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Is ClipX Safe?

CLIPXBNB Chain
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
Chart
Low RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical10/10Governance10/10Upgrades10/10Checks passed5 of 5Findings1 Low · 2 Info3
SummaryAI Copilot

The FourERC20 contract provides a foundational ERC-20 token implementation, largely based on OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Volume/Liquidity > 10×
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Volume/Liquidity > 10× (13.8× — possible wash trading)
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 45 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRenounced
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
13.5%Contracts14.5%Wallets72.0%Everyone else
13.5%Contracts14.5%Wallets72.0%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
28.0%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking13.5%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell14.5%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply72.0%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads19.9%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$216.6K across 2 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$215.5KShare of depth99.5%
LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address
Unlocked LP held by
0x78ee…646b0x6992…374b

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Low2 Info
Low

Lack of Emergency Pausable Mechanism

The contract does not include a pausable mechanism (e.g., using OpenZeppelin's Pausable module). A pausable feature allows an authorized entity (e.g., an owner or multisig) to temporarily halt critical operations like transfers in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability, a major market disruption, or a governance decision. While not strictly required by the ERC-20 standard, it is a common security best practice for tokens to provide a circuit breaker.L-01

Issue

The contract does not include a pausable mechanism (e.g., using OpenZeppelin's Pausable module). A pausable feature allows an authorized entity (e.g., an owner or multisig) to temporarily halt critical operations like transfers in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability, a major market disruption, or a governance decision. While not strictly required by the ERC-20 standard, it is a common security best practice for tokens to provide a circuit breaker.

Fix

Consider inheriting from OpenZeppelin's Pausable contract and implementing _pause() and _unpause() functions, protected by appropriate access control, to provide an emergency stop mechanism for the token.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Incomplete Initialization Mechanism for Base Contract

The FourERC20 contract includes an internal _init function to set the token's name and symbol. However, this base contract does not provide a public constructor to call _init. Consequently, any derived contract must explicitly implement a constructor that calls _init to ensure the token's metadata is properly set upon deployment. If a derived contract fails to do so, the name() and symbol() functions will return empty strings.I-01

Issue

The FourERC20 contract includes an internal _init function to set the token's name and symbol. However, this base contract does not provide a public constructor to call _init. Consequently, any derived contract must explicitly implement a constructor that calls _init to ensure the token's metadata is properly set upon deployment. If a derived contract fails to do so, the name() and symbol() functions will return empty strings.

Fix

Ensure that any contract inheriting from FourERC20 implements a constructor that calls _init(string memory name_, string memory symbol_) with the desired token name and symbol.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Missing Public Supply Management Functions

The FourERC20 contract provides internal _mint and _burn functions for managing the token supply. However, it does not expose any public functions to allow for the creation or destruction of tokens. This design choice means the contract itself cannot mint or burn tokens directly. A derived contract would need to implement these functionalities, typically with appropriate access control (e.g., only an owner or minter role can mint), to make the token supply manageable.I-02

Issue

The FourERC20 contract provides internal _mint and _burn functions for managing the token supply. However, it does not expose any public functions to allow for the creation or destruction of tokens. This design choice means the contract itself cannot mint or burn tokens directly. A derived contract would need to implement these functionalities, typically with appropriate access control (e.g., only an owner or minter role can mint), to make the token supply manageable.

Fix

For a functional token, implement public mint and burn functions in a derived contract, ensuring they incorporate robust access control mechanisms (e.g., using OpenZeppelin's Ownable or AccessControl modules) to restrict who can perform these actions.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The FourERC20 contract provides a foundational ERC-20 token implementation, largely based on OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries. It adheres to the ERC-20 standard and incorporates best practices like increaseAllowance and decreaseAllowance. The contract is designed as a base for further extension, lacking a direct minting mechanism or constructor for initialization, which requires careful implementation in derived contracts.

Technical10/10Low risk

The FourERC20 contract is a robust implementation of the ERC-20 standard, leveraging OpenZeppelin's secure and audited codebase (7.2 Code Security). It correctly handles token transfers, allowances, and balances, including mitigations for known ERC-20 allowance issues (e.g., increaseAllowance). The use of Solidity 0.8.0+ provides default overflow/underflow protection. However, as a base contract, it lacks a public minting mechanism and a constructor to initialize name and symbol (7.1 Architecture).

Governance10/10Low risk

The contract implements a standard ERC-20 token model without complex economic incentives or governance features (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance). Its design is purely functional for token transfers and approvals. There are no special roles or privileged functions beyond the standard ERC-20 operations, which contributes to a low economic risk profile.

Upgrades10/10Low risk

The FourERC20 contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy or an implementation contract for a specific proxy pattern (7.7 Upgrades). Therefore, it does not introduce direct upgrade-related risks. If intended for use with a proxy, a separate upgradeability audit would be required to ensure proper integration and state management.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

For deployment, ensure any derived contract properly implements a constructor to call _init and defines a secure supply mechanism (e.g., minting, burning) with appropriate access control.

Consider integrating a pausable mechanism for emergency situations. Thoroughly test the complete token implementation, including any added functionalities and access controls, before production use.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age8mo
Contract0xc269…4444
Deployer0x9aac…2926
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Audit History
  1. Aug 11, 20260Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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