The audited Token contract on BSC implements standard ERC-20 tokenomics with built-in liquidity fee handling and fee exclusions. Contract ownership has been verified as renounced on-chain, rendering all owner-restricted administration functions permanently dormant. However, critical vulnerabilities exist in internal automated swap logic where unauthorized token movements can occur, alongside unhandled transfer returns and trapped native assets.
Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is Catecoin a Scam?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The audited Token contract on BSC implements standard ERC-20 tokenomics with built-in liquidity fee handling and fee exclusions.
Read the full analysis- Volume/Liquidity > 15×
- Code: Arbitrary Token Pull in Swap Routine
- Code: Precision Loss Due to Division Before Multiplication
- Code: Permanent Locking of Received Native Assets
- Code: Unchecked Return Value in External Token Transfers
Exact factors
- Volume/Liquidity > 15× (57.6× — wash-trading signal)
- Code: Arbitrary Token Pull in Swap Routine (Critical, static analysis)
- Code: Precision Loss Due to Division Before Multiplication (Low, static analysis)
- Code: Permanent Locking of Received Native Assets (Medium, static analysis)
- Code: Unchecked Return Value in External Token Transfers (High, static analysis)
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Oct 19Holders
as of audit · Oct 19, 2026- Burnedout of circulation94.0%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity0.3%
- Everyone else43,329 holders5.7%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 19, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Oct 19The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…97060xbe52…cf34No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
CriticalArbitrary Token Pull in Swap Routine
The internal function _executeSwapAndLiquify executes transferFrom using an address that the caller can manipulate or that draws from third-party balances. Anyone who has approved the contract can have their tokens transferred without their direct authorization.CD-01
Issue
The internal function _executeSwapAndLiquify executes transferFrom using an address that the caller can manipulate or that draws from third-party balances. Anyone who has approved the contract can have their tokens transferred without their direct authorization.
Fix
Refactor _executeSwapAndLiquify to only transfer tokens held directly in the contract's own balance using address(this) rather than pulling from external user balances.
Status
Unresolved
HighUnchecked Return Value in External Token Transfers
The function _executeSwapAndLiquify performs ERC-20 token transfers without checking the returned boolean status. If a transfer fails silently, the contract continues execution under the false assumption that funds were moved.CD-04
Issue
The function _executeSwapAndLiquify performs ERC-20 token transfers without checking the returned boolean status. If a transfer fails silently, the contract continues execution under the false assumption that funds were moved.
Fix
Use OpenZeppelin's SafeERC20 safeTransfer and safeTransferFrom functions to verify successful transfer execution and revert on failure.
Status
Unresolved
MediumPermanent Locking of Received Native Assets
The contract implements a receive function that accepts native BNB payments but lacks any withdrawal function or outgoing transfer mechanism, causing any sent funds to be permanently trapped.CD-03
Issue
The contract implements a receive function that accepts native BNB payments but lacks any withdrawal function or outgoing transfer mechanism, causing any sent funds to be permanently trapped.
Fix
Remove the receive function if native assets are not required, or implement an explicit, protected sweep function to route received native currency to a secure receiver.
Status
Unresolved
LowPrecision Loss Due to Division Before Multiplication
In _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, mathematical calculations perform division before multiplication, leading to avoidable rounding loss and truncated fee amounts during token processing.CD-02
Issue
In _executeSwapAndLiquify and _transfer, mathematical calculations perform division before multiplication, leading to avoidable rounding loss and truncated fee amounts during token processing.
Fix
Reorder mathematical expressions to perform all multiplication steps prior to division, preserving precision throughout fee and liquidity calculations.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 94.3% of supply. Of that, 94.0% burned, 0.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.0% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 43,339 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 94.3% of supply. Of that, 94.0% burned, 0.3% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 0.0% in wallets, 0.0% in other contracts. 43,339 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
43,339 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
43,339 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity time-locked
97.2% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 97.3% is locked in PinkLock02 until 19 Nov 2026 (30 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 2.7% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
97.2% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 97.3% is locked in PinkLock02 until 19 Nov 2026 (30 days). Until then nobody — the project included — can withdraw it unless the locker contract itself is flawed; after that date the lock's owner can. 2.7% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $163K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $9.4M (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $163K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $9.4M (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Meme token
A community token whose value comes from attention rather than a product. Being a meme is not a risk in itself: it is scored on exactly the same contract and market facts as any other token. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: meme vocabulary in name/ticker (cat). Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 3.94% on sell. Market: $163K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A community token whose value comes from attention rather than a product. Being a meme is not a risk in itself: it is scored on exactly the same contract and market facts as any other token. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: meme vocabulary in name/ticker (cat). Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 3.9% on buy, 3.94% on sell. Market: $163K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Expect attention-driven volatility; the facts in this report say whether the contract itself can be used against holders.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Oct 19Under 7.1 Architecture, the token relies on standard ERC-20 foundations and structured modular inheritance from OpenZeppelin Context and Ownable. Regarding 7.2 Code Security, fundamental validation is present across basic transfer flows, but severe logic gaps exist such as unchecked return values in _executeSwapAndLiquify and calculation imprecision. In terms of 7.3 Access Control, owner-restricted entry points are safely disabled via renounced ownership, yet automated internal functions expose dangerous arbitrary transfer capabilities.
Under 7.5 Governance, the contract eliminates administrative rug-pull vectors because contract ownership is renounced and owner functions like setExclusionFromFee are rendered dormant. In 7.4 Economic considerations, fixed supply parameters prevent arbitrary inflation, though fee deductions and automated liquidity routing introduce potential slippage and extraction vectors. Examining 7.6 External factors, liquidity interactions via _executeSwapAndLiquify lack defensive transfer checks, leaving economic reserves exposed to token interaction failures.
In 7.7 Upgrades, the contract is deployed as an immutable non-proxy instance, ensuring that bytecode cannot be altered or hijacked post-deployment. Regarding 7.8 Operations, routine user transactions function predictably through immutable transfer pathways, providing stable predictability. The principal operational weakness stems from a receive function that locks incoming native BNB permanently due to the absence of withdrawal logic.
Users should exercise extreme caution when granting allowances to this contract.
Because _executeSwapAndLiquify can pull tokens from arbitrary addresses holding allowances, users must strictly avoid approving tokens to the contract beyond exact transaction requirements or consider revoking approvals entirely. For future iterations, the development team must ensure that liquidity management routines only transfer tokens directly owned by the contract rather than relying on caller-defined addresses. Additionally, safe transfer wrappers such as SafeERC20 should be integrated, rounding operations sequenced after multiplications, and dedicated withdrawal methods implemented for any native currency received.
Contract & Record
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