Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
BNB ChainThe contract implements a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee logic.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 22, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060xda39…ca2dNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function uses transferFrom in a way that could allow the contract to pull tokens from any address that has previously approved the contract, potentially draining user balances.
Restrict the scope of transferFrom to only move tokens owned by the contract itself.
Unresolved
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function ignores the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which can lead to silent failures where tokens are not actually moved but the contract state updates as if they were.
Use the SafeERC20 library to perform transfers and verify that the return value is true.
Unresolved
The contract accepts ETH via receive() and deposit functions but lacks any mechanism to withdraw or transfer these funds out, effectively locking them permanently.
Implement a withdrawal function restricted to a secure address or a governance-controlled mechanism to recover trapped ETH.
Unresolved
In _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, the code performs division before multiplication, which leads to rounding errors and potential loss of tokens during fee calculations.
Reorder operations to perform multiplication before division to maintain precision.
Unresolved
The ten largest holders own 88.1% of supply. Of that, 87.4% burned, 0.6% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.1% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 47,560 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
47,560 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
94.8% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 94.8% is locked in PinkLock02 until 16 Nov 2026 (24 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 5.2% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $273K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $66.5M (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A community token whose value comes from attention rather than a product. Being a meme is not a risk in itself: it is scored on exactly the same contract and market facts as any other token. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: meme vocabulary in name/ticker (cat). Tokenomics — Supply: mint capability could not be read. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 4.5% on buy, 4.56% on sell. Market: $273K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Expect attention-driven volatility; the facts in this report say whether the contract itself can be used against holders.
Acknowledged
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Acknowledged
The contract implements a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee logic. While ownership has been renounced, preventing further administrative changes, the contract contains critical vulnerabilities in its internal swap and liquidity management logic. Specifically, the lack of return value checking and improper token handling in _executeSwapAndLiquify poses a significant risk to user funds.
The architecture follows a standard ERC-20 implementation with additional fee-on-transfer logic. 7.1 Architecture is standard, but 7.2 Code Security is compromised by improper handling of external calls. 7.3 Access Control is currently locked due to renounced ownership, which prevents further malicious configuration changes. 7.6 External interactions are flawed, specifically regarding the failure to validate return values from token transfers.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance risks are mitigated by the renounced ownership status. No further changes to fee structures or administrative roles can be made. The tokenomics are fixed, providing stability for holders.
7.7 Upgrades are not applicable as the contract is not a proxy. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers. The contract is immutable.
Immediate action is required to address the critical and high-severity findings.
Since ownership is renounced, the contract cannot be patched; users should be advised of the risks associated with the liquidity management functions. Future deployments should utilize OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library to handle token transfers and ensure all return values are validated. Avoid performing arithmetic operations that lead to precision loss and ensure all received ETH can be recovered by the contract.
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Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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