The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee logic. Ownership has been renounced, meaning the privileged functions are now permanently disabled. The protocol faces significant risks due to unhandled return values and trapped ETH, though the core token transfer logic remains functional.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is bibi.ai a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The contract is a standard ERC-20 token with custom fee logic.
Read the full analysis- LP lock ends in 20d
- Code: Arbitrary Token Withdrawal
- Code: Rounding Errors in Fee Calculation
- Code: Trapped Native Assets
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values
Exact factors
- LP lock ends in 20d (short-term protection)
- Code: Arbitrary Token Withdrawal (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Rounding Errors in Fee Calculation (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Trapped Native Assets (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Ignored Transfer Return Values (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 25Holders
as of audit · Oct 25, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking0.4%
- Burnedout of circulation62.5%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.3%
- Everyone else14,325 holders36.8%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 25, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 25The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060xfdda…3863No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalArbitrary Token Withdrawal
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the movement of tokens from any address that has granted allowance to the contract, potentially leading to unauthorized token drainage.CD-01
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function allows the movement of tokens from any address that has granted allowance to the contract, potentially leading to unauthorized token drainage.
Fix
Restrict the function to only interact with tokens owned by the contract itself.
Status
Unresolved
HighIgnored Transfer Return Values
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function fails to check the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which may fail silently and lead to inconsistent contract state.CD-04
Issue
The _executeSwapAndLiquify function fails to check the boolean return value of ERC-20 transfers, which may fail silently and lead to inconsistent contract state.
Fix
Use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library to ensure all transfers are verified.
Status
Unresolved
MediumTrapped Native Assets
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH but lacks any mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, causing them to be permanently locked.CD-03
Issue
The contract includes a receive function that accepts ETH but lacks any mechanism to withdraw or utilize these funds, causing them to be permanently locked.
Fix
Implement an owner-only withdrawal function to recover trapped ETH.
Status
Unresolved
LowRounding Errors in Fee Calculation
Division before multiplication in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer causes precision loss, resulting in slightly inaccurate fee calculations.CD-02
Issue
Division before multiplication in _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer causes precision loss, resulting in slightly inaccurate fee calculations.
Fix
Perform multiplication before division to maintain precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 63.2% of supply. Of that, 62.5% burned, 0.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.0% in wallets, 0.4% in other contracts. 14,335 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 63.2% of supply. Of that, 62.5% burned, 0.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.0% in wallets, 0.4% in other contracts. 14,335 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
14,335 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
14,335 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
98.3% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.3% is locked in PinkLock02 until 15 Nov 2026 (20 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 1.7% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
98.3% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 98.3% is locked in PinkLock02 until 15 Nov 2026 (20 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. That date is close: treat it as short-term protection. 1.7% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $867K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $8.4M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $867K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $8.4M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 3.96% on sell. Market: $867K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 3.96% on sell. Market: $867K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 25The architecture follows standard ERC-20 patterns with additional fee exclusion logic. 7.1 Architecture is straightforward, but 7.2 Code Security is compromised by ignoring return values in swap functions. 7.3 Access Control is currently locked due to renounced ownership, preventing further administrative changes. 7.6 External interactions are limited, but the lack of ETH withdrawal mechanisms creates a permanent lock on assets.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance risks are mitigated by the renounced ownership state. No further changes to fee structures or tokenomics can be made by any party. The economic model is static, providing predictability for holders but preventing emergency adjustments.
7.7 Upgrades are not supported as the contract is not a proxy. 7.8 Operations are fixed and immutable. The contract state is permanent, ensuring no malicious logic can be injected via upgrades.
The contract should be treated with caution due to the identified critical and high-severity issues.
Since ownership is renounced, the current vulnerabilities cannot be patched by the original developers. Users should be aware that ETH sent to the contract address is permanently locked. Future iterations should implement proper return value checking for all ERC-20 interactions and include a withdrawal function for trapped native assets.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 25, 202682High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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