The Uni contract implements an ERC-20 token with governance delegation and a controlled minting mechanism. The contract correctly utilizes OpenZeppelin's SafeMath library to prevent integer overflows/underflows, which is appropriate for its Solidity version. A key centralization risk exists with the minter role, which has significant control over token supply, albeit with defined limits. The contract is not upgradeable, ensuring immutability.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is Uniswap Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The Uni contract implements an ERC-20 token with governance delegation and a controlled minting mechanism.
Read the full analysis- Ownership not renounced
- Mintable supply, but capped at 2.0%/year
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- LP lock status UNKNOWN — the pool's LP could not be read
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership NOT renounced (admin/mint authority retained)
- Mintable supply, but capped at 2.0%/year
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (52.3% total → 35.6% effective; 24.4% in EOAs, 28.0% in contracts — moderate)
- LP lock status UNKNOWN — the pool's LP could not be read
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking28.0%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell24.4%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply47.7%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4- Uniswap v3WETHAnalysed$18.12M42.2%
- Uniswap v4ETH$4.50M10.5%
- Uniswap v3WETH$3.91M9.1%
- Uniswap v4USDC$3.79M8.8%
- Uniswap v2WETH$3.62M8.4%
- Uniswap v4AAVE$3.19M7.4%
Show 4 more pairs
The 12 remaining pairs hold $1.09M between them and are not listed. The risk score reads depth across every pair.
Whether the LP tokens are locked could not be determined.
Security Findings
HighCentralized Minter Role
The minter address has the sole authority to mint new tokens, subject to mintCap and time constraints. This represents a significant centralization risk (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic). If the minter's private key is compromised, an attacker could inflate the token supply up to the mintCap per year, devaluing existing tokens. The setMinter function allows the current minter to transfer this critical role, which is also a high-privilege operation.H-01
Issue
The minter address has the sole authority to mint new tokens, subject to mintCap and time constraints. This represents a significant centralization risk (7.3 Access Control, 7.4 Economic). If the minter's private key is compromised, an attacker could inflate the token supply up to the mintCap per year, devaluing existing tokens. The setMinter function allows the current minter to transfer this critical role, which is also a high-privilege operation.
Fix
Consider decentralizing the minter role by assigning it to a robust multi-signature wallet (e.g., Gnosis Safe) or a community-governed smart contract. This would require multiple approvals for minting operations or role transfers, significantly reducing the risk of a single point of failure.
Status
Unresolved
LowPotential High Gas Costs for Checkpoints
The _writeCheckpoint function stores historical vote data for each account. While necessary for the governance delegation mechanism, if an account frequently delegates or transfers tokens, the numCheckpoints for that address could grow very large. This could lead to increased gas costs for subsequent _writeCheckpoint operations or for reading historical vote data (7.8 Operations).L-01
Issue
The _writeCheckpoint function stores historical vote data for each account. While necessary for the governance delegation mechanism, if an account frequently delegates or transfers tokens, the numCheckpoints for that address could grow very large. This could lead to increased gas costs for subsequent _writeCheckpoint operations or for reading historical vote data (7.8 Operations).
Fix
While this is an inherent design choice for Compound-style governance, consider monitoring the growth of numCheckpoints for highly active addresses. For future iterations, explore alternative checkpointing strategies or gas optimization techniques if this becomes a significant operational burden.
Status
Unresolved
InfoOlder Solidity Compiler Version
The contract is compiled with Solidity version ^0.5.16. While SafeMath is correctly used to prevent integer overflows/underflows, newer Solidity versions (e.g., 0.8.x) include built-in overflow/underflow checks by default, making external libraries like SafeMath largely redundant and potentially saving gas (7.2 Code Security). Newer compilers also offer additional language features and security improvements.I-01
Issue
The contract is compiled with Solidity version ^0.5.16. While SafeMath is correctly used to prevent integer overflows/underflows, newer Solidity versions (e.g., 0.8.x) include built-in overflow/underflow checks by default, making external libraries like SafeMath largely redundant and potentially saving gas (7.2 Code Security). Newer compilers also offer additional language features and security improvements.
Fix
For future contract deployments or upgrades, consider migrating to a more recent Solidity compiler version (e.g., 0.8.x). This would allow for the removal of SafeMath library calls, simplifying the code and potentially reducing gas costs, while benefiting from the latest compiler optimizations and security features.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The contract demonstrates good code security practices by using OpenZeppelin's SafeMath library to prevent arithmetic overflows/underflows (7.2 Code Security). The implementation of ERC-20, EIP-712 signatures for permit and delegateBySig, and the Compound-style delegation mechanism are standard and well-understood (7.1 Architecture). However, the use of an older Solidity compiler version (^0.5.16) means reliance on SafeMath is necessary, whereas newer versions offer built-in checks, and the gas cost for updating vote checkpoints could become substantial for accounts with many historical delegations (7.8 Operations).
The contract incorporates a robust governance delegation system, allowing token holders to delegate their voting power, which is a strength for decentralized decision-making (7.5 Governance). Economically, the minter role holds significant power to inflate the token supply, albeit constrained by a mintCap of 2% and a minimumTimeBetweenMints of one year (7.4 Economic). The centralization of the minter role presents a single point of failure for token supply control (7.3 Access Control).
The contract is not designed with an upgrade mechanism (e.g., proxy pattern), meaning its logic is immutable once deployed (7.7 Upgrades). This eliminates upgrade-related risks such as proxy misconfigurations or malicious upgrade implementations. However, it also means that any future bug fixes or feature enhancements would require a new contract deployment and migration of assets.
It is recommended to consider migrating to a newer Solidity compiler version (e.g., 0.8.x) in future iterations to leverage built-in overflow checks and other language improvements.
The minter role, which currently holds significant power, should ideally be controlled by a robust multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance mechanism to mitigate centralization risks and enhance security. Regular security reviews of the minter's operational procedures are also advised.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Jul 23, 202650Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Uniswap a scam?
Based on the data, Uniswap (UNI) does not exhibit typical scam characteristics; its contract is verified, and no mint function exists, preventing arbitrary supply inflation. However, non-renounced ownership and significant token concentration (52.3% by top 10 holders) introduce centralization risks. While these contribute to its 'High Risk' score of 68/100 and warrant caution, they do not inherently categorize Uniswap as a scam.
Is Uniswap safe to buy?
UNI carries a 'High Risk' score (68/100) due to several factors. Contract ownership is not renounced, and liquidity is unlocked, raising concerns about administrative control over token parameters or market stability. Additionally, 52.3% of the supply is concentrated among the top 10 holders. These factors suggest potential for centralized influence, meaning investors should exercise elevated caution and conduct thorough due diligence.
Has Uniswap been audited?
The Uniswap (UNI) contract is verified, meaning its deployed bytecode matches the publicly available source code. This offers transparency for community review. However, contract verification differs from a comprehensive security audit, which involves expert analysis to identify vulnerabilities and logic flaws. The provided data confirms verification but does not explicitly indicate a full security audit has been performed.
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