The LayerZeroToken contract is an Omnichain Fungible Token (OFT) built on LayerZero v2, inheriting from OpenZeppelin's Ownable. It facilitates cross-chain token transfers. The contract's design follows standard LayerZero patterns, leveraging battle-tested libraries. The initial owner is a 3/5 multisig, which significantly enhances access control security.
On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is LayerZero Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The LayerZeroToken contract is an Omnichain Fungible Token (OFT) built on LayerZero v2, inheriting from OpenZeppelin's Ownable.
Read the full analysis- Ownership not renounced — strong Multisig
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 88.6%
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership NOT renounced — strong Multisig (3-of-5)
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (50.4% total → 49.0% effective; 48.1% in EOAs, 2.3% in contracts — moderate)
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 88.6% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 54% of DEX liquidity)
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking2.3%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell48.1%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply49.6%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4- UniswapWETHAnalysed$84.4K54.3%
- UniswapWETH$21.0K13.5%
- Camelot v3WETH$19.5K12.6%
- UniswapUSD₮0$10.6K6.8%
- UniswapUSDC$7.8K5.0%
- PancakeswapWETH$6.6K4.3%
Show 3 more pairs
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0xb1a3…80ed0x8a81…e9b90x933b…b0690x04a1…e5af0xa984…1f590xdd66…bc180xbb93…ef5d0xf757…a5070x5c12…ff970xff18…e823No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
MediumCentralized Control by Owner
The contract owner (initialized by _delegate) possesses significant administrative privileges, including the ability to call setPeer and setDelegate. These functions are critical for the cross-chain functionality of the OFT, allowing the owner to define which external contracts can interact with this token across chains and to change the LayerZero endpoint's delegate. While the owner is a 3/5 multisig, these privileges are still substantial.M-01
Issue
The contract owner (initialized by _delegate) possesses significant administrative privileges, including the ability to call setPeer and setDelegate. These functions are critical for the cross-chain functionality of the OFT, allowing the owner to define which external contracts can interact with this token across chains and to change the LayerZero endpoint's delegate. While the owner is a 3/5 multisig, these privileges are still substantial.
Fix
While the owner is a multisig, which mitigates risk, it is crucial to ensure the multisig's security and operational procedures are robust. Consider implementing time-locks for critical administrative actions to provide a window for community review or emergency intervention, further decentralizing control over time.
Status
Unresolved
LowPotential for Operational Misconfiguration
The setPeer function, callable by the owner, allows configuring the bytes32 peer for a given uint32 eid. An incorrect peer address or eid could lead to cross-chain messages failing or being routed incorrectly, causing operational disruption for token transfers. This is an operational risk rather than a code vulnerability.L-01
Issue
The setPeer function, callable by the owner, allows configuring the bytes32 peer for a given uint32 eid. An incorrect peer address or eid could lead to cross-chain messages failing or being routed incorrectly, causing operational disruption for token transfers. This is an operational risk rather than a code vulnerability.
Fix
Implement robust operational procedures and thorough testing for any changes to peer configurations. Consider adding a mechanism (e.g., a two-step process or a delay) for critical configuration changes to prevent immediate adverse effects from human error.
Status
Unresolved
InfoReliance on External LayerZero Endpoint Security
The LayerZeroToken contract is inherently dependent on the security and correct functioning of the LayerZero Endpoint V2 contract. All cross-chain messaging and fee payments are routed through this external endpoint. Any vulnerability, misconfiguration, or compromise of the LayerZero Endpoint could directly impact the functionality and security of the LayerZeroToken.I-01
Issue
The LayerZeroToken contract is inherently dependent on the security and correct functioning of the LayerZero Endpoint V2 contract. All cross-chain messaging and fee payments are routed through this external endpoint. Any vulnerability, misconfiguration, or compromise of the LayerZero Endpoint could directly impact the functionality and security of the LayerZeroToken.
Fix
While this is an inherent dependency of using LayerZero, it is important for the protocol to continuously monitor the security posture and operational status of the LayerZero infrastructure and any updates or advisories they release.
Status
Unresolved
InfoNon-Upgradeability Requires Redeployment for Changes
The LayerZeroToken contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable contract. This means that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or protocol changes would require deploying an entirely new contract and migrating all existing token holders and liquidity. This can be a complex and costly process.I-02
Issue
The LayerZeroToken contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable contract. This means that any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or protocol changes would require deploying an entirely new contract and migrating all existing token holders and liquidity. This can be a complex and costly process.
Fix
Acknowledge the implications of non-upgradeability. For future versions or other protocol components, consider if an upgradeable proxy pattern (e.g., UUPS) would be more suitable if flexibility and future-proofing are desired, weighing the benefits against the added complexity and potential risks of upgradeability.
Status
Unresolved
InfoLZ Token Availability Check
The _payLzToken function explicitly checks if endpoint.lzToken() returns address(0) and reverts with LzTokenUnavailable() if it does. This indicates that the LayerZero endpoint might not always have an associated LZ token for fee payments, or it might be configurable.I-03
Issue
The _payLzToken function explicitly checks if endpoint.lzToken() returns address(0) and reverts with LzTokenUnavailable() if it does. This indicates that the LayerZero endpoint might not always have an associated LZ token for fee payments, or it might be configurable.
Fix
Ensure clear documentation and operational understanding of when and how LZ token payments are expected or required, and the implications if the LZ token is unavailable for cross-chain transactions. This helps in managing user expectations and troubleshooting.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The technical architecture (7.1) is sound, utilizing the LayerZero v2 OApp framework and OpenZeppelin's Ownable for access control. Code security (7.2) benefits from Solidity 0.8.x's default overflow/underflow checks and SafeERC20 for token interactions. Access control (7.3) is well-defined with onlyOwner modifiers for critical functions like setPeer and setDelegate, and robust checks in lzReceive for endpoint and peer validation. No direct reentrancy or other severe code vulnerabilities were identified in the provided snippets.
The governance and economic model (7.5, 7.4) centers around the _delegate address, which is the contract owner. This owner has administrative control over LayerZero configurations, such as setting cross-chain peers and the endpoint delegate. The use of a 3/5 multisig for the owner (7.8 Operations) is a strong security measure, distributing control and reducing the risk of a single point of failure or malicious action. However, the owner's extensive privileges still represent a centralized point of control.
The LayerZeroToken contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable implementation (7.7). This eliminates risks associated with proxy patterns, such as storage collisions or incorrect upgrade logic. However, any future protocol changes or bug fixes would necessitate deploying an entirely new contract and migrating existing token holders, which can be a complex and costly process.
The LayerZeroToken contract is a well-implemented OFT following established patterns.
The primary security considerations revolve around the administrative control held by the owner and the inherent dependencies on the LayerZero protocol. Ensure the multisig owner's operational security is paramount, and maintain vigilance regarding the LayerZero Endpoint's status and security. For future protocol iterations, consider the trade-offs of upgradeability versus immutability.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 4, 202630Low
- Sep 3, 202633Low
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the ZRO contract address?
The LayerZero (ZRO) contract on Arbitrum is 0x6985884c4392d348587b19cb9eaaf157f13271cd. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is LayerZero a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for LayerZero is 30/100 (Low risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Retained; Mint: No mint; Liquidity lock: Not locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is ZRO liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Not locked (as of Sep 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $155.4K.
Who holds ZRO?
As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 50.4% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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