The DopplerERC20V1 contract is a standard ERC-20 token with governance voting capabilities, deployed as an EIP-1167 minimal clone. The architecture is immutable, preventing logic upgrades. While the core token functionality is standard, the contract includes centralized administrative controls that allow the owner or controller to restrict token transfers and manage balance limits. Two primary issues were identified: the presence of centralized transfer-blocking mechanisms and the inability to recover accidentally sent ETH.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is Beagle a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The DopplerERC20V1 contract is a standard ERC-20 token with governance voting capabilities, deployed as an EIP-1167 minimal clone.
Read the full analysis- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by controller: EOA
- LP lock status UNKNOWN — the deepest pool's LP could not be read; this pool is 100% of DEX liquidity
- Liquidity not locked
- Liquidity < $50k
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- Contract source not verified — its logic cannot be read
- Code: Inability to Withdraw ETH
Exact factors
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by controller: EOA
- LP lock status UNKNOWN — the deepest pool's LP could not be read; this pool is 100% of DEX liquidity
- Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool; this pool is 0% of DEX liquidity) — held by independent providers — market-depth risk
- Liquidity < $50k ($29,052 across 4 pairs — thin market)
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (91.9% total → 41.1% effective; 7.2% in EOAs, 84.7% in contracts)
- Contract source NOT verified — its logic cannot be read
- Code: Inability to Withdraw ETH (Medium, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Nov 3Holders
as of audit · Nov 3, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking84.7%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell7.2%
- Everyone else69 holders8.1%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 3, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Nov 3The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the checked pool, Uniswap v4, are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity. The LP of the deepest pool (99.9% of depth) could not be read, so whether it is locked is unknown.
0x0dad…d24eNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumInability to Withdraw ETH
The contract accepts ETH but lacks any function to withdraw or transfer it out. Any ETH sent to the contract address will be permanently locked and inaccessible to the protocol or its users.CD-01
Issue
The contract accepts ETH but lacks any function to withdraw or transfer it out. Any ETH sent to the contract address will be permanently locked and inaccessible to the protocol or its users.
Fix
Add a function restricted to the owner that allows for the withdrawal of any ETH held by the contract.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCentralized Control Over Token Transfers
The owner and controller have the ability to lock pools and disable balance limits, which effectively allows them to halt or restrict token transfers for users. This creates a centralized point of failure where the protocol's utility can be unilaterally suspended.CP-05
Issue
The owner and controller have the ability to lock pools and disable balance limits, which effectively allows them to halt or restrict token transfers for users. This creates a centralized point of failure where the protocol's utility can be unilaterally suspended.
Fix
Implement a timelock for all administrative actions that affect transferability to provide users with notice, or transition these controls to a decentralized governance contract.
Status
Unresolved
MediumLiquidity not locked
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x0dad…d24e — holds 100.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x0dad…d24e — holds 100.0% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 91.9% of supply. What remains: 7.2% in wallets, 84.7% in other contracts. 79 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 91.9% of supply. What remains: 7.2% in wallets, 84.7% in other contracts. 79 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
79 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
79 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $29K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $87K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $29K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $87K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Governance token
A token whose main use is voting on a protocol's decisions (delegation and vote checkpoints in its code). The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: vote delegation in its code. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: a ProxyAdmin contract. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $29K of DEX liquidity across 4 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token whose main use is voting on a protocol's decisions (delegation and vote checkpoints in its code). The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: vote delegation in its code. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: a ProxyAdmin contract. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $29K of DEX liquidity across 4 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check how much of the voting supply insiders hold and what governance can change.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 3The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC-20 and governance features, ensuring robust base logic. 7.1 Architecture: EIP-1167 clone pattern is correctly implemented for gas efficiency. 7.2 Code Security: The logic is clean and follows standard patterns, though it lacks a mechanism to recover trapped funds. 7.3 Access Control: Privileged functions are correctly guarded by Ownable and controller roles.
7.4 Economic: The token includes balance limits and pool locking mechanisms that directly impact liquidity and transferability. 7.5 Governance: The owner holds significant power to modify transfer rules, which could be used to freeze user assets. 7.8 Operations: The lack of an ETH withdrawal function creates a permanent loss risk for any funds sent to the contract address.
7.7 Upgrades: The contract is an EIP-1167 minimal clone, which is inherently immutable. The implementation address is fixed at deployment, preventing any future logic changes. This eliminates the risk of malicious implementation upgrades but requires high confidence in the initial code.
The protocol should implement a 'withdrawETH' function restricted to the owner to allow for the recovery of accidentally sent funds.
Additionally, the team should provide clear documentation or a public-facing policy regarding the use of the 'lockPool' and 'disableBalanceLimit' functions to maintain transparency with token holders, as these functions directly impact the ability to trade the token.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Nov 3, 202678High
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the BGLE contract address?
The Beagle (BGLE) contract on Base is 0xb8a49d0e436512b462365496974f5e3dafaddba3. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is Beagle a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for Beagle is 78/100 (High risk) as of Nov 3, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Not verified; Ownership: Retained; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Not locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is BGLE liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Not locked (as of Nov 3, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $29.1K.
Who holds BGLE?
As of Nov 3, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 91.9% of the supply across 79 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
Would You Like a More Detailed Audit of Beagle?
This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Add your links and get it Verified