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ClipX CLIPX
0xc269…4444
BNB Chain Not verifiedLast checked 3d ago 1 audit on record
DexScreener ↗
How is this score calculated? → Low Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The `FourERC20` contract provides a foundational ERC-20 token implementation, largely based on OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries. It adheres to the ERC-20 standard and incorporates best practices like `increaseAllowance` and `decreaseAllowance`. The contract is designed as a base for further extension, lacking a direct minting mechanism or constructor for initialization, which requires careful implementation in derived contracts.

1 Low2 Informational
Volume 24h
$2.97M
Liquidity
$215.5K
Price
$0.002144
Token Age
8mo
Top 10 Holders
28.0%

Security Findings

1 Low2 Info
Low

Lack of Emergency Pausable Mechanism

L-01The contract does not include a pausable mechanism (e.g., using OpenZeppelin's `Pausable` module). A pausable feature allows an authorized entity (e.g., an owner or multisig) to temporarily halt critical operations like transfers in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability, a major market disruption, or a governance decision. While not strictly required by the ERC-20 standard, it is a common security best practice for tokens to provide a circuit breaker.
IssueThe contract does not include a pausable mechanism (e.g., using OpenZeppelin's `Pausable` module). A pausable feature allows an authorized entity (e.g., an owner or multisig) to temporarily halt critical operations like transfers in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability, a major market disruption, or a governance decision. While not strictly required by the ERC-20 standard, it is a common security best practice for tokens to provide a circuit breaker.
FixConsider inheriting from OpenZeppelin's `Pausable` contract and implementing `_pause()` and `_unpause()` functions, protected by appropriate access control, to provide an emergency stop mechanism for the token.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Incomplete Initialization Mechanism for Base Contract

I-01The `FourERC20` contract includes an internal `_init` function to set the token's name and symbol. However, this base contract does not provide a public constructor to call `_init`. Consequently, any derived contract must explicitly implement a constructor that calls `_init` to ensure the token's metadata is properly set upon deployment. If a derived contract fails to do so, the `name()` and `symbol()` functions will return empty strings.
IssueThe `FourERC20` contract includes an internal `_init` function to set the token's name and symbol. However, this base contract does not provide a public constructor to call `_init`. Consequently, any derived contract must explicitly implement a constructor that calls `_init` to ensure the token's metadata is properly set upon deployment. If a derived contract fails to do so, the `name()` and `symbol()` functions will return empty strings.
FixEnsure that any contract inheriting from `FourERC20` implements a constructor that calls `_init(string memory name_, string memory symbol_)` with the desired token name and symbol.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Missing Public Supply Management Functions

I-02The `FourERC20` contract provides internal `_mint` and `_burn` functions for managing the token supply. However, it does not expose any public functions to allow for the creation or destruction of tokens. This design choice means the contract itself cannot mint or burn tokens directly. A derived contract would need to implement these functionalities, typically with appropriate access control (e.g., only an owner or minter role can mint), to make the token supply manageable.
IssueThe `FourERC20` contract provides internal `_mint` and `_burn` functions for managing the token supply. However, it does not expose any public functions to allow for the creation or destruction of tokens. This design choice means the contract itself cannot mint or burn tokens directly. A derived contract would need to implement these functionalities, typically with appropriate access control (e.g., only an owner or minter role can mint), to make the token supply manageable.
FixFor a functional token, implement public `mint` and `burn` functions in a derived contract, ensuring they incorporate robust access control mechanisms (e.g., using OpenZeppelin's `Ownable` or `AccessControl` modules) to restrict who can perform these actions.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow10/10

The `FourERC20` contract is a robust implementation of the ERC-20 standard, leveraging OpenZeppelin's secure and audited codebase (7.2 Code Security). It correctly handles token transfers, allowances, and balances, including mitigations for known ERC-20 allowance issues (e.g., `increaseAllowance`). The use of Solidity 0.8.0+ provides default overflow/underflow protection. However, as a base contract, it lacks a public minting mechanism and a constructor to initialize `name` and `symbol` (7.1 Architecture).

GovernanceLow10/10

The contract implements a standard ERC-20 token model without complex economic incentives or governance features (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance). Its design is purely functional for token transfers and approvals. There are no special roles or privileged functions beyond the standard ERC-20 operations, which contributes to a low economic risk profile.

UpgradesLow10/10

The `FourERC20` contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy or an implementation contract for a specific proxy pattern (7.7 Upgrades). Therefore, it does not introduce direct upgrade-related risks. If intended for use with a proxy, a separate upgradeability audit would be required to ensure proper integration and state management.

Security Checklist

5/5 checks passed
Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedPass
No Mint FunctionPass
Liquidity LockedPass
Not a ProxyPass

Holder Composition

28.0% in top 10
14.5% in wallets13.5% in contracts
Effective Concentration19.9%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$216.6K across 2 pairs
Pancakeswap v2WBNBanalysed$215.5K99.5%TopazWBNB$1.1K0.5%

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address

Key Addresses

3 addresses
Deployer
0x9aac…2926
Unlocked LP Held By
0x78ee…646b0x6992…374b

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

2 factors
  • Volume/Liquidity > 10× (13.8× — possible wash trading)
  • 1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Related Audits

6 more on the record
TCryptochicks (TCC)Low Risk币安人生Low RiskSKYAILow RiskBLow RiskDOYRLow RiskCREPELow Risk

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