The Aztec token contract is an ERC20 token with a centralized minting capability, allowing the owner to create an unlimited supply of tokens. While the contract leverages battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for core functionalities and access control, the owner's ability to mint tokens presents a critical economic risk. The contract is not upgradeable, ensuring immutability of its current logic.

On-chain security analysis — is it a scam or legit?
Is AZTEC Safe?
Not verified
This record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →The Aztec token contract is an ERC20 token with a centralized minting capability, allowing the owner to create an unlimited supply of tokens.
Read the full analysis- Ownership not renounced — owner is a contract
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 70%
- LP lock status UNKNOWN — the pool's LP could not be read
- 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Exact factors
- Ownership NOT renounced — owner is a contract (governance/executor, not an EOA)
- Mintable supply — no cap found, dilution unbounded
- Top-10 concentration > 70% (100.0% total → 100.0% effective; 100.0% in EOAs, 0.0% in contracts — extreme)
- LP lock status UNKNOWN — the pool's LP could not be read
- 1 Critical finding(s) from audit
- 1 Low finding(s) from audit
Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Security Checklist
as of audit · Sep 4Holders
as of audit · Sep 4, 2026- Walletsanonymous holders, free to sell100.0%
How holder types affect the score
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Sep 4, 2026
Liquidity
as of audit · Sep 4- Uniswap v4ETHAnalysed$15.56M99.7%
- Uniswap v4ETH$22.5K0.1%
- Uniswap v3WETH$5.8K0.0%
- Uniswap v4ETH$4.8K0.0%
- Uniswap v4ETH$2.3K0.0%
- Uniswap v4USDT$2.0K0.0%
Show 2 more pairs
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
Whether the LP tokens are locked could not be determined.
Security Findings
CriticalCentralized Minting Capability
The Aztec token contract includes a mint function that is restricted to the contract owner via the onlyOwner modifier. This allows the owner to mint an arbitrary and unlimited amount of new tokens at any time. This centralized control over the token supply introduces a critical economic risk, as it can lead to uncontrolled inflation, dilution of existing token holders' value, and potential for malicious manipulation of the token's market dynamics (7.4 Economic, 7.3 Access Control).C-01
Issue
The Aztec token contract includes a mint function that is restricted to the contract owner via the onlyOwner modifier. This allows the owner to mint an arbitrary and unlimited amount of new tokens at any time. This centralized control over the token supply introduces a critical economic risk, as it can lead to uncontrolled inflation, dilution of existing token holders' value, and potential for malicious manipulation of the token's market dynamics (7.4 Economic, 7.3 Access Control).
Fix
Implement a robust governance mechanism (e.g., DAO, multi-signature wallet with a timelock) to control the minting function. Alternatively, cap the total supply, remove the minting capability after an initial distribution, or introduce a burning mechanism to balance minting. Clearly communicate the minting policy to token holders.
Status
Unresolved
LowLack of Pause Mechanism
The contract does not include a pause mechanism (e.g., using OpenZeppelin's Pausable contract) to temporarily halt token transfers or other critical operations in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability or a major market event. While not strictly required for a basic ERC20, a pause function can be a valuable operational tool (7.8 Operations).L-01
Issue
The contract does not include a pause mechanism (e.g., using OpenZeppelin's Pausable contract) to temporarily halt token transfers or other critical operations in case of an emergency, such as a discovered vulnerability or a major market event. While not strictly required for a basic ERC20, a pause function can be a valuable operational tool (7.8 Operations).
Fix
Consider integrating a pause mechanism, such as OpenZeppelin's Pausable contract, to provide an emergency stop functionality. This would allow the owner (or a designated role) to temporarily freeze token transfers or minting in unforeseen circumstances, mitigating potential damage.
Status
Unresolved
InfoReliance on OpenZeppelin Libraries
The Aztec contract heavily relies on well-audited and battle-tested OpenZeppelin contracts (ERC20, Ownable2Step, ERC20Permit). This significantly reduces the likelihood of low-level implementation bugs and enhances the overall security posture of the contract (7.2 Code Security, 7.1 Architecture).I-01
Issue
The Aztec contract heavily relies on well-audited and battle-tested OpenZeppelin contracts (ERC20, Ownable2Step, ERC20Permit). This significantly reduces the likelihood of low-level implementation bugs and enhances the overall security posture of the contract (7.2 Code Security, 7.1 Architecture).
Fix
No specific recommendation. This is a positive architectural choice.
Status
Resolved
InfoTwo-Step Ownership Transfer Implemented
The contract utilizes OpenZeppelin's Ownable2Step for ownership transfers. This pattern requires the new owner to explicitly accept ownership after it has been transferred by the current owner, preventing accidental loss of ownership due to typos or incorrect addresses (7.3 Access Control).I-02
Issue
The contract utilizes OpenZeppelin's Ownable2Step for ownership transfers. This pattern requires the new owner to explicitly accept ownership after it has been transferred by the current owner, preventing accidental loss of ownership due to typos or incorrect addresses (7.3 Access Control).
Fix
No specific recommendation. This is a strong security practice.
Status
Resolved
Analysis
AI Copilotas of audit · Sep 4The contract leverages battle-tested OpenZeppelin libraries for ERC20, Ownable2Step, and ERC20Permit functionalities, significantly enhancing code security and reliability (7.2 Code Security). The implementation is minimal, primarily extending these libraries with a single mint function. The use of Ownable2Step for ownership transfers is a strong security practice, mitigating the risk of accidental ownership loss (7.3 Access Control). No complex custom logic is present that could introduce technical vulnerabilities like reentrancy or arithmetic errors.
The primary economic risk stems from the highly centralized control over token supply (7.4 Economic). The mint function, callable only by the contract owner, allows for arbitrary creation of new tokens, which can lead to inflation and dilution of existing token holders without external governance mechanisms (7.5 Governance). While this design provides flexibility for the owner, it introduces significant trust assumptions. The Ownable2Step pattern for ownership transfer is a positive aspect, providing a secure mechanism for changing the controlling entity.
The Aztec token contract is not designed to be upgradeable (7.7 Upgrades). This means its logic is immutable once deployed, providing certainty regarding its behavior. While immutability prevents future bug fixes or feature enhancements, it eliminates the risks associated with proxy patterns, such as upgradeability misconfigurations or malicious upgrade paths. Any changes to the token's core logic would require a new contract deployment and migration.
It is strongly recommended to implement robust governance mechanisms or a clear policy regarding the use of the centralized minting function to mitigate the significant economic risk of token inflation.
Consider implementing a timelock for critical owner actions or a multi-signature wallet for the owner address to enhance security and decentralization. If the intention is for a fixed supply, the mint function should be removed or made callable only once for an initial supply.
Contract & Record
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
- Sep 4, 202671High
- Aug 13, 202653Medium
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the AZTEC contract address?
The AZTEC contract on Ethereum is 0xa27ec0006e59f245217ff08cd52a7e8b169e62d2. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Is AZTEC a scam?
Quantum Audit's risk score for AZTEC is 71/100 (High risk) as of Sep 4, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Verified; Ownership: Retained; Mint: Mintable; Upgradeability: Fixed code. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
Who holds AZTEC?
As of Sep 4, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 100.0% of the supply. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
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