The DegenToken contract is an ERC20 token with burnable, pausable, permit, and voting functionalities, built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries. The contract includes a custom minting mechanism allowing the owner to mint up to 1% of the total supply annually, and the ability to pause all token transfers. While the implementation is generally robust, these centralized owner controls introduce significant economic and operational risks. The owner is a 2/3 multisig, which partially mitigates single-point-of-failure risks.
On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is Degen Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The DegenToken contract is an ERC20 token with burnable, pausable, permit, and voting functionalities, built upon battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries.
Read the full analysis- Ownership not renounced — Multisig
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 99.9%
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership NOT renounced — Multisig (2-of-3)
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (61.5% total → 37.8% effective; 22.0% in EOAs, 39.6% in contracts — moderate)
- Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
- LP top3 unlocked holders = 99.9% (independent LP — depth risk, pool = 84% of DEX liquidity)
- 1 High finding(s) from audit
- 1 Medium finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking39.6%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell22.0%
- Everyone elsethe rest of the supply38.5%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4- Uniswap v3WETHAnalysed$999.0K84.0%
- Uniswap v3WETH$115.7K9.7%
- AerodromeWETH$34.4K2.9%
- AerodromeWETH$16.6K1.4%
- Uniswap v4ETH$6.2K0.5%
- AerodromeTKN$5.2K0.4%
Show 4 more pairs
The 20 remaining pairs hold $3.7K between them and are not listed. The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x66bd…55e50x2448…1e9b0x1cbb…b1a40xed79…66360x94cf…54e60x2423…9d1a0x99d1…e2820x33b5…7a280x1df2…65780x0000…afcaNo privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighCentralized Control Over Token Supply (Minting)
The mint function, callable only by the contract owner, allows the creation of new tokens up to 1% of the current total supply annually. This centralized control over token supply can lead to inflation and dilution of existing token holders if misused or if the owner's keys are compromised. While the owner is a multisig, the power itself is significant.H-01
Issue
The mint function, callable only by the contract owner, allows the creation of new tokens up to 1% of the current total supply annually. This centralized control over token supply can lead to inflation and dilution of existing token holders if misused or if the owner's keys are compromised. While the owner is a multisig, the power itself is significant.
Fix
Implement a timelock for the mint function to introduce a delay between the owner initiating a minting operation and its execution. This provides a window for community review and reaction. Consider a more decentralized approach to minting, such as a community-governed mechanism or a fixed, transparent emission schedule.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCentralized Control Over Token Transfers (Pausable)
The contract owner has the ability to pause and unpause all token transfers via the pause() and unpause() functions. While this can be a useful emergency mechanism to mitigate active exploits, it also grants the owner the power to unilaterally halt all token activity, potentially disrupting liquidity, exchanges, and user operations. This introduces a single point of control for critical token functionality.M-01
Issue
The contract owner has the ability to pause and unpause all token transfers via the pause() and unpause() functions. While this can be a useful emergency mechanism to mitigate active exploits, it also grants the owner the power to unilaterally halt all token activity, potentially disrupting liquidity, exchanges, and user operations. This introduces a single point of control for critical token functionality.
Fix
Ensure robust operational procedures are in place for the multisig controlling the pause function. Consider implementing a timelock for the unpause function to prevent immediate re-enabling of transfers after a pause, allowing for a more controlled recovery. Clearly communicate the conditions under which pausing may occur to the community.
Status
Unresolved
LowFixed Minting Cap Parameter
The MINT_CAP is a constant value of 1, which translates to a 1% annual minting cap relative to the total supply. This parameter is hardcoded and cannot be adjusted after deployment. While a fixed cap provides predictability, it lacks flexibility. Future economic requirements or protocol changes might necessitate a different minting rate, which would require a new contract deployment and token migration.L-01
Issue
The MINT_CAP is a constant value of 1, which translates to a 1% annual minting cap relative to the total supply. This parameter is hardcoded and cannot be adjusted after deployment. While a fixed cap provides predictability, it lacks flexibility. Future economic requirements or protocol changes might necessitate a different minting rate, which would require a new contract deployment and token migration.
Fix
Consider making the MINT_CAP a configurable parameter, adjustable by the owner (preferably with a timelock and/or governance vote). This would allow the protocol to adapt to changing economic conditions without requiring a full redeployment.
Status
Unresolved
InfoLack of Upgradeability
The DegenToken contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable implementation. This means that its logic is immutable once deployed to the blockchain. Any future bug fixes, security patches, or feature enhancements would require deploying an entirely new contract and migrating all token holders and integrated protocols to the new address, which is a complex and costly process.I-01
Issue
The DegenToken contract is deployed as a standard, non-upgradeable implementation. This means that its logic is immutable once deployed to the blockchain. Any future bug fixes, security patches, or feature enhancements would require deploying an entirely new contract and migrating all token holders and integrated protocols to the new address, which is a complex and costly process.
Fix
For future contracts, consider implementing an upgradeable proxy pattern (e.g., UUPS or Transparent Proxy) to allow for secure and controlled upgrades. This provides flexibility for long-term maintenance and evolution of the protocol without requiring token migrations.
Status
Unresolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The DegenToken contract leverages well-audited OpenZeppelin libraries for its core ERC20 functionalities, including burnable, pausable, permit, and voting extensions (7.2 Code Security). The custom minting logic correctly implements time-based restrictions and a supply cap, preventing immediate re-minting and excessive inflation per transaction. However, the reliance on onlyOwner for critical functions like minting and pausing introduces a centralized technical control point (7.3 Access Control).
The economic model grants the owner significant control over token supply through an annual minting function, capped at 1% of the total supply (7.4 Economic). This introduces a continuous inflationary mechanism. Additionally, the owner can pause all token transfers, which can severely impact liquidity and user operations (7.4 Economic). While the owner is a 2/3 multisig, which improves security over a single EOA, these powers remain centralized and could be misused or compromised (7.5 Governance).
The DegenToken contract is implemented as a standard, non-upgradeable contract (7.7 Upgrades). This means that once deployed, its logic cannot be modified. Any future bug fixes, feature enhancements, or changes to the economic model would necessitate a new contract deployment and a token migration process, which can be complex and costly for the community.
It is crucial for the multisig owners to secure their keys with the highest standards, as compromise would grant control over minting and pausing.
Consider implementing a timelock for critical owner actions like minting to provide transparency and a window for community reaction. For future protocol evolution, evaluate the benefits of an upgradeable contract architecture to allow for flexibility and bug fixes without requiring token migration.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 4, 202652Medium
- Aug 14, 202639Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the DEGEN contract address?
The Degen contract on Base is 0x4ed4e862860bed51a9570b96d89af5e1b0efefed. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is Degen a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for Degen is 52/100 (Medium risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Retained; Mint: Mintable; Liquidity lock: Not locked; Upgradeability: Fixed code. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Is DEGEN liquidity locked?
Liquidity lock: Not locked (as of Sep 4, 2026). Total DEX liquidity: $1.19M.
Who holds DEGEN?
As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 61.5% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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