Early-stage security check — honeypot & rug-pull analysis
The protocol implements a standard ERC-20 token with minting capabilities.
Read the full analysisEach factor is an on-chain fact recorded at the time of this analysis. The score is computed from them by a deterministic function, so the same contract returns the same score for anyone who runs the audit. How scores are computed
Share held by contracts — treasury, vesting, bridge or staking — is discounted against share held by wallets when the score is computed: a contract cannot decide to sell the way an anonymous holder can, though it can still be drained or voted to sell. Effective concentration is the figure the risk score is actually calculated from.
Holder balances as recorded by the audit of Oct 22, 2026
The risk score reads depth across every pair.
The LP tokens of the analysed pool are not locked or burned, so whoever holds them can withdraw that liquidity.
0x5ae3…d2f20x44bf…6032No privileged address appears among these holders: the unlocked liquidity sits with independent providers, not with the deployer.
Presents itself as Aerodrome Finance (AERO), but the listed AERO contract on base is (CoinGecko). Holders who think they own the real asset own this contract instead; it has none of the real asset's backing, liquidity or redemption.
Do not buy, hold or accept this token as the asset it names. Verify any token address against the issuer's official site.
Acknowledged
The mint(address,uint256) function allows the designated minter to create an unlimited amount of new tokens. This action directly increases the total supply and dilutes the value of existing holdings.
Restrict the minting authority to a multi-signature wallet or a decentralized governance contract. Implement a maximum supply cap to prevent arbitrary inflation.
Unresolved
0.0% of the pool's LP is burned or time-locked. 100.0% is held, unlocked, by 2 address(es) other than the owner/deployer. One of them — a wallet, 0x5ae3…d2f2 — holds 90.3% and can remove that share at once; who controls it is not visible on-chain, so it is not treated as an independent provider. Some pools are concentrated-liquidity (V3/V4) positions; shares above are by position as GoPlus reports them. This assessment covers the main pool, which holds 40% of the token's DEX liquidity; the other pools were not assessed.
Check the lock's end date and beneficiary on the locker's own page before relying on it.
Acknowledged
The ten largest holders own 99.0% of supply. What remains: 0.2% in wallets, 98.7% in other contracts. 2,225 holders in total.
Watch the largest wallets that are not exchanges, pools or locks — those are the ones that can move the price.
Acknowledged
Liquidity $5.6M (DexScreener, all pools). 24h trading volume $3.7M (DexScreener, all pools).
Size any position to the liquidity and daily volume shown — they set how much you can sell and at what price.
Acknowledged
A token presenting itself under the name or ticker of an established asset without being that asset's contract. Its only reason to borrow that identity is to be mistaken for it. Scored as an imitation (see the identity finding). Basis: behaves as: project token. Tokenomics — Supply: mintable with no on-chain cap found. Control: an owner that could not be resolved. Code: not upgradeable (no proxy). Fees: no buy or sell tax. Market: $5.6M of DEX liquidity across 12 pools. Launch: under a day of market history.
Do not treat this token as the asset it names. Use only the official contract address published by that asset's issuer.
Acknowledged
The token's oldest DEX pool is less than a day old. Age is not part of the risk score — a new token is not a risky one by default — but a short history means fewer trades and holder changes behind the facts in this report.
Re-check ownership, liquidity and holder distribution as the token matures; those are the facts that move early.
Acknowledged
The protocol implements a standard ERC-20 token with minting capabilities. The architecture is straightforward and follows established patterns for token management. The primary risk involves the centralized control over the minting function, which allows for supply inflation.
The contract utilizes standard OpenZeppelin-like ERC-20 implementations, ensuring 7.1 Architecture and 7.2 Code Security standards are met. 7.3 Access Control is enforced via a minter role for the mint() function. 7.6 External interactions are minimal, reducing the attack surface for reentrancy or flash loan exploits.
7.4 Economic and 7.5 Governance risks are centered on the centralized minter role. The ability to mint tokens at will allows the minter to dilute existing holders, which is a significant economic concern. There are no automated governance mechanisms to limit this power.
7.7 Upgrades are not applicable as the contract is not a proxy. 7.8 Operations are limited to standard token transfers and minting. The lack of upgradeability ensures immutability of the current logic.
To mitigate the risk of supply dilution, consider implementing a multi-signature wallet or a time-locked governance contract to manage the minter role.
This ensures that any minting action requires consensus rather than a single point of failure. Additionally, consider adding a hard cap on the total supply to provide transparency and security to token holders regarding the maximum potential dilution.
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Score changes are recorded as dated snapshots — history is append-only and cannot be edited.
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