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On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?

Is flork Safe?

FLORKBNB Chain
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Low RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical10/10Governance8/10Upgrades10/10Checks passed7 of 7Findings1 Medium · 1 Low · 1 Info3
SummaryAI Copilot

The FourERC20 contract implements a standard ERC-20 token, leveraging well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries for its core functionalities.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Liquidity < $50k
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (57.3% total → 30.5% effective; 12.7% in EOAs, 44.7% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity < $50k ($43,052 across 2 pairs — thin market)
  • 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 47 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
44.7%Contracts12.7%Wallets42.7%Everyone else
44.7%Contracts12.7%42.7%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
57.3%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking44.7%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell12.7%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply42.7%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads30.5%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$43.1K across 2 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$41.3KShare of depth96.0%
LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address

Security Findings

1 Medium1 Low1 Info
Medium

Missing Public Token Supply Mechanism

The FourERC20 contract provides internal _mint and _burn functions but lacks any public or external functions to create or destroy tokens. As a result, the token's _totalSupply will remain zero upon deployment, and there will be no mechanism to issue new tokens, rendering the contract non-functional as a standalone ERC-20 token. This is a design flaw that prevents the token from being used as intended without further development.M-01

Issue

The FourERC20 contract provides internal _mint and _burn functions but lacks any public or external functions to create or destroy tokens. As a result, the token's _totalSupply will remain zero upon deployment, and there will be no mechanism to issue new tokens, rendering the contract non-functional as a standalone ERC-20 token. This is a design flaw that prevents the token from being used as intended without further development.

Fix

If this contract is intended to be a base, ensure that any derived contract implements a public minting function (e.g., mint(address to, uint256 amount)) that calls the internal _mint function. This public function must be protected by appropriate access control mechanisms (e.g., Ownable, AccessControl) to prevent unauthorized token creation.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Incomplete Source Code Provided for Audit

The provided source code for the _transfer internal function within FourERC20.sol is truncated. This prevents a full and accurate security analysis of one of the most critical functions in an ERC-20 token, as the complete logic for balance updates and checks could not be reviewed. While it is likely based on OpenZeppelin's standard implementation, an audit cannot make assumptions about missing code.L-01

Issue

The provided source code for the _transfer internal function within FourERC20.sol is truncated. This prevents a full and accurate security analysis of one of the most critical functions in an ERC-20 token, as the complete logic for balance updates and checks could not be reviewed. While it is likely based on OpenZeppelin's standard implementation, an audit cannot make assumptions about missing code.

Fix

Always provide the complete and final source code for all contracts and functions to be audited. This ensures that all logic, including internal helper functions, can be thoroughly reviewed for potential vulnerabilities, edge cases, and deviations from expected behavior.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Non-Upgradeability of Contract

The FourERC20 contract is deployed directly and does not implement any upgradeability pattern (e.g., UUPS, Transparent Proxies). This means that once deployed, its logic cannot be modified or updated. While this simplifies the security model by removing upgrade-related risks, it also means that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or protocol changes would require deploying an entirely new contract and migrating users/assets.I-01

Issue

The FourERC20 contract is deployed directly and does not implement any upgradeability pattern (e.g., UUPS, Transparent Proxies). This means that once deployed, its logic cannot be modified or updated. While this simplifies the security model by removing upgrade-related risks, it also means that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or protocol changes would require deploying an entirely new contract and migrating users/assets.

Fix

Acknowledge the implications of non-upgradeability. If future flexibility is desired, consider implementing an upgradeable proxy pattern (e.g., UUPS) for the token contract. If non-upgradeability is a deliberate design choice, ensure that the current implementation is robust and future-proof to minimize the need for redeployment.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The FourERC20 contract implements a standard ERC-20 token, leveraging well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries for its core functionalities. While the base implementation for transfers and allowances appears robust, the contract as provided lacks a public mechanism to mint tokens, rendering it non-functional as a standalone token. Additionally, a critical portion of the _transfer function was truncated in the provided source, which significantly limited a complete security analysis of its internal logic. The contract is not upgradeable, which simplifies its security model but removes future flexibility.

Technical10/10Low risk

The contract leverages well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries (v4.9.4) for its ERC-20 implementation, ensuring a strong foundation for core token functionalities like transfers and allowances (7.2 Code Security). Standard mitigations for allowance race conditions are included via increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance. However, the provided code for the _transfer function was truncated, preventing a full review of its internal logic and introducing uncertainty regarding its security (7.2 Code Security). Crucially, the contract lacks a public function to mint tokens, making it non-functional as a standalone token without a derived contract (7.1 Architecture).

Governance8/10Low risk

The contract implements a basic ERC-20 token with no complex economic models, fees, or governance mechanisms (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance). This simplicity inherently reduces economic and governance risks, as there are no internal parameters or roles that could be manipulated. The token's value is entirely external, and the contract itself does not introduce any specific economic incentives or disincentives.

Upgrades10/10Low risk

The FourERC20 contract is not designed to be upgradeable (7.7 Upgrades). This eliminates risks associated with proxy patterns, such as storage collisions, improper initialization, or upgrade path vulnerabilities. Any future changes to the token's logic would require a new contract deployment, which is a clear and transparent process, albeit without the flexibility of an upgradeable design.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is strongly recommended to provide the complete and final source code for all functions, especially the truncated _transfer function, for a comprehensive security analysis before deployment.

If this contract is intended to be a functional token, it must be inherited by a derived contract that implements a public minting mechanism, along with robust access control for that mechanism. Consider the long-term implications of the non-upgradeable design for future protocol flexibility and potential feature enhancements.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age11mo
Contract0x09db…4444
Deployer0x7780…46ee
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Audit History
  1. Sep 1, 20260Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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