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Is HEX Safe?

Ethereum
Not verified This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

This audit covers standard OpenZeppelin library contracts (Context, IERC20, SafeMath) from Solidity version 0.5.13. These foundational components are generally robust and widely used.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN
  • Top-10 concentration > 20%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 57.0%
Exact factors
  • Ownership status UNKNOWN (owner could not be resolved)
  • Top-10 concentration > 20% (40.6% total → 28.4% effective; 20.2% in EOAs, 20.3% in contracts — mild)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • LP top1 unlocked holder = 57.0% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 42% of DEX liquidity)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 43 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipUnknown
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
20.3%Contracts20.2%Wallets59.4%Everyone else
20.3%Contracts20.2%Wallets59.4%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
40.6%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking20.3%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell20.2%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply59.4%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads28.4%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$1.18M across 10 pairs
LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$497.6KShare of depth42.2%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder57.0%
Top-3 Unlocked72.1%
Unlocked LP held by
0x0118…53f00xd7ce…e8fe0xbe06…b23a0xed0f…81140x4a90…656b0x6146…d70c0x1ffd…82910x4c8d…baf90xe2ff…9d6d0x373d…4462

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

3 Info
Info

Older Solidity Compiler Version (0.5.13)

The contracts are compiled with Solidity version 0.5.13. While functional, this is an older compiler version. Newer versions (e.g., 0.8.x) include native overflow/underflow checks, improved optimizer, and new language features that enhance security and developer experience. Relying on older versions might miss out on these advancements and potentially expose the project to known compiler-related quirks or bugs that have since been patched.I-01

Issue

The contracts are compiled with Solidity version 0.5.13. While functional, this is an older compiler version. Newer versions (e.g., 0.8.x) include native overflow/underflow checks, improved optimizer, and new language features that enhance security and developer experience. Relying on older versions might miss out on these advancements and potentially expose the project to known compiler-related quirks or bugs that have since been patched.

Fix

Consider upgrading to a more recent Solidity compiler version (e.g., 0.8.x) for new development. If upgrading is not feasible for existing contracts, ensure thorough testing and awareness of any known issues specific to Solidity 0.5.13. For new contracts, leverage the native overflow checks in Solidity 0.8.0+ to simplify code and reduce reliance on SafeMath.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Missing Core Application Logic for Comprehensive Audit

The audit scope was limited to foundational libraries (Context, IERC20, SafeMath). The main application contract, referred to as 'HEX' in the prefill data, was not provided for review. This limitation prevents a comprehensive security assessment of the entire protocol's business logic, access control mechanisms (7.3 Access Control), economic model (7.4 Economic), and interactions with external contracts (7.6 External).I-02

Issue

The audit scope was limited to foundational libraries (Context, IERC20, SafeMath). The main application contract, referred to as 'HEX' in the prefill data, was not provided for review. This limitation prevents a comprehensive security assessment of the entire protocol's business logic, access control mechanisms (7.3 Access Control), economic model (7.4 Economic), and interactions with external contracts (7.6 External).

Fix

To obtain a complete security posture, the core application contract(s) must be provided for a full audit. This would allow for a thorough analysis of potential vulnerabilities such as reentrancy, access control flaws, economic exploits, and integration risks specific to the protocol's unique design.

Status

Unresolved

Info

ERC20 approve Race Condition Warning

The IERC20 interface documentation explicitly highlights a potential race condition when changing an allowance using the approve function. If a user calls approve(spender, newAmount) while a malicious spender is monitoring the transaction, the spender could front-run the transaction, spend the oldAmount, and then allow the newAmount to be set, effectively spending oldAmount + newAmount.I-03

Issue

The IERC20 interface documentation explicitly highlights a potential race condition when changing an allowance using the approve function. If a user calls approve(spender, newAmount) while a malicious spender is monitoring the transaction, the spender could front-run the transaction, spend the oldAmount, and then allow the newAmount to be set, effectively spending oldAmount + newAmount.

Fix

While this is a known ERC20 design consideration and not a vulnerability in the interface itself, implementers or users of approve should be aware of this pitfall. To mitigate this, it is recommended to first reduce the spender's allowance to zero with approve(spender, 0) and then set the desired new value with a subsequent approve(spender, newAmount).

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

This audit covers standard OpenZeppelin library contracts (Context, IERC20, SafeMath) from Solidity version 0.5.13. These foundational components are generally robust and widely used. The core application logic, such as the 'HEX' contract, was not provided for review, limiting the scope to these dependencies. No critical or high-severity vulnerabilities were found within the provided code.

Technical10/10Low risk

The provided code consists of well-established OpenZeppelin libraries (Context, IERC20, SafeMath) from Solidity 0.5.13. These contracts are designed for robustness, with SafeMath effectively preventing integer overflow/underflow vulnerabilities (7.2 Code Security). The architecture (7.1 Architecture) is modular and follows standard patterns. No direct technical vulnerabilities were identified within these specific components, demonstrating strong foundational security practices.

Governance4/10Medium risk

The provided contracts (Context, IERC20, SafeMath) do not contain any governance or economic logic (7.4 Economic, 7.5 Governance). Therefore, no specific economic or governance risks can be assessed from these components alone. Any such risks would reside within the application contract that utilizes these libraries, which was not part of this audit.

Upgrades6/10Medium risk

The provided contracts do not implement any upgrade mechanisms (7.7 Upgrades). They are standard libraries and interfaces, typically not designed for direct upgradeability. Upgrade safety would depend entirely on the main application contract's design and its interaction with these components, which was outside the scope of this review.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

While the reviewed standard libraries are robust, a comprehensive security assessment requires evaluating the main application contract (e.g., 'HEX') that utilizes these components.

It is crucial to audit the business logic, access control, and economic model of the primary contract. Additionally, consider migrating to a newer Solidity version (e.g., 0.8.x) for enhanced security features and native overflow checks, or ensure all arithmetic operations in the main contract consistently use SafeMath or similar libraries.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeStaking, Token
NetworkEthereum
Token age1y
Contract0x2b59…eb39
Deployer0x896f…98cc
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202611Low
  2. Jul 31, 202632Low

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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