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Is America is Back Safe?

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America is Back AIB
0xb3a0…30b6
Ethereum
Not verifiedThis record has not gone through deep verification and is not being monitored. The score is a dated snapshot — the token’s risk can change at any time.Own this token? Put it under verification →
Last checked today 1 audit on record
DexScreener ↗
How is this score calculated? → Medium Risk
Executive SummaryAI Copilot

The AIB token is an ERC-20 standard compliant token. Ownership of the contract has been renounced, meaning many privileged functions previously controlled by the owner are now dormant. However, a designated `_taxWallet` address retains significant control over transfer fees and liquidity management, posing a medium economic risk. A technical vulnerability related to the use of `tx.origin` in transfer logic was also identified.

3 Medium7 Informational
Volume 24h
$47.6K
Liquidity
$93.5K
Price
$0.0002697
Token Age
1y
Top 10 Holders
36.3%

Security Findings

3 Med7 Info
Medium

Reliance on tx.origin for Authorization or Rules

CD-01The contract's internal `_transfer` function uses `tx.origin` to determine certain rules or authorizations. `tx.origin` refers to the original external account that initiated a transaction, not necessarily the immediate caller. This can be problematic if a malicious contract tricks a user into interacting with it, and that contract then calls the token contract, potentially bypassing intended access controls or rules.
IssueThe contract's internal `_transfer` function uses `tx.origin` to determine certain rules or authorizations. `tx.origin` refers to the original external account that initiated a transaction, not necessarily the immediate caller. This can be problematic if a malicious contract tricks a user into interacting with it, and that contract then calls the token contract, potentially bypassing intended access controls or rules.
FixToken holders should be aware that the contract's internal transfer logic relies on `tx.origin`. While not always directly exploitable, this pattern is generally discouraged in smart contract development as it can be vulnerable to phishing or relay attacks where an attacker's contract acts as an intermediary.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Privileged Address Can Influence Transfer Processing

CP-05The `_taxWallet` address has the ability to call the `manualSwap()` function. This function can change an internal state (`inSwap`) that might affect how token transfers are processed, potentially influencing whether transfers or sales are allowed or refused under certain conditions. While the original owner could also disable transfer delays via `removeLimits()`, this is no longer possible due to renounced ownership.
IssueThe `_taxWallet` address has the ability to call the `manualSwap()` function. This function can change an internal state (`inSwap`) that might affect how token transfers are processed, potentially influencing whether transfers or sales are allowed or refused under certain conditions. While the original owner could also disable transfer delays via `removeLimits()`, this is no longer possible due to renounced ownership.
FixToken holders should be aware that the `_taxWallet` has the power to influence transfer processing through the `manualSwap()` function. This introduces a centralized point of control over a critical aspect of token functionality.
StatusUnresolved
Medium

Privileged Address Can Change Transfer Fees

CP-07The `_taxWallet` address can call the `reduceFee()` function to change the `_finalBuyTax` and `_finalSellTax` percentages applied to token transactions. This means the fees taken from buying and selling tokens can be modified by this single address. The original owner also had the ability to remove the general `_transferTax` via `removeTransferTax()`, but this is now dormant.
IssueThe `_taxWallet` address can call the `reduceFee()` function to change the `_finalBuyTax` and `_finalSellTax` percentages applied to token transactions. This means the fees taken from buying and selling tokens can be modified by this single address. The original owner also had the ability to remove the general `_transferTax` via `removeTransferTax()`, but this is now dormant.
FixToken holders should be aware that the `_taxWallet` has the ability to modify the buy and sell taxes applied to transactions. This introduces a centralized control point over the token's economic parameters.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Ability to Block Individual Holders is Dormant

CP-06Previously, the contract owner could add or remove specific addresses from a 'bot' list using the `addBots()` and `delBots()` functions. If an address was on this list, it could be prevented from moving or selling its tokens. However, since ownership has been renounced, no one can call these functions anymore, making this control dormant.
IssuePreviously, the contract owner could add or remove specific addresses from a 'bot' list using the `addBots()` and `delBots()` functions. If an address was on this list, it could be prevented from moving or selling its tokens. However, since ownership has been renounced, no one can call these functions anymore, making this control dormant.
FixThis control mechanism is no longer active because the contract's ownership has been permanently renounced. Therefore, there is no active risk of individual holders being blocked by a privileged address.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Ability to Change Transfer or Wallet Limits is Dormant

CP-08The contract owner previously had the ability to call `removeLimits()` to modify numeric limits such as the maximum transaction amount (`_maxTxAmount`) and the maximum wallet size (`_maxWalletSize`), and to disable `transferDelayEnabled`. However, since ownership has been renounced, no one can call this function anymore, making these controls dormant.
IssueThe contract owner previously had the ability to call `removeLimits()` to modify numeric limits such as the maximum transaction amount (`_maxTxAmount`) and the maximum wallet size (`_maxWalletSize`), and to disable `transferDelayEnabled`. However, since ownership has been renounced, no one can call this function anymore, making these controls dormant.
FixThis control mechanism is no longer active because the contract's ownership has been permanently renounced. Therefore, there is no active risk of transfer or wallet limits being changed by a privileged address.
StatusUnresolved
Info

Who holds the supply

QA-HOLDERSThe ten largest holders own 36.3% of supply. Of that, 17.4% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 8.5% in wallets, 10.4% in other contracts. 2,474 holders in total.
IssueThe ten largest holders own 36.3% of supply. Of that, 17.4% in DEX pools — not holders that can sell, so excluded from the concentration score. What remains: 8.5% in wallets, 10.4% in other contracts. 2,474 holders in total.
FixWatch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

Listed, but not independently verified

QA-IDENTITYListed on CoinGecko as America is Back (AIB), rank #4378. 2,474 holders.
IssueListed on CoinGecko as America is Back (AIB), rank #4378. 2,474 holders.
FixMatch the contract address against the project's official channels before trading.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

Liquidity burned — cannot be withdrawn

QA-LIQUIDITY100.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
Issue100.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% of the LP tokens were sent to a burn address — that liquidity can never be withdrawn by anyone. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them.
FixCheck the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

The market for this token

QA-MARKETLiquidity $94K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $44K (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $48K (DexScreener, all pools). CoinGecko's record for this coin: all-time high $0.00424 on 2026-05-11; the price is now 93.4392% below it.
IssueLiquidity $94K (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $44K (CoinGecko, all markets, daily snapshot). 24h trading volume $48K (DexScreener, all pools). CoinGecko's record for this coin: all-time high $0.00424 on 2026-05-11; the price is now 93.4392% below it.
FixSize any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
StatusAcknowledged
Info

Asset class: Meme token

QA-PROFILEA community token whose value comes from attention rather than a product. Being a meme is not a risk in itself: it is scored on exactly the same contract and market facts as any other token. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: CoinGecko category: Meme. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $94K of DEX liquidity across 2 pools. Launch: 629 days of market history.
IssueA community token whose value comes from attention rather than a product. Being a meme is not a risk in itself: it is scored on exactly the same contract and market facts as any other token. The class itself adds no points; the contract and market facts decide the score. Basis: CoinGecko category: Meme. Tokenomics — Supply: fixed — the contract has no mint function. Control: nobody (ownership renounced). Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $94K of DEX liquidity across 2 pools. Launch: 629 days of market history.
FixExpect attention-driven volatility; the facts in this report say whether the contract itself can be used against holders.
StatusAcknowledged

Category Ratings

TechnicalLow8/10

The contract implements standard ERC-20 functionality, ensuring basic token operations. A significant technical concern is the use of `tx.origin` in the `_transfer` function, which can be vulnerable to phishing or relay attacks (CD-01). While the owner's ability to add/remove bots (CP-06) and modify transfer/wallet limits (CP-08) is dormant due to renounced ownership, the `_taxWallet` retains active control over transfer switches via `manualSwap()` (CP-05).

GovernanceLow8/10

The economic model is influenced by the `_taxWallet` address, which can actively change buy and sell transfer fees using `reduceFee()` (CP-07) and manage liquidity through `manualSwap()` and `manualsend()`. While the original owner's ability to remove transfer taxes (CP-07) or limits (CP-08) is now dormant, the active controls held by the `_taxWallet` introduce a centralized point of economic influence (7.4 Economic, 7.3 Access Control).

UpgradesLow8/10

The contract is not designed as an upgradeable proxy, meaning its logic is immutable once deployed. Furthermore, ownership of the contract has been renounced, preventing any future administrative changes to the contract's core settings by a single entity (7.7 Upgrades, 7.3 Access Control).

Security Checklist

5/5 checks passed
Contract VerifiedPass
Ownership RenouncedPass
No Mint FunctionPass
Liquidity LockedPass
Not a ProxyPass
HoneypotNoneBuy Tax0.0%Sell Tax0.0%

Holder Composition

36.3% in top 10
8.5% in wallets10.4% in contracts
Effective Concentration12.7%

Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.

Liquidity Depth

$93.6K across 2 pairs
Uniswap v2WETHanalysed$93.5K99.9%Uniswap v4USDC$490.1%

The risk score reads depth across every pair. The volume figure and the volume-to-liquidity ratio elsewhere on this page describe only the pair this audit analysed, so the two are not directly comparable.

LP Distribution

LP Burned100.0% · ≈ permanent lock
LP Locked100.0% · Null Address

Key Addresses

1 addresses
Deployer
0xaf97…1bf5

What Raised This Score

3 factors
  • A privileged address controls a switch that decides whether transfers go through
  • Owner can change the buy/sell tax
  • Code: Reliance on tx.origin for Authorization or Rules (Medium, static analysis)

Each factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed

Related Audits

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