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AGCBNB Chain
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Last checked Nov 2, 2026 · 1 audit on recordNew Launch · 6h old
SummaryAI Copilot

The AGC token is a standard ERC-20 implementation with added administrative controls for minting, fee management, and transfer flow control.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through
  • Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by minter: Other-Contract
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Code: Rounding Loss Due to Division Before Multiplication
Exact factors
  • A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through
  • Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by minter: Other-Contract
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by minter: Other-Contract
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Code: Rounding Loss Due to Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (6h old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Nov 24 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintMintable
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax2% / 2%

Holders

as of audit · Nov 2, 20261,520 holders
33.3%Contracts4.8%16.7%DEX pools45.2%Everyone else
33.3%Contracts4.8%16.7%DEX pools45.2%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsDEX poolsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
54.8%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking33.3%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell4.8%
  • DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity16.7%
  • Everyone else1,510 holders45.2%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads18.1%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 2, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Nov 2$125.6K

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$125.6KShare of depth100.0%
LP Burned92.7%
LP Locked92.7% · Null Address
Unlocked LP held by
0x6288…37430x0ed9…9706

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

3 Medium1 Low6 Info
Medium

Centralized Minting Authority

The minter role has the authority to mint new tokens up to the maximum supply, which can lead to the dilution of existing token holders' value.CP-01

Issue

The minter role has the authority to mint new tokens up to the maximum supply, which can lead to the dilution of existing token holders' value.

Fix

Restrict minting capabilities or implement a multi-signature requirement for all minting operations.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Administrative Control Over Transfers

The swapBackSelf function allows the controller to toggle a switch that can halt or enable token transfers, potentially locking user funds.CP-05

Issue

The swapBackSelf function allows the controller to toggle a switch that can halt or enable token transfers, potentially locking user funds.

Fix

Remove the ability to pause transfers or implement a clear, public-facing policy for when this function is utilized.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Unrestricted Fee Modification

The minter role can arbitrarily change transfer fees, which directly affects the economic outcome of every transaction for users.CP-07

Issue

The minter role can arbitrarily change transfer fees, which directly affects the economic outcome of every transaction for users.

Fix

Set a hard cap on the maximum fee percentage that can be configured by the administrator.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Rounding Loss Due to Division Before Multiplication

In the _swapBack function, performing division before multiplication can result in precision loss, leading to inaccurate fee calculations.CD-01

Issue

In the _swapBack function, performing division before multiplication can result in precision loss, leading to inaccurate fee calculations.

Fix

Reorder mathematical operations to perform multiplication before division to maintain precision.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Who holds the supply

The ten largest holders own 54.8% of supply. Of that, 16.7% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 4.8% in wallets, 33.3% in other contracts. 1,520 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS

Issue

The ten largest holders own 54.8% of supply. Of that, 16.7% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 4.8% in wallets, 33.3% in other contracts. 1,520 holders in total.

Fix

Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Not listed by any independent source

1,520 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY

Issue

1,520 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.

Fix

Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Liquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn

92.7% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 92.7% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 7.3% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY

Issue

92.7% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 92.7% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 7.3% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.

Fix

Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

The market for this token

Liquidity $126K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $546K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET

Issue

Liquidity $126K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $546K (DexScreener, all pools).

Fix

Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Asset class: Project token

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 2% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $126K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE

Issue

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 2% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $126K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.

Fix

Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Recently launched — less than a day of market history

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT

Issue

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.

Fix

Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.

Status

Acknowledged

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 2
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The AGC token is a standard ERC-20 implementation with added administrative controls for minting, fee management, and transfer flow control. The contract relies on a centralized minter role and internal logic for swap-back operations. While the code is structurally sound, the high degree of administrative privilege poses a significant centralization risk to token holders.

Technical8/10Low risk

The contract follows standard ERC-20 patterns with clean logic for state management. 7.1 Architecture is straightforward, though 7.2 Code Security reveals minor rounding issues. 7.3 Access Control is strictly enforced via a minter role, though this creates a single point of failure. 7.6 External interactions are limited, reducing the attack surface for external exploits.

Governance4/10Medium risk

7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance aspects are highly centralized. The minter role has unilateral power to dilute supply and adjust fees, which directly impacts holder value. There are no time-locks or multi-signature requirements for these sensitive operations, leaving users vulnerable to administrative abuse.

Upgrades4/10Medium risk

7.7 Upgrades are not supported as the contract is not a proxy. 7.8 Operations are handled via fixed administrative roles. The lack of upgradeability ensures immutability but prevents emergency patching of the current logic.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is recommended to transition the minter role to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract to mitigate centralization risks.

Additionally, implementing a time-lock for sensitive fee and supply changes would provide transparency and protection for token holders.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age6h
Contract0x63de…4ba6
Deployer0xeb74…d82c
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Audit History
  1. Nov 2, 202648Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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