allowance based on an outdated state, potentially leading to an unintended allowance value. The contract does provide increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance as mitigations.

Fix

Advise users to primarily use increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance instead of directly calling approve when modifying existing allowances. Educate users about the risks associated with directly calling approve to change an allowance.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Lack of Pause Mechanism

The contract does not include a pause mechanism (7.8 Operations) to halt transfers or other critical operations in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability or a major market disruption. While not strictly required for all tokens, a pause function can be a valuable tool for mitigating risks in complex DeFi ecosystems.I-02

Issue

The contract does not include a pause mechanism (7.8 Operations) to halt transfers or other critical operations in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability or a major market disruption. While not strictly required for all tokens, a pause function can be a valuable tool for mitigating risks in complex DeFi ecosystems.

Fix

Consider integrating a pause mechanism, such as OpenZeppelin's Pausable contract, into a derived token contract. This would allow a designated administrator to temporarily halt token operations during critical situations, providing a safety switch for the protocol.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The FourERC20 contract is a standard implementation of the ERC-20 token interface, largely based on OpenZeppelin Contracts. It provides core functionalities for token transfers, allowances, and balance management. The contract is designed as a base for further extension, requiring a derived contract to implement specific supply mechanisms (minting/burning) and a constructor to initialize token metadata. While the core logic is robust, its incompleteness as a standalone deployable token and the absence of explicit access control for potential administrative functions in derived contracts are key considerations.

Technical10/10Low risk

The technical architecture (7.1) of the FourERC20 contract is sound, leveraging well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries for its ERC-20 implementation. Code security (7.2) is high, with Solidity 0.8.0+ mitigating integer overflows/underflows by default, and unchecked blocks used safely where appropriate. The contract correctly implements standard ERC-20 functions and includes increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance to mitigate common approve front-running issues. However, as a base contract, it lacks a public constructor and explicit supply mechanisms, requiring a derived contract for full functionality.

Governance9/10Low risk

The contract does not implement any governance (7.5) or complex economic (7.4) models beyond standard ERC-20 token transfers. There are no fees, staking mechanisms, or voting functionalities. The economic risk is low due to the simplicity and adherence to the ERC-20 standard, which is well-understood and widely adopted. Any economic implications would arise from the specific implementation of a derived contract that adds supply mechanisms or other features.

Upgrades10/10Low risk

The FourERC20 contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy (7.7) itself. While the internal _init function suggests it could be used as an implementation contract in a proxy pattern, the provided code does not include any proxy-specific logic or upgrade mechanisms. Therefore, upgrade safety considerations are not directly applicable to this standalone contract. If used as an implementation, proper proxy deployment and initialization would be critical.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

For deployment, ensure a derived contract properly implements a public constructor to initialize token metadata and includes robust access control for any exposed administrative functions, such as minting or burning.

Consider integrating a pause mechanism if the token is part of a larger ecosystem requiring emergency control. If upgradeability is desired, deploy this contract as an implementation behind a well-audited proxy contract (e.g., UUPS or Transparent) and ensure the _init function is called correctly during proxy initialization.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age8mo
Contract0x3e17…4444
Deployer0xad8c…0145
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Audit History
  1. Aug 30, 20260Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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