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Is Anakin Skywalker a Scam?

ANAKINEthereum
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Last checked Nov 2, 2026 · 1 audit on recordNew Launch · 5h old
Chart
Medium RiskHow is this score calculated?
How the score breaks downratings: 10 is safest
Technical8/10Governance8/10Upgrades8/10Checks passed6 of 7Findings1 High · 1 Medium · 6 Info8
SummaryAI Copilot

The Anakin token is a standard ERC-20 implementation. The audit identified critical logic flaws regarding return values and insecure authorization patterns that could impact integration with decentralized exchanges and automated protocols.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Liquidity < $50k
  • Code: Incorrect Return Values in Transfer Functions
  • Code: Insecure Use of tx.origin for Authorization
Exact factors
  • Liquidity < $50k ($25,948 across 1 pairs — thin market)
  • Code: Incorrect Return Values in Transfer Functions (High, static analysis)
  • Code: Insecure Use of tx.origin for Authorization (Medium, static analysis)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (5h old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Nov 26 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Nov 2, 2026203 holders
15.2%Contracts12.0%Wallets72.9%Everyone else
15.2%Contracts12.0%Wallets72.9%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
27.1%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking15.2%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell12.0%
  • Everyone else193 holders72.9%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads18.0%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 2, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Nov 2$25.9K

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$25.9KShare of depth100.0%
LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Dead Address

Security Findings

1 High1 Medium6 Info
High

Incorrect Return Values in Transfer Functions

The _transfer, transfer, and transferFrom functions do not correctly handle or return the expected boolean values required by the ERC-20 standard. This can cause external protocols, such as decentralized exchanges, to incorrectly assume a transaction failed or succeeded, leading to locked funds or broken integrations.CD-01

Issue

The _transfer, transfer, and transferFrom functions do not correctly handle or return the expected boolean values required by the ERC-20 standard. This can cause external protocols, such as decentralized exchanges, to incorrectly assume a transaction failed or succeeded, leading to locked funds or broken integrations.

Fix

Update the transfer and transferFrom functions to explicitly return the boolean result of the transfer operation as defined in the ERC-20 specification.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Insecure Use of tx.origin for Authorization

The returnTx function uses tx.origin to determine authorization or apply rules. Because tx.origin refers to the original externally owned account that initiated the transaction, it is vulnerable to phishing attacks where a malicious contract can trick a user into calling a function that performs unauthorized actions on their behalf.CD-02

Issue

The returnTx function uses tx.origin to determine authorization or apply rules. Because tx.origin refers to the original externally owned account that initiated the transaction, it is vulnerable to phishing attacks where a malicious contract can trick a user into calling a function that performs unauthorized actions on their behalf.

Fix

Replace all instances of tx.origin with msg.sender to ensure that authorization is checked against the immediate caller of the function.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Who holds the supply

The ten largest holders own 27.1% of supply. What remains: 12.0% in wallets, 15.2% in other contracts. 203 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS

Issue

The ten largest holders own 27.1% of supply. What remains: 12.0% in wallets, 15.2% in other contracts. 203 holders in total.

Fix

Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Not listed by any independent source

203 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY

Issue

203 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.

Fix

Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Liquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn

100.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY

Issue

100.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.

Fix

Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

The market for this token

Liquidity $26K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $146K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET

Issue

Liquidity $26K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $146K (DexScreener, all pools).

Fix

Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Asset class: Project token

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $26K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE

Issue

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $26K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.

Fix

Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Recently launched — less than a day of market history

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT

Issue

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.

Fix

Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.

Status

Acknowledged

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 2
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The Anakin token is a standard ERC-20 implementation. The audit identified critical logic flaws regarding return values and insecure authorization patterns that could impact integration with decentralized exchanges and automated protocols. 7.1 Architecture: Standard ERC-20. 7.2 Code Security: High risk due to return value inconsistencies. 7.3 Access Control: Medium risk due to tx.origin usage. 7.4 Economic: Low risk. 7.5 Governance: N/A. 7.6 External: Medium risk. 7.7 Upgrades: N/A. 7.8 Operations: Low risk.

Technical8/10Low risk

The contract follows standard ERC-20 patterns for balance management and allowance tracking. However, the implementation of transfer logic contains flaws that deviate from the expected interface behavior. Specifically, the return values in the transfer path are inconsistent with the ERC-20 specification, which may cause failures in external smart contract integrations.

Governance8/10Low risk

The token does not implement complex economic mechanisms or governance structures. It functions as a simple asset transfer contract. No inflationary or deflationary logic was identified in the provided source.

Upgrades8/10Low risk

The contract is not upgradeable and does not utilize proxy patterns. The logic is immutable upon deployment. No upgrade-related risks are present.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

The development team should immediately correct the return value logic in the transfer functions to ensure full compliance with the ERC-20 standard.

Additionally, the use of tx.origin for authorization must be replaced with msg.sender to prevent potential phishing or contract-based exploitation.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkEthereum
Token age5h
Contract0xd1a4…262c
Deployer0x2611…cc70
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Audit History
  1. Nov 2, 202645Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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