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Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis

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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on recordNew Launch · 1d old
SummaryAI Copilot

The audit of the Token contract, an ERC-20 token, revealed a generally robust technical implementation leveraging OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Token age < 7 days
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Token age < 7 days (early, volatile)
  • 1 High finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (1d old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 46 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax0% / 0%

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
31.8%Contracts6.1%62.2%Everyone else
31.8%Contracts6.1%62.2%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
37.8%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking31.8%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell6.1%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply62.2%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads18.8%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$544.5K across 2 pairs

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$544.5KShare of depth100.0%
LP Locked64.8% · UNCX V4 Lock
Top-1 Unlocked Holder35.2%
Top-3 Unlocked35.2%
Unlocked LP held by
0x40ee…3abb

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High3 Info
High

Centralized Initial Supply Distribution

The Token contract's constructor mints the entire TOTAL_SUPPLY (100,000,000 tokens) to a single recipient address. This design choice results in a highly centralized initial distribution, granting the recipient complete control over the token supply. This centralization can lead to significant market manipulation risks, lack of decentralization, and potential single point of failure for the token's ecosystem.H-01

Issue

The Token contract's constructor mints the entire TOTAL_SUPPLY (100,000,000 tokens) to a single recipient address. This design choice results in a highly centralized initial distribution, granting the recipient complete control over the token supply. This centralization can lead to significant market manipulation risks, lack of decentralization, and potential single point of failure for the token's ecosystem.

Fix

If decentralization is a goal, consider implementing a more distributed initial supply mechanism. This could involve a vesting contract, a multi-signature wallet for the recipient, a public sale, or a phased distribution strategy. Clearly communicate the distribution strategy to stakeholders.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Reliance on OpenZeppelin Libraries

The contract extensively utilizes battle-tested OpenZeppelin contracts (ERC20, ERC20Burnable, ERC20Permit). This is a strong security practice as these libraries are widely audited and maintained. However, it also means that any undiscovered vulnerability in the specific versions of the OpenZeppelin contracts used would directly impact this token.I-01

Issue

The contract extensively utilizes battle-tested OpenZeppelin contracts (ERC20, ERC20Burnable, ERC20Permit). This is a strong security practice as these libraries are widely audited and maintained. However, it also means that any undiscovered vulnerability in the specific versions of the OpenZeppelin contracts used would directly impact this token.

Fix

Regularly monitor OpenZeppelin security advisories and consider upgrading to newer versions of the libraries if critical vulnerabilities are patched. Ensure the exact versions of OpenZeppelin contracts used are pinned in the package.json or equivalent dependency management system.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Immutability of Token Parameters

The token's name, symbol, decimals (fixed at 18), and TOTAL_SUPPLY are set as constants or in the constructor and cannot be modified after deployment. While this provides predictability and transparency, it removes any flexibility for future adjustments, such as re-branding or supply modifications, which might be desired in some long-term project roadmaps.I-02

Issue

The token's name, symbol, decimals (fixed at 18), and TOTAL_SUPPLY are set as constants or in the constructor and cannot be modified after deployment. While this provides predictability and transparency, it removes any flexibility for future adjustments, such as re-branding or supply modifications, which might be desired in some long-term project roadmaps.

Fix

This is a design choice inherent to standard ERC-20 tokens. Ensure that the project's long-term vision aligns with these immutable parameters. If future flexibility is desired, an upgradeable token contract or a different tokenomics model would be required.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Fixed Solidity Compiler Version

The contract specifies a fixed Solidity compiler version pragma solidity 0.8.35;. While this prevents unexpected behavior from future compiler changes, it might miss out on minor bug fixes or optimizations introduced in newer patch versions within the 0.8.x series.I-03

Issue

The contract specifies a fixed Solidity compiler version pragma solidity 0.8.35;. While this prevents unexpected behavior from future compiler changes, it might miss out on minor bug fixes or optimizations introduced in newer patch versions within the 0.8.x series.

Fix

Consider using a floating pragma (e.g., ^0.8.35) if minor patch updates are desired, or regularly review and update the fixed version to the latest stable patch within the major version if no breaking changes are introduced. Always test thoroughly after any compiler version change.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The audit of the Token contract, an ERC-20 token, revealed a generally robust technical implementation leveraging OpenZeppelin's battle-tested libraries. The primary concern identified is the highly centralized initial distribution of the entire token supply to a single recipient, which poses significant economic and governance risks.

Technical9/10Low risk

The contract demonstrates strong technical security by inheriting from OpenZeppelin's ERC20, ERC20Burnable, and ERC20Permit libraries, which are widely audited and considered secure (7.2 Code Security). Standard ERC20 functionalities like transfers, approvals, and burning are implemented correctly. The use of Solidity 0.8.35 ensures protection against integer overflows/underflows by default, except in explicitly unchecked blocks which are used appropriately within OZ logic. No reentrancy or other common technical vulnerabilities were found (7.2 Code Security).

Governance4/10Medium risk

The contract's economic model is straightforward, with a clearly defined TOTAL_SUPPLY and initial distribution mechanism (7.4 Economic). However, this model introduces a high centralization risk as the entire token supply is minted to a single recipient address during deployment. This grants the initial recipient complete control over the token's distribution and potential market influence, lacking any on-chain governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance) for broader community input.

Upgrades7/10Low risk

The contract is not designed to be upgradeable, as indicated by is_proxy: false in the provided information (7.7 Upgrades). This eliminates upgrade-related risks such as proxy misconfigurations or logic inconsistencies between implementation versions. The immutability of the contract ensures predictable behavior post-deployment.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

It is strongly recommended to carefully consider the implications of the highly centralized initial token distribution.

If a decentralized distribution is desired, mechanisms such as a vesting schedule, multi-signature wallet for the recipient, or a public sale contract should be explored to mitigate the risks associated with a single point of control. For future token designs, consider implementing a more distributed initial supply or incorporating governance features if broader community participation is intended.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeToken
NetworkBase
Token age1d
Contract0x1ea8…8dd2
Deployer0x4cc2…6945
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202617Low
  2. Sep 1, 202625Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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