The contract implements a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee logic. Ownership has been renounced, meaning privileged functions are now dormant. However, critical vulnerabilities exist in the internal swap logic that could lead to unauthorized token movement and loss of funds.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is BNBCAT a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The contract implements a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee logic.
Read the full analysis- Mint capability UNKNOWN
- LP lock ends in 8d
- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Contract source not verified — its logic cannot be read
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement
- Code: Rounding Errors in Fee Calculation
- Code: Locked ETH in Contract
- Code: Unchecked Transfer Return Values
Exact factors
- Mint capability UNKNOWN (implementation ABI unreadable)
- LP lock ends in 8d (short-term protection)
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (57.7× — wash-trading signal)
- Contract source NOT verified — its logic cannot be read
- Code: Unauthorized Token Movement (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Rounding Errors in Fee Calculation (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Locked ETH in Contract (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Unchecked Transfer Return Values (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 24Holders
as of audit · Oct 24, 2026- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell0.4%
- Burnedout of circulation90.0%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.3%
- Everyone else17,936 holders9.3%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 24, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 24The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060xe223…0f0dNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalUnauthorized Token Movement
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has granted an allowance to the contract, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the contract to move tokens from any address that has granted an allowance to the contract, potentially leading to unauthorized drainage of user funds.
Fix
Restrict the scope of token transfers to only those initiated by the contract's own balance or authorized liquidity pools.
Status
Unresolved
HighUnchecked Transfer Return Values
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function fails to check the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not moved as expected.CD-04
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function fails to check the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not moved as expected.
Fix
Always verify the return value of transfer and transferFrom calls, or use the SafeERC20 library from OpenZeppelin.
Status
Unresolved
MediumLocked ETH in Contract
The contract accepts ETH via receive() and deposit functions but lacks any mechanism to withdraw or transfer these funds, causing them to be permanently locked.CD-03
Issue
The contract accepts ETH via receive() and deposit functions but lacks any mechanism to withdraw or transfer these funds, causing them to be permanently locked.
Fix
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to a secure address or ensure the contract does not accept ETH if it cannot be utilized.
Status
Unresolved
LowRounding Errors in Fee Calculation
The contract performs division before multiplication in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, which causes precision loss during fee calculations.CD-02
Issue
The contract performs division before multiplication in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, which causes precision loss during fee calculations.
Fix
Rearrange arithmetic operations to perform multiplication before division to maintain precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 90.7% of supply. Of that, 90.0% burned, 0.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.4% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 17,946 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 90.7% of supply. Of that, 90.0% burned, 0.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.4% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 17,946 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
17,946 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
17,946 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
97.2% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 97.2% is locked in PinkLock02 until 02 Nov 2026 (8 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 2.8% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
97.2% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 97.2% is locked in PinkLock02 until 02 Nov 2026 (8 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 2.8% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $105K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $6.1M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $105K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $6.1M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Meme token
A community token whose value comes from attention rather than a product. Being a meme is not a risk in itself: it is scored on exactly the same contract and market facts as any other token. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: meme vocabulary in name/ticker (cat). Tokenomics — Supply: mint capability could not be read. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4.02% on sell. Market: $105K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A community token whose value comes from attention rather than a product. Being a meme is not a risk in itself: it is scored on exactly the same contract and market facts as any other token. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: meme vocabulary in name/ticker (cat). Tokenomics — Supply: mint capability could not be read. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4% on buy, 4.02% on sell. Market: $105K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Expect attention-driven volatility; the facts in this report say whether the contract itself can be used against holders.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 24The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns with additional fee-on-transfer logic. 7.1 Architecture is standard, but 7.2 Code Security is compromised by improper handling of external calls. 7.3 Access Control is currently locked due to renounced ownership, preventing further configuration of fee exclusions. 7.6 External interactions in the swap mechanism are insecure, failing to validate return values.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance are effectively static. Since ownership is renounced, no further changes can be made to the fee structure or contract parameters. The economic model is fixed, preventing any future governance-based adjustments.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as the contract is not a proxy. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers. The contract is immutable, providing certainty but also preventing the patching of identified vulnerabilities.
The contract should be considered unsafe for deployment or use due to the critical vulnerability allowing unauthorized token transfers.
Because ownership is renounced, these issues cannot be patched via contract updates. Users should avoid interacting with this contract. If the token is intended for production, a redeployment with a corrected codebase that includes proper return value checks and secure arithmetic operations is required.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 24, 202684High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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