The IQERC20 token contract implements a standard ERC20 token with added minting and burning capabilities. The contract leverages OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries for core ERC20 functionality and access control. A critical economic risk is identified due to the centralized control over token supply through minting and burning functions, which are accessible by the contract owner and a designated minter. While the owner is a multisig, the power to inflate the supply remains a significant concern.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is Everipedia IQ Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The IQERC20 token contract implements a standard ERC20 token with added minting and burning capabilities.
Read the full analysis- Ownership not renounced — strong Multisig
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 70%
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 99.9%
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
- LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked
- 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership NOT renounced — strong Multisig (3-of-5)
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 70% (92.0% total → 78.6% effective; 69.7% in EOAs, 22.3% in contracts — extreme)
- LP top1 unlocked holder = 99.9% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 89% of DEX liquidity)
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 89% of DEX liquidity)
- LP claimed locked but only 0.0% actually locked
- 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking22.3%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell69.7%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply8.0%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4- FraxswapFRAXAnalysed$1.63M88.9%
- SushiswapWETH$117.4K6.4%
- CurvefrxETH$77.1K4.2%
- 0xB076…Be4bFRAX$5.0K0.3%
- Uniswap v2FRAX$4.0K0.2%
- Uniswap v2WETH$700.0%
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x5639…b6540x659d…69be0x3887…7f1c0x6df7…86ba0x5ad6…e2770x913f…62b40xaf93…42c30x62d8…38ceNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalCentralized Minting/Burning Authority
The IQERC20 contract grants the owner and a designated _minter the ability to mint and burn an unlimited amount of tokens via the mint and burn functions. This centralized control over the token supply introduces a critical economic risk, as it allows for arbitrary inflation or deflation of the token, potentially devaluing existing token holders' assets. While the owner is a multisig, the power itself is highly centralized.C-01
Issue
The IQERC20 contract grants the owner and a designated _minter the ability to mint and burn an unlimited amount of tokens via the mint and burn functions. This centralized control over the token supply introduces a critical economic risk, as it allows for arbitrary inflation or deflation of the token, potentially devaluing existing token holders' assets. While the owner is a multisig, the power itself is highly centralized.
Fix
Implement a robust governance mechanism (e.g., a DAO or a more complex multi-signature scheme) to control minting and burning. Consider introducing a maximum total supply limit (cap) for the token or a rate-limiting mechanism for minting operations. If unlimited minting is an intentional design, ensure this is clearly communicated to token holders and that the _minter address is secured with the highest possible operational security standards.
Status
Unresolved
HighMinter Role Security
The _minter address, once set by the owner, gains the power to mint and burn tokens. If this _minter address is a single Externally Owned Account (EOA) and its private key is compromised, an attacker could gain full control over the token supply, leading to severe economic damage. The setMinter function is onlyOwner, but the security of the _minter itself is critical.H-01
Issue
The _minter address, once set by the owner, gains the power to mint and burn tokens. If this _minter address is a single Externally Owned Account (EOA) and its private key is compromised, an attacker could gain full control over the token supply, leading to severe economic damage. The setMinter function is onlyOwner, but the security of the _minter itself is critical.
Fix
Ensure that the _minter address is controlled by a highly secure entity, such as a hardware wallet, a multi-signature wallet, or a well-audited smart contract with robust access controls. Implement strict operational procedures around the _minter's private key management or contract interaction. Regularly review the _minter address and its associated security practices.
Status
Unresolved
InfoStandard ERC20 Approval Race Condition
The approve function in ERC20 contracts is susceptible to a known front-running vulnerability. If a user approves an allowance for a spender and then attempts to change that allowance, a malicious actor could front-run the second transaction, spending the original allowance before the new one is set, and then spending the new allowance as well. This can lead to the spender spending more than intended.I-01
Issue
The approve function in ERC20 contracts is susceptible to a known front-running vulnerability. If a user approves an allowance for a spender and then attempts to change that allowance, a malicious actor could front-run the second transaction, spending the original allowance before the new one is set, and then spending the new allowance as well. This can lead to the spender spending more than intended.
Fix
While this is an inherent characteristic of the ERC20 standard, users should be advised to use the increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance functions (which are implemented in this contract) instead of directly calling approve when modifying an existing allowance. These functions mitigate the race condition by atomically adding or subtracting from the current allowance.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The contract utilizes OpenZeppelin's robust ERC20, Ownable, and SafeMath libraries, which significantly enhance code security and mitigate common vulnerabilities like integer overflows (7.2 Code Security). The architecture is straightforward, extending a standard ERC20 with a custom _minter role (7.1 Architecture). Access control for mint and burn functions is managed by an ownerOrMinter modifier, ensuring only authorized addresses can perform these actions (7.3 Access Control). No complex external interactions or reentrancy vectors were identified (7.6 External).
The contract design introduces a critical centralization risk due to the owner and _minter roles having unlimited minting and burning capabilities (7.4 Economic). This power allows for arbitrary inflation of the token supply, potentially devaluing existing tokens. While the owner is a 3/5 multisig, which is a positive operational security measure (7.8 Operations), the _minter role could be a single point of failure if it's an EOA and gets compromised. The governance model is highly centralized, relying on the security and integrity of these privileged addresses (7.5 Governance).
The IQERC20 contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy (7.7 Upgrades). Therefore, no upgrade-specific vulnerabilities or risks are present. Any changes to the contract logic would require deploying a new contract and migrating assets, if applicable.
It is strongly recommended to implement robust off-chain governance or multi-signature controls for the _minter role to mitigate the risk of unauthorized token inflation.
Consider implementing a maximum supply limit or a rate-limiting mechanism for minting to provide greater economic stability. Ensure the operational security of both the owner multisig and the designated minter address is paramount to prevent compromise.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 1, 202671High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the IQ contract address?
The Everipedia IQ (IQ) contract on Ethereum is 0x579cea1889991f68acc35ff5c3dd0621ff29b0c9. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is Everipedia IQ a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for Everipedia IQ is 71/100 (High risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Retained; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is IQ liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Locked (as of Sep 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $1.83M.
Who holds IQ?
As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 92.0% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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