Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis

Is Binance Brokers a Scam?

BBROKERS

BNB Chain

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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on recordNew Launch · 1d old

Chart

78/ 100

High RiskHow is this score calculated?

How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest

Technical6/10 Governance2/10 Upgrades3/10 Checks passed3 of 5 Findings1 Critical · 1 High · 1 Medium · 1 Low4

SummaryAI Copilot

The FlapTaxTokenV3 contract implements an upgradeable ERC20 token with a complex tax and liquidation mechanism.

Read the full analysis

What raised the score

Proxy contract
Non-standard proxy storage
Top-10 concentration > 50%
Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
LP top1 unlocked holder = 55.6%
LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0%
Token age < 7 days
1 Critical finding(s) from audit
1 High finding(s) from audit
1 Medium finding(s) from audit
1 Low finding(s) from audit

Exact factors

Proxy contract (upgradeable — admin can replace logic)
Non-standard proxy storage (Etherscan-confirmed)
Top-10 concentration > 50% (84.2% total → 66.9% effective; 55.3% in EOAs, 28.9% in contracts — heavy)
Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
LP top1 unlocked holder = 55.6% (independent LP — depth risk)
LP top3 unlocked holders = 100.0% (independent LP — depth risk)
Token age < 7 days (early, volatile)
1 Critical finding(s) from audit
1 High finding(s) from audit
1 Medium finding(s) from audit
1 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (1d old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 43 of 5 checks passed

Contract verifiedVerified

OwnershipRenounced

MintNo mint

Liquidity lockNot locked

UpgradeabilityUpgradeable

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026

ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply

84.2%of supply sits with the top 10 holders

Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking28.9%
Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell55.3%
Everyone elsethe rest of the supply15.8%

Effective concentrationwhat the score reads66.9%

How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.90M

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$1.90MShare of depth100.0%

Top-1 Unlocked Holder55.6%

Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

Unlocked LP held by

0x14e5…be4a0x6921…11af

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 Critical1 High1 Medium1 Low

Critical

Incomplete Code Prevents Full Security Assessment of `_processTax` Function

The provided source code for FlapTaxTokenV3.sol is truncated, specifically omitting the implementation of the _processTax function. This function is called within _liquidateTax, which executes on every token transfer. Without the full implementation, it is impossible to assess critical security aspects such as potential reentrancy vulnerabilities, external call interactions (e.g., with v2Router, taxProcessor, dividendContract), gas consumption, and overall correctness. While a notLiquidating flag is used as a reentrancy guard around the _processTax call, the full impact of _processTax on the contract's state and interactions with other components cannot be determined. (7.1…C-01

Issue

Fix

Provide the complete and untruncated source code for the _processTax function and any directly related external interfaces or contracts. A full audit of this critical component is essential to ensure the security and integrity of the token's tax and liquidation mechanisms.

Status

Unresolved

High

High Centralization Risk and Owner Privileges

The initialize function mints the entire maxSupply (1 billion tokens) to msg.sender (the deployer/owner). The owner also controls critical state transitions via startMigration and finalizeMigration, which can change the PoolState and activate/deactivate tax mechanisms. This grants significant control to a single entity, posing a centralization risk. (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic)H-01

Issue

Fix

Consider implementing a multi-signature wallet for ownership or critical operations to distribute control. Clearly document the owner's capabilities and potential impact to users and the community.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Reliance on `block.timestamp` for Critical State Transitions

The _liquidateTax function uses block.timestamp to determine taxExpirationTime and antiFarmerExpirationTime, which trigger changes in the PoolState (e.g., from TaxEnforcedAntiFarmer to TaxEnforced or TaxFree). While block.timestamp is generally reliable, miners can manipulate it within a small window (up to 900 seconds on Ethereum, similar on BSC). This could potentially allow a miner to prematurely or belatedly trigger a state change, impacting tax collection or anti-farmer mechanisms. (7.2 Code Security, 7.4 Economic)M-01

Issue

Fix

For highly time-sensitive or economically critical state transitions, consider using a more robust time oracle (e.g., Chainlink Keepers or a custom time-weighted average oracle) if precise timing is paramount and miner manipulation is a significant concern. Evaluate the impact of a small timestamp deviation on the protocol's economics.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Gas Inefficiency from `_liquidateTax` on Every Transfer

The _liquidateTax function is called at the beginning of every _transfer operation. This function performs several state reads, comparisons, and potentially state writes, even if no liquidation or state change is required. If _processTax involves complex operations or external calls (which cannot be fully assessed due to truncated code), this could lead to higher gas costs for every token transfer, impacting user experience and network congestion. (7.2 Code Security, 7.8 Operations)L-01

Issue

Fix

Evaluate the gas cost implications of calling _liquidateTax on every transfer. Consider optimizing the logic to only perform checks or operations when strictly necessary, or explore alternative mechanisms for tax liquidation that are not tied to every single transfer.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4

Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The FlapTaxTokenV3 contract implements an upgradeable ERC20 token with a complex tax and liquidation mechanism. The audit identified a critical information gap due to truncated code for the _processTax function, which prevents a full security assessment. Additionally, the contract exhibits high centralization risk and relies on block.timestamp for critical state transitions. While OpenZeppelin's upgradeable pattern is correctly implemented, the unverified _processTax function poses a significant unknown risk.

Technical6/10Medium risk

The contract leverages OpenZeppelin's upgradeable ERC20 standards, ensuring a robust foundation for token functionality and future enhancements (7.1 Architecture). It implements a complex state machine for tax enforcement and liquidation, utilizing a notLiquidating flag as a reentrancy guard for the _processTax function (7.2 Code Security). However, the truncation of the _processTax function prevents a full security assessment, posing a critical unknown risk (C-01). Additionally, the reliance on block.timestamp for critical state transitions introduces a minor risk of miner manipulation (M-01).

Governance2/10High risk

The contract exhibits a high degree of centralization, with the owner receiving the entire maxSupply upon initialization and retaining exclusive control over critical state transitions like startMigration and finalizeMigration (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic). This concentration of power introduces significant trust assumptions. The system also relies on external contracts such as taxProcessor, dividendContract, and v2Router, whose security and behavior are critical to the overall protocol's integrity (7.6 External).

Upgrades3/10High risk

The contract correctly implements the OpenZeppelin upgradeable pattern, including Initializable and _disableInitializers() in the constructor, along with an initializer function (7.7 Upgrades). This design allows for future upgrades to fix bugs or add features without deploying a new contract, provided the upgrade proxy is managed securely.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Prioritize providing the complete source code for the _processTax function and any associated external contracts to enable a comprehensive security review.

Conduct thorough testing, including unit, integration, and fuzz testing, especially for the complex state transitions and the _liquidateTax logic. Consider implementing a multi-signature wallet for critical owner-controlled functions to mitigate centralization risks and enhance security.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record

TypeFlapTaxTokenV3

NetworkBNB Chain

Token age1d

Contract0xfe59…7777

Deployer0x415a…6004

Proxy Upgrade Controls

Proxy TypeEtherscan Detected Custom

ImplementationVerified source

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Audit History

Sep 4, 202678High
Aug 15, 202670High

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the BBROKERS contract address?

The Binance Brokers (BBROKERS) contract on BNB Chain is 0xfe59283fd13e15608d2fa627e6d238e47ff17777. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.