Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
BNB ChainThe CycpadToken is a minimal clone implementation of a bonding curve token.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 24, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
The factory address can call buyFor and buyForQuote to modify the balances of any user, effectively allowing the burning or movement of tokens without user consent.
Restrict the scope of these functions or remove the ability to target arbitrary addresses.
Unresolved
The _buyExact function updates state after an external ETH transfer, creating a reentrancy vulnerability.
Apply the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern by updating state before the external call.
Unresolved
The factory and fee recipient can toggle switches that determine if transfers or sales are permitted, potentially freezing user assets.
Implement a time-lock or governance vote for any changes to transfer-blocking switches.
Unresolved
Privileged roles can change transfer fees at will, which can be used to extract value from users unexpectedly.
Hardcode fee caps or require governance approval for fee adjustments.
Unresolved
The _curveBuy function performs division before multiplication, leading to potential precision loss in token pricing.
Reorder operations to multiply before dividing to maintain precision.
Unresolved
Privileged roles can modify transaction and wallet limits, which may be used to restrict liquidity or target specific holders.
Define limits in the constructor and make them immutable.
Unresolved
The ten largest holders own 48.1% of supply. Of that, 29.1% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 11.5% in wallets, 7.5% in other contracts. 430 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
430 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
100.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them. This assessment covers the main pool, which holds 86% of the token's DEX liquidity; the other pools were not assessed.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $21K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $611K (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 1% on sell. Market: $21K of DEX liquidity across 3 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Acknowledged
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Acknowledged
The CycpadToken is a minimal clone implementation of a bonding curve token. While the contract ownership is renounced, the protocol relies on a factory and fee recipient address that maintain significant control over token economics, including the ability to move user balances and modify fee structures. The architecture is fixed and not upgradeable, which limits long-term flexibility but prevents malicious logic updates.
The contract utilizes a standard EIP-1167 minimal clone pattern, ensuring immutable logic. 7.1 Architecture is sound for a bonding curve, though 7.2 Code Security shows potential reentrancy risks in ETH transfer functions. 7.3 Access Control is partially centralized via factory and fee recipient roles, which can influence token state and transfer rules.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance risks are elevated due to the privileged roles held by the factory and fee recipient. These entities can unilaterally alter fees and transaction limits, directly impacting token liquidity and holder value. 7.6 External dependencies on the router for fee processing introduce additional trust requirements.
7.7 Upgrades are not applicable as the contract is a minimal clone with fixed bytecode. 7.8 Operations are restricted to the initial deployment parameters and the predefined privileged roles. No further logic changes are possible.
Users should exercise caution due to the high level of control granted to the factory and fee recipient addresses.
We recommend that the protocol transition these privileged roles to a decentralized multi-signature wallet or a time-locked governance contract to mitigate the risk of unilateral changes to token economics. Developers should implement reentrancy guards on all functions that interact with external addresses and perform state updates before external calls to prevent potential fund drainage. Ensure that all mathematical operations are audited for precision loss, particularly in the bonding curve pricing logic.
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Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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