The TapeoutOpenFourToken is an EIP-1167 minimal clone implementation. The contract exhibits high centralization risk due to privileged roles having extensive control over transfer logic, fee structures, and external dependency routing. While the core ERC-20 functionality is standard, the complex tax and migration logic introduces significant trust requirements for users.

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is CRAZYCOIN a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The TapeoutOpenFourToken is an EIP-1167 minimal clone implementation.
Read the full analysis- A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on; held by tokenmodule: Other-Contract
- Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by migratemodule: Other-Contract, vault: Other-Contract
- Top-10 concentration > 30%
- Code: Rounding Loss Due to Division Before Multiplication
Exact factors
- A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on; held by tokenmodule: Other-Contract
- Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by migratemodule: Other-Contract, vault: Other-Contract
- Top-10 concentration > 30% (97.6% total → 38.5% effective; 0.5% in EOAs, 95.1% in contracts; 2.0% burned, locked or in pools excluded)
- Code: Rounding Loss Due to Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 22Holders
as of audit · Oct 22, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking95.1%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell0.5%
- Burnedout of circulation0.1%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity1.9%
- Everyone else2,053 holders2.4%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 22, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 22The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
Security Findings
HighCentralized Control Over Critical Dependencies
The postInitialize function allows a privileged 'tokenModule' to change the addresses of critical external contracts that the token relies on for every transfer. This grants the controller the ability to redirect token logic or intercept funds.CP-03
Issue
The postInitialize function allows a privileged 'tokenModule' to change the addresses of critical external contracts that the token relies on for every transfer. This grants the controller the ability to redirect token logic or intercept funds.
Fix
Restrict the ability to change these addresses to a multi-signature wallet or implement a time-lock to ensure transparency and prevent immediate malicious redirection.
Status
Unresolved
MediumDynamic Fee Manipulation
Privileged modules can modify transfer fees via onMigrate, claimFee, and onBondingTrade. This allows the controller to change the economic cost of transactions at any time without user consent.CP-07
Issue
Privileged modules can modify transfer fees via onMigrate, claimFee, and onBondingTrade. This allows the controller to change the economic cost of transactions at any time without user consent.
Fix
Implement a cap on the maximum fee that can be set and provide an on-chain event notification whenever fee parameters are updated.
Status
Unresolved
LowRounding Loss Due to Division Before Multiplication
The _doDispatchFee function performs division before multiplication, which can lead to precision loss and minor discrepancies in fee calculations.CD-01
Issue
The _doDispatchFee function performs division before multiplication, which can lead to precision loss and minor discrepancies in fee calculations.
Fix
Rearrange the arithmetic operations to perform multiplication before division to maintain higher precision.
Status
Unresolved
InfoPrivileged Control Over Transfer Functionality
Privileged functions can toggle the 'swapping' state, which directly impacts whether transfers or sales are permitted. This creates a risk where a controller could arbitrarily halt trading for users. Ownership is renounced, so no one can call these functions now.CP-05
Issue
Privileged functions can toggle the 'swapping' state, which directly impacts whether transfers or sales are permitted. This creates a risk where a controller could arbitrarily halt trading for users. Ownership is renounced, so no one can call these functions now.
Fix
Document the intended use of the 'swapping' switch and provide clear public communication when such states are toggled to maintain user trust.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 97.6% of supply. Of that, 1.9% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.5% in wallets, 95.1% in other contracts. 2,063 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 97.6% of supply. Of that, 1.9% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.5% in wallets, 95.1% in other contracts. 2,063 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
2,063 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
2,063 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn
100.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
100.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $120K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $374K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $120K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $374K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 2% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $120K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 2% on buy, 2% on sell. Market: $120K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 22The architecture utilizes a modular approach for tax and migration handling. 7.1 Architecture: EIP-1167 clone pattern ensures immutable logic. 7.2 Code Security: Standard ERC-20 implementation is robust, though complex tax logic increases surface area. 7.3 Access Control: Highly centralized; multiple modules (tokenModule, taxVault, migrateModule) hold significant power over state variables.
7.4 Economic: The token relies on dynamic fee structures and external liquidity pools. 7.5 Governance: No decentralized governance exists; all parameters are controlled by privileged modules. 7.6 External: Heavy reliance on external contracts for price and liquidity management creates systemic risk if those dependencies are compromised.
7.7 Upgrades: The contract is an immutable EIP-1167 clone, meaning the logic cannot be upgraded. 7.8 Operations: Operational risk is high due to the ability of privileged modules to modify critical transfer rules and fee parameters at runtime.
Users should exercise caution due to the high degree of centralization.
The protocol should consider implementing a multi-signature wallet or a time-lock mechanism for the privileged modules to mitigate the risk of sudden, malicious changes to transfer logic or fee structures. Developers should perform a comprehensive audit of the external modules (tokenModule, taxVault, migrateModule) as these contracts effectively govern the token's behavior and economic security.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Oct 22, 202647Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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