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Banana BANANA
0x38e6…30b4
Ethereum Not verifiedLast checked 2d ago 1 audit on record
DexScreener ↗
How is this score calculated? → Critical Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The Banana token contract implements an ERC-20 standard with significant deflationary and anti-whale mechanics, including transaction fees, max transaction limits, and automated liquidity provision. The audit identified critical centralization risks due to extensive owner privileges, an expired liquidity pool lock, and a lack of slippage protection in automated swaps. High transaction fees and the owner's ability to change the Uniswap pair also pose substantial economic and security risks. While basic reentrancy protection is present, the overall design grants the owner excessive control, making the protocol highly susceptible to malicious actions or economic instability.

3 Critical2 High2 Medium1 Informational
Volume 24h
$155.2K
Liquidity
$3.14M
Price
$4.0330
Token Age
2y
Top 10 Holders
73.5%

Security Findings

3 Crit2 High2 Med1 Info
Critical

Expired Liquidity Pool Lock Poses Rug Pull Risk

C-01The provided prefill data indicates that the liquidity pool (LP) lock for the Uniswap V2 pair has expired. This means that the initial liquidity provider, likely the contract owner or an associated address, can withdraw all liquidity from the pool at any time. Such an action would lead to a complete collapse of the token's price, resulting in a total loss for token holders.
IssueThe provided prefill data indicates that the liquidity pool (LP) lock for the Uniswap V2 pair has expired. This means that the initial liquidity provider, likely the contract owner or an associated address, can withdraw all liquidity from the pool at any time. Such an action would lead to a complete collapse of the token's price, resulting in a total loss for token holders.
FixImmediately re-lock the liquidity for a significant duration (e.g., 1-5 years) using a reputable locker service. Provide verifiable proof of the new lock to the community to restore trust and mitigate the rug pull risk.
StatusUnresolved
Critical

Lack of Slippage Protection in Automated Swaps

C-02The `swapAndLiquify` function calls `uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens` with `amountOutMin` set to `0`. This lack of slippage protection means that the contract is vulnerable to sandwich attacks and high price impact during automated token swaps. Malicious actors can front-run and back-run these transactions, extracting value and causing the contract to receive significantly less ETH than expected for the swapped tokens, ultimately harming the protocol's liquidity and value.
IssueThe `swapAndLiquify` function calls `uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens` with `amountOutMin` set to `0`. This lack of slippage protection means that the contract is vulnerable to sandwich attacks and high price impact during automated token swaps. Malicious actors can front-run and back-run these transactions, extracting value and causing the contract to receive significantly less ETH than expected for the swapped tokens, ultimately harming the protocol's liquidity and value.
FixImplement a reasonable `amountOutMin` value in the `swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens` call within `swapAndLiquify`. This value should be calculated based on the expected ETH output and a tolerable slippage percentage, protecting the contract from excessive losses due to market manipulation.
StatusUnresolved
Critical

Excessive Owner Privileges and Centralization Risk

C-03The `owner()` address has extensive control over critical contract parameters, including the ability to set `buyTotalFees`, `sellTotalFees`, `revFee`, `treasuryFee`, `teamFee`, `maxTransactionAmount`, `maxWallet`, `swapTokensAtAmount`, `limitsInEffect`, `launched`, and to add/remove addresses from fee and transaction limit exclusions. The owner can also update the `uniswapV2Pair` to an arbitrary address. This high degree of centralization presents a significant risk of malicious actions, such as draining funds, manipulating tokenomics, or disabling trading, leading to a potential rug pull or severe economic instability.
IssueThe `owner()` address has extensive control over critical contract parameters, including the ability to set `buyTotalFees`, `sellTotalFees`, `revFee`, `treasuryFee`, `teamFee`, `maxTransactionAmount`, `maxWallet`, `swapTokensAtAmount`, `limitsInEffect`, `launched`, and to add/remove addresses from fee and transaction limit exclusions. The owner can also update the `uniswapV2Pair` to an arbitrary address. This high degree of centralization presents a significant risk of malicious actions, such as draining funds, manipulating tokenomics, or disabling trading, leading to a potential rug pull or severe economic instability.
FixConsider implementing a decentralized governance mechanism (e.g., a multi-signature wallet or a DAO) for critical parameter changes. If decentralization is not feasible, clearly document the owner's responsibilities and consider time-locks or multi-party approvals for highly sensitive functions to reduce single-point-of-failure risks. Renouncing ownership without a robust governance system is not recommended given the current level of control.
StatusUnresolved
High

High Transaction Fees Detrimental to Adoption

H-01The contract implements extremely high transaction fees, with `buyTotalFees` and `sellTotalFees` both set to 40%. Such high fees are economically unsustainable for a cryptocurrency token and will severely deter legitimate trading activity. This can lead to low liquidity, reduced adoption, and a perception of the token as a speculative asset rather than a viable medium of exchange, ultimately harming its long-term value and stability.
IssueThe contract implements extremely high transaction fees, with `buyTotalFees` and `sellTotalFees` both set to 40%. Such high fees are economically unsustainable for a cryptocurrency token and will severely deter legitimate trading activity. This can lead to low liquidity, reduced adoption, and a perception of the token as a speculative asset rather than a viable medium of exchange, ultimately harming its long-term value and stability.
FixSignificantly reduce transaction fees to a more reasonable and competitive level (e.g., 1-10%). High fees often discourage trading and can lead to a 'dead' chart. A sustainable fee structure is crucial for fostering a healthy trading environment and encouraging adoption.
StatusUnresolved
High

Owner Can Change Uniswap Pair to Arbitrary Address

H-02The `updateUniswapV2Pair` function allows the owner to set the `uniswapV2Pair` address to any arbitrary address. A malicious owner could point this to a controlled contract or a non-existent address, effectively disrupting the automated liquidity provision mechanism, preventing swaps, or even draining funds if the new address is a malicious contract designed to exploit interactions.
IssueThe `updateUniswapV2Pair` function allows the owner to set the `uniswapV2Pair` address to any arbitrary address. A malicious owner could point this to a controlled contract or a non-existent address, effectively disrupting the automated liquidity provision mechanism, preventing swaps, or even draining funds if the new address is a malicious contract designed to exploit interactions.
FixRestrict the `updateUniswapV2Pair` function to only allow setting a new pair if it has been properly created and verified, or remove the ability to change the pair after initial deployment if the intention is for it to be immutable. If the functionality is necessary, consider adding a time-lock or multi-signature approval for such a critical change.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Hardcoded External Contract Addresses

M-01The contract hardcodes the addresses for `IUniswapV2Router02` (0x7a25…488D) and `WETH` (0xC02a…6Cc2). While these are standard addresses on Ethereum mainnet, hardcoding them makes the contract less flexible. In the event of a router upgrade, a WETH contract change, or deployment to a different network with different addresses, the contract would need to be redeployed, which is not possible for a non-upgradeable contract.
IssueThe contract hardcodes the addresses for `IUniswapV2Router02` () and `WETH` (). While these are standard addresses on Ethereum mainnet, hardcoding them makes the contract less flexible. In the event of a router upgrade, a WETH contract change, or deployment to a different network with different addresses, the contract would need to be redeployed, which is not possible for a non-upgradeable contract.
FixFor future contracts, consider making such critical external addresses configurable by the owner (with appropriate access controls and safeguards) or through a governance mechanism. For this deployed contract, this is a limitation that cannot be changed without redeployment.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

`renounceOwnership` Without Replacement Mechanism

M-02The `Ownable` contract includes a `renounceOwnership` function, which, if called, sets the contract owner to `address(0)`. Given the extensive owner privileges in the `Banana` contract (e.g., setting fees, limits, managing exclusions, updating the Uniswap pair), renouncing ownership without a robust, decentralized governance mechanism in place would render the contract unmanageable. This could prevent necessary parameter adjustments, bug fixes, or responses to unforeseen circumstances.
IssueThe `Ownable` contract includes a `renounceOwnership` function, which, if called, sets the contract owner to `address(0)`. Given the extensive owner privileges in the `Banana` contract (e.g., setting fees, limits, managing exclusions, updating the Uniswap pair), renouncing ownership without a robust, decentralized governance mechanism in place would render the contract unmanageable. This could prevent necessary parameter adjustments, bug fixes, or responses to unforeseen circumstances.
FixIf the intention is to decentralize control, ensure a fully functional and tested governance system (e.g., a DAO or a multi-signature wallet) is in place and capable of managing all critical parameters before `renounceOwnership` is ever considered. Otherwise, the owner should retain control to manage the contract's parameters responsibly.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Unnecessary `pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;`

I-01The `pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;` directive is included in the contract. `ABIEncoderV2` is no longer experimental since Solidity version 0.8.0. While its presence is harmless, it is no longer necessary for Solidity 0.8.21 and can be removed for cleaner code.
IssueThe `pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;` directive is included in the contract. `ABIEncoderV2` is no longer experimental since Solidity version 0.8.0. While its presence is harmless, it is no longer necessary for Solidity 0.8.21 and can be removed for cleaner code.
FixRemove the `pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2;` directive.
StatusUnresolved

Category Ratings

TechnicalHigh2/10

The contract utilizes Solidity 0.8.21, benefiting from built-in overflow/underflow protection. It includes a `swapping` flag to prevent reentrancy during automated liquidity operations, addressing a common vulnerability (7.2 Code Security). However, a critical technical flaw exists in the `swapAndLiquify` function, which performs swaps with `amountOutMin = 0`, exposing the contract to severe slippage and sandwich attacks (7.2 Code Security). Additionally, hardcoded external contract addresses reduce flexibility (7.1 Architecture).

GovernanceHigh1/10

The economic model is highly centralized, with the owner possessing extensive control over critical parameters such as transaction fees, max transaction amounts, and wallet limits (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic). A significant economic risk is the expired liquidity pool lock, which allows the owner to remove all liquidity, leading to a rug pull (7.4 Economic). The extremely high transaction fees (40% buy/sell) are economically unsustainable and likely to deter legitimate trading (7.4 Economic). The owner's ability to update the Uniswap pair to an arbitrary address introduces a severe governance risk (7.5 Governance).

UpgradesMedium4/10

The contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy (7.7 Upgrades). Therefore, there are no upgrade-specific risks or considerations. Any changes to the contract logic would require a new deployment and migration of assets.

Security Checklist

4/5 checks passed
Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedFail
No Mint FunctionPass
Liquidity LockedPass
Not a ProxyPass

Holder Composition

73.5% in top 10
27.6% in wallets45.9% in contracts
Effective Concentration46.0%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$3.14M across 2 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

LP Locked100.0% · Null Address, UNCX
Lock ExpiryExpired 335d ago

Key Addresses

7 addresses
Deployer
0x37aa…d66b
Unlocked LP Held By
0xb3ac…68a00x826f…1e650xdc86…6d910x0000…8a900x1f2f…f3870xf450…231a

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

5 factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — owner is an EOA (single private key)
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (73.5% total → 46.0% effective; 27.6% in EOAs, 45.9% in contracts — moderate)
  • 3 Critical finding(s) from audit
  • 2 High finding(s) from audit
  • 2 Medium finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Related Audits

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