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Is Bnb Burn Forge a Scam?

BBFBNB Chain
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Last checked Nov 3, 2026 · 1 audit on recordNew Launch · 18h old
SummaryAI Copilot

The WbnbTransferTaxToken is a highly centralized ERC-20 token with complex transfer logic tied to external oracle and router contracts.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on; held by controller: Other-Contract
  • Owner can pause all transfers; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
  • A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
  • Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
  • A privileged address can change transfer or wallet limits; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
Exact factors
  • A privileged address can replace a contract every transfer depends on; held by controller: Other-Contract
  • Owner can pause all transfers; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
  • A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
  • Owner can change the buy/sell tax; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
  • A privileged address can change transfer or wallet limits; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract
  • Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded; held by controller: Other-Contract, officialpair: Other-Contract, router: Other-Contract

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Early-stage analysis. This token has limited on-chain history (18h old). New tokens carry elevated risk — data may change rapidly. Always verify independently before investing.

Security Checklist

as of audit · Nov 34 of 7 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintMintable
Liquidity lockLocked
UpgradeabilityFixed code
HoneypotNone found
Buy / sell tax1% / 1%

Holders

as of audit · Nov 3, 20261,962 holders
10.1%Wallets7.1%23.5%DEX pools58.2%Everyone else
10.1%7.1%23.5%DEX pools58.2%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsBurnedDEX poolsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
41.8%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking1.1%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell10.1%
  • Burnedout of circulation7.1%
  • DEX poolsthe pools' own liquidity23.5%
  • Everyone else1,952 holders58.2%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads10.5%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Nov 3, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Nov 3$64.7K

The risk score reads depth across every pair.

LP tokensLocked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are locked or burned.

Analysed pool$64.7KShare of depth100.0%
LP Burned99.5% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked99.5% · Null Address
Unlocked LP held by
0x0ed9…9706

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

1 High3 Medium1 Low6 Info
High

Arbitrary External Dependency Replacement

The controller can change the price oracle contract address. Since transfers rely on this oracle, a malicious or compromised controller could redirect transfer logic or manipulate price data.CP-03

Issue

The controller can change the price oracle contract address. Since transfers rely on this oracle, a malicious or compromised controller could redirect transfer logic or manipulate price data.

Fix

Restrict the ability to change the oracle address after the market has opened, or require a multi-step governance process for such changes.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Centralized Minting Authority

The controller can mint new tokens at will using the mint function, which directly increases the total supply and dilutes the value of existing holdings.CP-01

Issue

The controller can mint new tokens at will using the mint function, which directly increases the total supply and dilutes the value of existing holdings.

Fix

Implement a hard cap on the total supply or move the minting authority to a time-locked governance contract.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Transfer Control Switch

The controller can influence internal flags that determine whether transfers are allowed, effectively enabling a 'pause' or 'block' mechanism on token movement.CP-05

Issue

The controller can influence internal flags that determine whether transfers are allowed, effectively enabling a 'pause' or 'block' mechanism on token movement.

Fix

Document the specific conditions under which these switches are toggled and provide transparency to the community regarding their usage.

Status

Unresolved

Medium

Dynamic Fee Manipulation

The controller can modify tax parameters via the mint and releaseTaxTokens functions, allowing them to change the cost of transferring tokens for all users.CP-07

Issue

The controller can modify tax parameters via the mint and releaseTaxTokens functions, allowing them to change the cost of transferring tokens for all users.

Fix

Set a maximum limit on the tax rate that can be configured to protect users from excessive fees.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Adjustable Transaction Limits

The controller can change transaction or wallet limits, which may impact the liquidity and trading behavior of the token.CP-08

Issue

The controller can change transaction or wallet limits, which may impact the liquidity and trading behavior of the token.

Fix

Establish a clear policy for how and when these limits are adjusted to ensure predictability for holders.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Who holds the supply

The ten largest holders own 41.8% of supply. Of that, 7.1% burned, 23.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 10.1% in wallets, 1.1% in other contracts. 1,962 holders in total.QA-HOLDERS

Issue

The ten largest holders own 41.8% of supply. Of that, 7.1% burned, 23.5% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 10.1% in wallets, 1.1% in other contracts. 1,962 holders in total.

Fix

Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Not listed by any independent source

1,962 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.QA-IDENTITY

Issue

1,962 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.

Fix

Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Liquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn

99.5% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.5% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.5% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.QA-LIQUIDITY

Issue

99.5% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 99.5% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. 0.5% is held, unlocked, by 1 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. No single one holds a majority: their exits thin the market rather than hand anyone the pool. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.

Fix

Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

The market for this token

Liquidity $65K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $354K (DexScreener, all pools).QA-MARKET

Issue

Liquidity $65K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $354K (DexScreener, all pools).

Fix

Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Asset class: Project token

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: controller — a contract; officialpair — a contract; router — a contract. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 1% on sell. Market: $65K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.QA-PROFILE

Issue

A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: controller — a contract; officialpair — a contract; router — a contract. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: 1% on buy, 1% on sell. Market: $65K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.

Fix

Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.

Status

Acknowledged

Info

Recently launched — less than a day of market history

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.QA-RECENT

Issue

The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.

Fix

Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.

Status

Acknowledged

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Nov 3
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The WbnbTransferTaxToken is a highly centralized ERC-20 token with complex transfer logic tied to external oracle and router contracts. The controller holds significant power to modify tokenomics, mint supply, and halt transfers. While the architecture is modular, the reliance on privileged administrative functions creates a high trust requirement for token holders.

Technical8/10Low risk

The contract implements standard ERC-20 functionality with custom hooks for tax processing and liquidity management. 7.1 Architecture is modular, separating price logic and routing into external contracts. 7.2 Code Security is robust regarding standard arithmetic, but 7.3 Access Control is heavily centralized. 7.6 External dependencies are tightly coupled, requiring specific interface implementations for the oracle and router.

Governance4/10Medium risk

7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance aspects are entirely controlled by the contract owner. The ability to mint tokens and adjust tax parameters allows for arbitrary dilution of holders. There are no decentralized governance mechanisms, meaning 7.8 Operations are fully dependent on the controller's integrity.

Upgrades4/10Medium risk

7.7 Upgrades are not implemented via proxy patterns; the contract is immutable. However, the logic is effectively 'upgradable' through the binding of new external oracle and router contracts. This provides flexibility but introduces risks if the binding process is not strictly managed.

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Investors should be aware that the controller has the authority to mint tokens, change tax rates, and potentially halt transfers.

We recommend transitioning to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract to manage these privileged functions to reduce single-point-of-failure risks. Ensure that the external contracts bound via bindPriceOracle and bindRouter are audited and verified, as the security of the token's transfer logic is entirely dependent on the behavior of these external components.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeWbnbTransferTaxToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age18h
Contract0x6fde…5232
Deployer0x6baa…e8c1
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Audit History
  1. Nov 3, 202647Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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