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Is Bluwhale AI Safe?

BLUAIBNB Chain
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Last checked Sep 4, 2026 · 1 audit on record
SummaryAI Copilot

The BlueWhaleToken contract is a standard ERC20 implementation leveraging battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries.

Read the full analysis
What raised the score
  • Ownership not renounced — Multisig
  • Top-10 concentration > 30%
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • 3 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
  • Ownership NOT renounced — Multisig (3-of-4)
  • Top-10 concentration > 30% (84.3% total → 36.5% effective; 4.7% in EOAs, 79.6% in contracts — moderate)
  • Liquidity not locked, but no owner/deployer address holds LP — market-depth risk, not rug risk
  • 3 Low finding(s) from audit

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Security Checklist

as of audit · Sep 43 of 5 checks passed
Contract verifiedVerified
OwnershipRetained
MintNo mint
Liquidity lockNot locked
UpgradeabilityFixed code

Holders

as of audit · Sep 4, 2026
79.6%Contracts4.7%15.7%Everyone else
79.6%Contracts4.7%15.7%Everyone else
ContractsWalletsEveryone elseBubble area = share of supply
84.3%of supply sits with the top 10 holders
  • Contractstreasury, vesting, bridge, staking79.6%
  • Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell4.7%
  • Everyone elsethe rest of the supply15.7%
Effective concentrationwhat the score reads36.5%
How holder types affect the score

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026

Liquidity

as of audit · Sep 4$824.3K across 5 pairs
LP tokensNot locked

The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.

Analysed pool$759.9KShare of depth92.2%
Top-1 Unlocked Holder27.3%
Top-3 Unlocked49.7%
Unlocked LP held by
0xf949…02980x55a1…be140x1498…d27e0xabe1…e0bf0x5471…c2cf0xa86d…dfc30x29ce…07e40xe8b0…a2bf0x5ca2…d75f0x4cc4…2ee2

No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.

Security Findings

3 Low1 Info
Low

Centralized Ownership

The contract utilizes OpenZeppelin's Ownable pattern, which grants a single address (or a multisig, as indicated by the prefill) exclusive control over certain administrative functions, specifically transferOwnership and renounceOwnership. While the prefill indicates a multisig, the contract itself does not enforce this, relying on external operational security. This centralization introduces a single point of control for critical administrative actions.L-01

Issue

The contract utilizes OpenZeppelin's Ownable pattern, which grants a single address (or a multisig, as indicated by the prefill) exclusive control over certain administrative functions, specifically transferOwnership and renounceOwnership. While the prefill indicates a multisig, the contract itself does not enforce this, relying on external operational security. This centralization introduces a single point of control for critical administrative actions.

Fix

While a multisig is used, consider implementing a timelock for ownership transfers to provide a delay for users to react to potentially malicious or accidental changes. For increased decentralization, explore migrating ownership to a community-governed DAO.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Lack of Pause Mechanism

The BlueWhaleToken contract does not include a pause mechanism. In the event of a critical vulnerability in the token itself, or in a protocol integrating the token, there is no way to halt transfers or other token operations. This could lead to irreversible loss of funds or exploitation before a fix can be deployed.L-02

Issue

The BlueWhaleToken contract does not include a pause mechanism. In the event of a critical vulnerability in the token itself, or in a protocol integrating the token, there is no way to halt transfers or other token operations. This could lead to irreversible loss of funds or exploitation before a fix can be deployed.

Fix

Consider implementing a Pausable mechanism (e.g., from OpenZeppelin) to allow the owner (or a designated role) to temporarily halt token transfers in emergencies. This feature should be used judiciously and ideally controlled by a multisig or governance.

Status

Unresolved

Low

Constructor Initial Minting to Deployer

The entire initialSupply of tokens is minted to the contract deployer's address during construction. While this is a common pattern for token launches, it means the deployer initially holds 100% of the token supply. This concentration of tokens in a single address could lead to significant selling pressure if not managed carefully, potentially impacting market stability or perceived decentralization.L-03

Issue

The entire initialSupply of tokens is minted to the contract deployer's address during construction. While this is a common pattern for token launches, it means the deployer initially holds 100% of the token supply. This concentration of tokens in a single address could lead to significant selling pressure if not managed carefully, potentially impacting market stability or perceived decentralization.

Fix

Ensure a clear and transparent distribution plan for the initial supply is communicated to the community. Consider distributing a portion of the initial supply to multiple addresses or vesting contracts from the outset to promote broader distribution and mitigate centralization concerns.

Status

Unresolved

Info

Fixed Decimals Value

The decimals() function in the ERC20 contract is hardcoded to return 18. While 18 is the most common decimal value for ERC20 tokens, it is a fixed design choice. This is not a vulnerability but a design characteristic that cannot be changed post-deployment.I-01

Issue

The decimals() function in the ERC20 contract is hardcoded to return 18. While 18 is the most common decimal value for ERC20 tokens, it is a fixed design choice. This is not a vulnerability but a design characteristic that cannot be changed post-deployment.

Fix

No action required, as this is a standard and widely accepted design choice for ERC20 tokens. Ensure all integrations and user interfaces correctly interpret the token's 18 decimals.

Status

Unresolved

Analysis

AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4
Executive SummaryWhat the contract is and what the review found

The BlueWhaleToken contract is a standard ERC20 implementation leveraging battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries. It includes basic ownership controls and mints an initial supply to the deployer. The contract is simple and does not introduce complex logic, contributing to its low technical risk. Several minor design considerations and centralization points were identified, but no critical or high-severity vulnerabilities were found.

Technical10/10Low risk

The BlueWhaleToken contract is a straightforward ERC20 implementation, inheriting from OpenZeppelin's highly audited ERC20 and Ownable contracts. This significantly reduces the likelihood of technical vulnerabilities (7.2 Code Security). The architecture (7.1 Architecture) is simple and well-understood, with no complex external interactions (7.6 External) or novel logic introduced, minimizing the attack surface. The use of Solidity 0.8+ provides default overflow/underflow protection, further enhancing code security.

Governance6/10Medium risk

The contract's economic model (7.4 Economic) is a standard fixed-supply ERC20 token with an initial mint to the deployer. Governance (7.5 Governance) is centralized via the Ownable pattern, allowing the owner (a multisig in this case, as per prefill) to transfer or renounce ownership. While centralized, the use of a multisig for ownership mitigates some single-point-of-failure risks. There is no mechanism for post-deployment minting or burning by the owner, ensuring a fixed supply after initial deployment.

Upgrades7/10Low risk

The BlueWhaleToken contract is not designed to be upgradeable (7.7 Upgrades), as it does not implement any proxy patterns. This eliminates risks specifically associated with upgradeability, such as proxy misconfigurations or logic errors during upgrades. Any changes to the token's logic would require a new deployment and migration, which is a known operational consideration (7.8 Operations).

Final RecommendationWhat to do about this score

Ensure the private keys for the multisig owner are securely managed and distributed among trusted parties to prevent unauthorized access.

Consider implementing a timelock for critical ownership actions if the project's decentralization goals evolve. For future contracts, evaluate the need for a pause mechanism to handle unforeseen emergencies or integrate with a governance module for broader community control.

Contract & Record

1 audit on record
TypeBlueWhaleToken
NetworkBNB Chain
Token age9mo
Contract0xed9a…9aad
Deployer0xa1e9…e7dc
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Audit History
  1. Sep 4, 202630Low
  2. Aug 12, 202639Medium

Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.

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