Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
The audit evaluated the DERC20 token contract deployed on Base.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 24, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
Whether the LP tokens are locked could not be determined.
The contract owner can invoke the updateMintRate function, which triggers mintInflation and creates new tokens up to a 2% annual cap. While the release function also releases vested tokens to claimants, updateMintRate directly increases the total circulating token supply, causing gradual dilution to existing token holders.
Impose a timelock on mint rate adjustments and consider establishing automated, decentralized distribution rules for newly minted tokens to ensure predictability for holders.
Unresolved
The owner has exclusive authority to call lockPool and unlockPool, modifying the isPoolUnlocked flag and setting the designated pool address. When locked, token transfers involving the pool can be blocked or restricted, effectively preventing token holders from buying or selling tokens on decentralized exchanges.
Implement a one-way irreversible unlock mechanism once public trading commences, or bound lockPool execution behind a timelock to prevent arbitrary disruption of market liquidity.
Unresolved
The ten largest holders own 100.0% of supply. Of that, 3.8% burned — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 16.2% in wallets, 80.0% in other contracts. The deployer/owner wallet itself holds 16.2%. 10,008 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
10,008 holders. Not listed by CoinGecko or any exchange GoPlus tracks. Nothing independent confirms who is behind this token, so every power its contract grants is scored at face value.
Match the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $108K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $483K (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token issued by a project for use, governance or fundraising. Scored on its contract and market facts. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: no class-specific evidence. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: a ProxyAdmin contract. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $108K of DEX liquidity across 1 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Check the project's own documentation for what the token is used for; this report covers what the contract allows.
Acknowledged
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Acknowledged
The audit evaluated the DERC20 token contract deployed on Base. The implementation builds on established OpenZeppelin components including ERC20Votes, ERC20Permit, and standard Ownable access controls. Two medium-severity issues were identified relating to privileged inflation minting via updateMintRate and trading restrictions via lockPool and unlockPool state switches.
Under 7.1 Architecture, the contract implements standard OpenZeppelin ERC-20, permit, and governance voting patterns with clean separation of duties. In terms of 7.2 Code Security, the contract relies on Solidity 0.8.26 built-in overflow protection and structured custom errors. However, under 7.3 Access Control, the owner maintains unrestricted control over pool trading states through lockPool and unlockPool functions. Additionally, 7.6 External interaction surfaces are minimal, limiting exposure to untrusted external calls.
For 7.4 Economic considerations, the contract enforces a hard cap on annual inflation via MAX_YEARLY_MINT_RATE_WAD (maximum 2% per year), protecting holders from runaway dilution. However, under 7.5 Governance, the contract owner possesses unilateral authority to trigger mintInflation during updateMintRate and manipulate pool liquidity status via lockPool. Under 7.8 Operations, multi-sig ownership mitigates single key compromise risks, but operational execution remains centralized without timelocks.
Regarding 7.7 Upgrades, the contract is deployed as an immutable non-proxy contract, eliminating logic swap vulnerabilities and storage collision risks. Administrative parameters such as tokenURI and pool settings can be updated directly by the owner without contract recreation. While immutability guarantees core ERC-20 logic cannot be altered maliciously, operational parameter changes still require active governance oversight.
The development team should place privileged administrative functions, particularly lockPool, unlockPool, and updateMintRate, behind a transparent timelock contract to give token holders advance notice of economic or transfer policy changes.
Additionally, the project should continue managing the contract with a robust multi-signature scheme and consider eventually renouncing or freezing transfer-locking capabilities once liquidity pools are permanently established.
Free for any token on the record. It links to this page and always shows the current score and the date it was checked.
Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
The AOP contract on Base is 0x73d36a52a6041788012d086ffc746516895b5920. Compare it with the address the project itself publishes before trading: other contracts can carry the same name and ticker.
Quantum Audit's risk score for AOP is 76/100 (High risk) as of Oct 24, 2026, computed by a deterministic function from on-chain facts — Contract verified: Not verified; Ownership: Retained; Mint: Mintable; Upgradeability: Fixed code; Honeypot: None found; Buy / sell tax: 0% / 0%. A score is a dated snapshot of those facts, not a guarantee; each one is listed on this page.
As of Oct 24, 2026, the 10 largest holders own 100.0% of the supply across 10,008 holders. The Holders section on this page shows who they are by holder type.
This token is brand new. Run a deeper AI-powered analysis of the contract code — free and instant.
Get Detailed Audit Is this your token? Publish your own audit on this page
