The WbnbTransferTaxToken is a highly centralized ERC-20 token with complex transfer logic tied to external oracle and router contracts. The controller holds significant power to modify tokenomics, mint supply, and halt transfers. While the architecture is modular, the reliance on privileged administrative functions creates a high trust requirement for token holders.

Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
Is Bnb Burn Forge a Scam?
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This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The WbnbTransferTaxToken is a highly centralized ERC-20 token with complex transfer logic tied to external oracle and router contracts.
Read the full analysis- A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on; held by controller: Other-Contract
- Owner can pause all transfers; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
- Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
- A privileged address can change transfer or wallet limits; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
Exact factors
- A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on; held by controller: Other-Contract
- Owner can pause all transfers; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
- A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
- Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
- A privileged address can change transfer or wallet limits; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Nov 3Holders
as of audit · Nov 3, 2026- Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking1.1%
- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell10.1%
- Burnedout of circulation7.1%
- DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity23.5%
- Everyone else1,952 holders58.2%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 3, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Nov 3The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.
0x0ed9…9706No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Security Findings
HighArbitrary External Dependency Replacement
The controller can change the price oracle contract address. Since transfers rely on this oracle, a malicious or compromised controller could redirect transfer logic or manipulate price data.CP-03
Issue
The controller can change the price oracle contract address. Since transfers rely on this oracle, a malicious or compromised controller could redirect transfer logic or manipulate price data.
Fix
Restrict the ability to change the oracle address after the market has opened, or require a multi-step governance process for such changes.
Status
Unresolved
MediumCentralized Minting Authority
The controller can mint new tokens at will using the mint function, which directly increases the total supply and dilutes the value of existing holdings.CP-01
Issue
The controller can mint new tokens at will using the mint function, which directly increases the total supply and dilutes the value of existing holdings.
Fix
Implement a hard cap on the total supply or move the minting authority to a time-locked governance contract.
Status
Unresolved
MediumTransfer Control Switch
The controller can influence internal flags that determine whether transfers are allowed, effectively enabling a 'pause' or 'block' mechanism on token movement.CP-05
Issue
The controller can influence internal flags that determine whether transfers are allowed, effectively enabling a 'pause' or 'block' mechanism on token movement.
Fix
Document the specific conditions under which these switches are toggled and provide transparency to the community regarding their usage.
Status
Unresolved
MediumDynamic Fee Manipulation
The controller can modify tax parameters via the mint and releaseTaxTokens functions, allowing them to change the cost of transferring tokens for all users.CP-07
Issue
The controller can modify tax parameters via the mint and releaseTaxTokens functions, allowing them to change the cost of transferring tokens for all users.
Fix
Set a maximum limit on the tax rate that can be configured to protect users from excessive fees.
Status
Unresolved
LowAdjustable Transaction Limits
The controller can change transaction or wallet limits, which may impact the liquidity and trading behavior of the token.CP-08
Issue
The controller can change transaction or wallet limits, which may impact the liquidity and trading behavior of the token.
Fix
Establish a clear policy for how and when these limits are adjusted to ensure predictability for holders.
Status
Unresolved
InfoWho holds the supply
The ten largest holders own 41.8% of supply. Of that, 7.1% burned, 23.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 10.1% in wallets, 1.1% in other contracts. 1,962 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS
Issue
The ten largest holders own 41.8% of supply. Of that, 7.1% burned, 23.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 10.1% in wallets, 1.1% in other contracts. 1,962 holders in total.
Fix
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoNot listed by any independent source
1,962 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY
Issue
1,962 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Fix
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoLiquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn
99.5% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.5% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.5% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY
Issue
99.5% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.5% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.5% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Fix
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoThe market for this token
Liquidity $65K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $354K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET
Issue
Liquidity $65K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $354K (DexScreener, all pools).
Fix
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoAsset class: Project token
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: controller — a contract; officialpair — a contract; router — a contract. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 1% on sell. Market: $65K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE
Issue
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: controller — a contract; officialpair — a contract; router — a contract. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 1% on sell. Market: $65K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Fix
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Status
Acknowledged
InfoRecently launched — less than a day of market history
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT
Issue
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Fix
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Status
Acknowledged
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 3The contract implements standard ERC-20 functionality with custom hooks for tax processing and liquidity management. 7.1 Architecture is modular, separating price logic and routing into external contracts. 7.2 Code Security is robust regarding standard arithmetic, but 7.3 Access Control is heavily centralized. 7.6 External dependencies are tightly coupled, requiring specific interface implementations for the oracle and router.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance aspects are entirely controlled by the contract owner. The ability to mint tokens and adjust tax parameters allows for arbitrary dilution of holders. There are no decentralized governance mechanisms, meaning 7.8 Operations are fully dependent on the controller's integrity.
7.7 Upgrades are not implemented via proxy patterns; the contract is immutable. However, the logic is effectively 'upgradable' through the binding of new external oracle and router contracts. This provides flexibility but introduces risks if the binding process is not strictly managed.
Investors should be aware that the controller has the authority to mint tokens, change tax rates, and potentially halt transfers.
We recommend transitioning to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract to manage these privileged functions to reduce single-point-of-failure risks. Ensure that the external contracts bound via bindPriceOracle and bindRouter are audited and verified, as the security of the token's transfer logic is entirely dependent on the behavior of these external components.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Nov 3, 202647Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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