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Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis

Is AgentPad a Scam?

PADBNB Chain
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Last checked Oct 23, 2026 · 1 audit on recordNew Launch · 17h old
Critical RiskHow is this score calculated?
SummaryAI Copilot

The AgentPadTokenV3 contract implements a custom token with integrated buy/sell functionality and minting capabilities.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by factory: EOA
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by factory: EOA
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Liquidity not locked
  • Liquidity < $50k
  • Code: Unchecked ERC-20 Transfer Results
Exact factors
  • A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by factory: EOA
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by factory: EOA
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool) — withdrawable by the owner/deployer — rug-pull risk
  • Liquidity < $50k ($18,729 across 1 pairs — thin market)
  • Code: Unchecked ERC-20 Transfer Results (High, static analysis)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (17h old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Oct 234 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintMintable
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Oct 23, 2026445 holders
2.0%17.5%Wallets24.8%DEX pools55.6%Everyone else
17.5%Wallets24.8%DEX pools55.6%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsDEX poolsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
44.4%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking2.0%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell17.5%
  • DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity24.8%
  • Everyone else435 holders55.6%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads18.3%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 23, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Oct 23$18.7K

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$18.7KShare of depth100.0%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder100.0%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%
Unlocked LP held by
0xa3b2…4bfc

A privileged address — the deployer, the owner, or the token contract itself — is among these holders, so that party can withdraw liquidity.

Security Findings

1 High3 Medium5 Info
High

Unchecked ERC-20 Transfer Results

The functions _finishV3 and _graduateV2 do not verify the return values of ERC-20 transfers, which may lead to silent failures if a transfer fails.CD-01

Issue

The functions _finishV3 and _graduateV2 do not verify the return values of ERC-20 transfers, which may lead to silent failures if a transfer fails.

Fix

Use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 library to perform transfers and ensure return values are validated.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Centralized Minting Control

The factory address has the authority to mint new tokens via buyWithBNB, sell, and related functions, which can dilute existing token holders.CP-01

Issue

The factory address has the authority to mint new tokens via buyWithBNB, sell, and related functions, which can dilute existing token holders.

Fix

Implement a hard cap on total supply or require a governance vote for significant minting events.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Transfer Gating by Factory

The factory controls a switch that can halt or enable transfers, giving it the power to freeze user assets or restrict trading at any time.CP-05

Issue

The factory controls a switch that can halt or enable transfers, giving it the power to freeze user assets or restrict trading at any time.

Fix

Document the specific conditions under which transfers are gated and provide transparency to users regarding these rules.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Liquidity not locked

0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% of the LP tokens sit in the token contract itself — only a function in the token's own code could move them, so whether this is a lock depends on that code and on who controls it. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY

Issue

0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% of the LP tokens sit in the token contract itself — only a function in the token's own code could move them, so whether this is a lock depends on that code and on who controls it. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.

Fix

Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Who holds the supply

The ten largest holders own 44.4% of supply. Of that, 24.8% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 17.5% in wallets, 2.0% in other contracts. The deployer/owner wallet itself holds 1.9%. 445 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS

Issue

The ten largest holders own 44.4% of supply. Of that, 24.8% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 17.5% in wallets, 2.0% in other contracts. The deployer/owner wallet itself holds 1.9%. 445 holders in total.

Fix

Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Not listed by any independent source

445 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY

Issue

445 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.

Fix

Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

The market for this token

Liquidity $19K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $123K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET

Issue

Liquidity $19K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $123K (DexScreener, all pools).

Fix

Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Asset class: Project token

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $19K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE

Issue

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $19K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.

Fix

Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Recently launched — less than a day of market history

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT

Issue

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.

Fix

Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.

Status

Acknowledged

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 23
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The AgentPadTokenV3 contract implements a custom token with integrated buy/sell functionality and minting capabilities. The architecture relies heavily on a factory-controlled state machine to manage token lifecycle and liquidity. While the core logic is functional, the contract exhibits significant centralization risks and potential failure points in external token interactions.

Technical4/10Medium risk

The contract utilizes ReentrancyGuard to protect sensitive buy/sell operations. 7.1 Architecture: The design tightly couples token logic with liquidity management. 7.2 Code Security: The failure to check ERC-20 return values in _finishV3 and _graduateV2 is a significant oversight. 7.3 Access Control: The factory contract holds absolute authority over minting and transfer gating.

Governance1/10High risk

7.4 Economic: The minting mechanism allows the factory to dilute holders at will. 7.5 Governance: There is no decentralized governance; the factory address acts as a single point of failure. 7.6 External: The protocol depends on the factory's integrity for all lifecycle transitions.

Upgrades2/10High risk

7.7 Upgrades: The contract is not upgradeable. 7.8 Operations: Operational risk is high due to the reliance on the factory address for critical state changes.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Implement strict return value checking for all external ERC-20 transfers to ensure transactions do not fail silently.

Consider introducing a multi-sig or timelock for the factory-controlled functions to mitigate the impact of a compromised or malicious factory address.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeAgentPadTokenV3
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age17h
Contract0xa3b2…4bfc
Deployer0xed59…ef59
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Audit History
  1. Oct 23, 202694Critical

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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