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Is Vangrid a Scam?

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis

Vangrid VAGRD
0x32a1…8356
Arbitrum
Not verifiedThis record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.
Last checked today 1 audit on record New Launch · 1d old
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

This report provides a security assessment for the contract at 0x32a1026b7c249d30e6c0901ffefa9626dc908356 on Arbitrum. Due to the absence of provided source code, a comprehensive technical analysis could not be performed. The assessment is based on general smart contract security principles and potential risks inherent in any EVM contract. All findings are theoretical and highlight common vulnerabilities that *could* exist in a contract without proper security considerations.

1 High4 Medium2 Low6 Informational
! Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (1d old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.
Volume 24h
$128.2K
Liquidity
$78.0K
Price
$0.01341
Token Age
1d
Top 10 Holders
82.1%

Security Findings

High

Potential Reentrancy Vulnerability

H-01Without source code, it's impossible to confirm, but reentrancy is a common and critical vulnerability where an external call can re-enter the calling contract before the first execution is complete, leading to repeated withdrawals or state manipulation. (7.2 Code Security)
IssueWithout source code, it's impossible to confirm, but reentrancy is a common and critical vulnerability where an external call can re-enter the calling contract before the first execution is complete, leading to repeated withdrawals or state manipulation. (7.2 Code Security)
FixImplement reentrancy guards (e.g., OpenZeppelin's `ReentrancyGuard`) on all functions that make external calls and modify state. Follow the Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Inadequate Access Control

M-01The contract might lack proper access control mechanisms (7.3 Access Control), potentially allowing unauthorized users to execute sensitive functions, modify critical parameters, or drain funds. This could include missing `onlyOwner` or role-based checks.
IssueThe contract might lack proper access control mechanisms (7.3 Access Control), potentially allowing unauthorized users to execute sensitive functions, modify critical parameters, or drain funds. This could include missing `onlyOwner` or role-based checks.
FixImplement strict role-based access control (RBAC) or `onlyOwner` modifiers for all sensitive functions. Clearly define and document the roles and their permissions.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Integer Overflow/Underflow Risks

M-02Arithmetic operations within the contract (7.2 Code Security) could be susceptible to integer overflows or underflows if not handled with `SafeMath` or Solidity versions >=0.8.0. This can lead to incorrect calculations, unexpected state changes, or fund manipulation.
IssueArithmetic operations within the contract (7.2 Code Security) could be susceptible to integer overflows or underflows if not handled with `SafeMath` or Solidity versions >=0.8.0. This can lead to incorrect calculations, unexpected state changes, or fund manipulation.
FixUse Solidity 0.8.0 or higher, which includes built-in overflow/underflow checks. For older versions, utilize `SafeMath` library for all arithmetic operations.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Centralization Risks / Single Point of Failure

M-03The contract might rely heavily on a single privileged address (e.g., `owner`) for critical operations (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance). This creates a single point of failure, making the protocol vulnerable if the private key is compromised or the owner acts maliciously.
IssueThe contract might rely heavily on a single privileged address (e.g., `owner`) for critical operations (7.3 Access Control, 7.5 Governance). This creates a single point of failure, making the protocol vulnerable if the private key is compromised or the owner acts maliciously.
FixConsider implementing a multi-signature wallet for critical administrative functions. Explore decentralized governance mechanisms or time-locks for sensitive operations to reduce centralization risks.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Liquidity not locked

QA-LIQUIDITY0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x7ba1…cd9a — holds 99.8% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider.
Issue0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x7ba1…cd9a — holds 99.8% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider.
FixCheck the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
StatusAcknowledged
Low

Lack of Event Emission for Critical Actions

L-01Important state changes or actions (7.2 Code Security, 7.8 Operations) might not be emitting events. This hinders off-chain monitoring, auditing, and user interface updates, making it difficult to track contract activity.
IssueImportant state changes or actions (7.2 Code Security, 7.8 Operations) might not be emitting events. This hinders off-chain monitoring, auditing, and user interface updates, making it difficult to track contract activity.
FixEmit events for all critical state changes, administrative actions, and significant value transfers. This improves transparency and allows for easier off-chain monitoring and debugging.
StatusUnresolved
Low

Unhandled External Call Failures

L-02If the contract interacts with external contracts (7.6 External), it might not properly handle potential failures of these external calls. This could lead to unexpected behavior, locked funds, or inconsistent state.
IssueIf the contract interacts with external contracts (7.6 External), it might not properly handle potential failures of these external calls. This could lead to unexpected behavior, locked funds, or inconsistent state.
FixAlways check the return values of external calls and handle potential failures gracefully, either by reverting the transaction or implementing a recovery mechanism.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Missing Natspec Documentation

I-01The absence of Natspec comments (7.2 Code Security) for functions, parameters, and return values makes the contract harder to understand, audit, and integrate with, increasing the likelihood of misinterpretation or errors.
IssueThe absence of Natspec comments (7.2 Code Security) for functions, parameters, and return values makes the contract harder to understand, audit, and integrate with, increasing the likelihood of misinterpretation or errors.
FixAdd comprehensive Natspec documentation to all public and external functions, explaining their purpose, parameters, return values, and any preconditions or postconditions.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Who holds the supply

QA-HOLDERSThe ten largest holders own 82.1% of supply. Of that, 2.9% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 68.1% in wallets, 11.2% in other contracts. The deployer/owner wallet itself holds 8.3%. 2,247 holders in total.
IssueThe ten largest holders own 82.1% of supply. Of that, 2.9% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 68.1% in wallets, 11.2% in other contracts. The deployer/owner wallet itself holds 8.3%. 2,247 holders in total.
FixWatch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

Not listed by any independent source

QA-IDENTITY2,247 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Issue2,247 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
FixMatch the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

The market for this token

QA-MARKETLiquidity $78K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $128K (DexScreener, all pools).
IssueLiquidity $78K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $128K (DexScreener, all pools).
FixSize any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

Asset class: Project token

QA-PROFILEA token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mint capability could not be read. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $78K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 1 days of market history.
IssueA token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mint capability could not be read. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $78K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: 1 days of market history.
FixCheck the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

Recently launched — 1 day of market history

QA-RECENTThe token's oldest DEX pool is 1 day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
IssueThe token's oldest DEX pool is 1 day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
FixRe-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
StatusAcknowledged

Category Ratings

TechnicalMedium6/10

Without source code (7.2 Code Security), a detailed technical assessment is impossible. However, robust smart contracts typically employ secure coding practices, including reentrancy guards and careful handling of external calls. Potential issues could include reentrancy vulnerabilities, integer overflows/underflows, or improper error handling. Adherence to established patterns and thorough testing are crucial for technical soundness.

GovernanceHigh1/10

The economic model and governance structure (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance) are unknown without source code. A well-designed system would feature transparent governance mechanisms, clear tokenomics, and safeguards against economic manipulation, such as oracle attacks or flash loan exploits. Conversely, a lack of these could expose the protocol to significant financial risks or centralized control.

UpgradesMedium6/10

The upgradeability mechanism (7.7 Upgrades) is unknown. If the contract is upgradeable, a secure proxy pattern (e.g., UUPS or Transparent) with proper access control for upgrades is essential. Without this, there's a risk of unmanaged changes or a lack of future adaptability. If not upgradeable, immutability provides security but sacrifices flexibility.

Security Checklist

Contract VerifiedFail
Ownership Renounced?
No Mint Function?
Liquidity LockedFail
Not a ProxyPass
HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

68.1% in wallets11.2% in contracts
Effective Concentration72.5%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

Top-1 Unlocked Holder99.8%
Top-3 Unlocked100.0%

Key Addresses

Deployer
0x1e4d…8834
Unlocked LP Held By
0x7ba1…cd9a0x1d2a…158c

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

What Raised This Score

  • Mint capability UNKNOWN (implementation ABI unreadable)
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Liquidity NOT locked (100% of the pool) — held by independent providers — market-depth risk
  • Top-10 concentration > 70% (82.1% total → 72.5% effective; 68.1% in EOAs, 11.2% in contracts; 2.9% burned, locked or in pools excluded)
  • Contract source NOT verified — its logic cannot be read

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

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